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ABSTRACT 
Towards a Political Economy of the Sacred: A Marxist Critique of the 
Sacred Dynamics of Society 
By 
Phillip Dexter 
This thesis puts forward the argument that the efficacy of ideas that have 
an impact on human subjects, causing them to act or behave in particular, 
noticeable ways, such as religion and ideology, is a product of the process 
of the necessary social labour involved in the production, circulation, 
exchange and consumption of symbolic property. Symbolic property is 
itself a product of the set-apart sacred, which is a basic, primary, socially 
constructed category that is strategically deployed in systems for the 
appropriation, expropriation, ownership, control and management of all 
property, whether material or symbolic. Socially effective ideas are 
expressed symbolically, whether they are signs of material, or real 
objects, or of imaginary things. It is further argued that to better 
comprehend these systems for managing the symbolic property, a critique 
of the political economy of the set-apart sacred must be developed. 
In developing this argument a literature review was conducted, primarily 
of structuralist and Marxist social theory, but also of key texts in the 
study of religion, political economy and of social theory more generally 
general. In the course of this review arguments to defend this hypothesis 
are developed and the critique of these arguments and the theory behind 
them also developed. Ideology, the fetish and money, three crucial 
categories of the set-apart sacred, are considered in terms of their 
function within the political economy of the sacred. 
Conclusions reached include the argument that religion as a category 
needs to be set aside and the set-apart sacred utilized as a pivotal concept 
in the study of religion, politics and the economy. Historical materialism, 
it is also concluded, has many flaws and weaknesses; including idealism, 
economism and a productivist bias, that make it essential to re-think and 
to re-materialise the methodology. 
The product of this work is a unique conversation between two schools of 
though often thought to stand in opposition to one another, namely, 
Durkheimian social theory and Marxist historical materialism. In the 
course of this argument, a materialist definition and theory of the set-
apart sacred is developed and a re-materialised historical materialist 
methodology is also proposed. These two theoretical premises are utilised 
to consider how systems for managing the set-apart sacred function.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In contemporary society there are ideas that people hold to be a true reflection 
or representation of the world they inhabit. Religion, ideology, economics, magic and 
science, to name some of the most obvious instances, are articulated in discourses and 
appear to move people to act in particular ways. These can be considered as features of 
the power of language and the beliefs expressed through it.  
Belief in supernatural agents, transcendence of death and perceived wisdom 
about deities are aspects of human existence that are, intuitively, universal. In every 
community, in every collective, indeed in any society, there are ideas that operate as a 
more or less dominant version of the world of its inhabitants and that commonly 
include some religious element. There are aspects of such ideas that consequently 
determine the actions of people and in turn, the effect of these actions on the world, 
including on other people. Of all these themes on the power of language, religion is 
one that seems to be prevalent, persistent and resilient. There is also a space claimed 
for religious beliefs that is argued to be beyond reason. Religion invokes passion, 
emotion and dogmatism. It is a unique and powerful phenomenon. Yet, it is a 
contested category. There is even a radical view held by some that claims religion to 
be an invented category, that is, that there is no such thing as religion sui generis 
(Dubuisson 2003; Fitzgerald 2000). In spite of this debate about its status, religion also 
serves as a recognizable and effective linking concept. Pivotally situated between the 
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economic, the political and the social in human collectives and cutting across many 
academic disciplines, religion is perceived as a significant phenomenon that is seen to 
give meaning to and allows for a variety of interpretations of the world. This 
dissertation is an attempt to consider this phenomenon of why it is that some ideas, in 
particular religious ones, appear to be more effective with regard to their impact on 
human subjects, their organisations and their institutions.  
The argument put forward is that the efficacy of such ideas that have an impact 
on human subjects, causing them to act or behave in particular, noticeable ways, is a 
product of the process of the necessary social labour involved in the production, 
circulation, exchange and consumption of symbolic property, that is, of the set-apart 
sacred. The set-apart sacred is argued to be a basic, primary, socially constructed 
category, created by the processes of identification, differentiation, definition and 
categorisation that are a function of human biology, psychology and sociology. The 
set-apart sacred, it is further argued, is strategically deployed in discourses and 
systems—whether economic, social and political—within which the appropriation, 
expropriation, ownership, control and management of all property, material and 
symbolic—are effected. The set-apart sacred, differentiated from the sacred as defined 
by theorists such as Otto and Eliade, who expressed the idea that the sacred was a 
supernatural or holy category, apprehended by humans because of their desire to 
experience this power or some perceived capability of humans alone, is a category 
grounded in the material processes of human activity. 
One of the criticisms of the sacred and by extension the set-apart sacred is that 
it is so broad as to have very little meaning. The argument put forward in this thesis is 
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that the ubiquitous character of the set-apart sacred is its very power as an analytical 
concept. It functions in much the same way as that of grammar does in the study of 
language. The set-apart sacred is an organizing principle that is contiguous with 
human social existence. Socially effective ideas are expressed symbolically, whether 
they are signs of material, or real objects, or of imaginary things. It is argued here that 
to better comprehend these systems for managing the set-apart sacred, a critique of the 
political economy of the set-apart sacred must be developed. In that regard, the 
category of the set-apart sacred is a general and generalised concept, by its nature. The 
set-apart sacred is manifested in many different mediums and at every level of social 
existence. Particular instances of the set-apart sacred can and will be identified and 
explored below, but it is argued for as a general category. 
Political economy classically is the study of the production, exchange and 
consumption of commercial goods and services and the relationship of these processes 
to the conventions of, and the political and the legal relationships of society. Because 
the set-apart sacred is both a sign and a commodity, it has power in the physical, the 
symbolic and the imaginary spheres of our social existence. Because the set-apart 
sacred is produced, circulated, exchanged and consumed, ―the means, modes and 
forces‖ in the production, exchange and consumption, that is, the necessary social 
labour involved in these processes, the value created either through the force of effect 
of the social power of an elite or as agreed to by social compact, the transformation of 
the scarcity or lack of signs into a surplus of signification and the struggles over the 
ownership and control of the sacred, can be mapped and interpreted, just as the 
political economy of commercial goods and services can be (Chidester 2005: 19). 
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The conceptual category of the set-apart sacred is proposed as a useful entry 
point to the study of what is described as religion, as it is argued that most if not all 
activity described as religious is actually an expression of the set-apart sacred. The set-
apart sacred, it is further argued, is a conceptual category that is created by the most 
primordial and archaic form of classification, that of binary opposites. This form of 
classification, is further argued, arises from human biology, that is human physical 
embodiment, human psychology and human sociology The set-apart sacred is 
identified through the basic categorization of things by humans in their physical, 
cognitive and social ordering of the world. In the course of this process, binary 
categories of sacred/profane are created and upon these, it is argued, arise all other 
forms of categorization, including the basis of language. 
Ideology, the fetish and money are three categories that are related to yet do 
not always feature prominently in academic discourse on religion and the set-apart 
sacred. These categories, in the case of ideology and the fetish often said to be 
artificial, are crucial to understanding the nature of the set-apart sacred and through 
this, religion. As with religion, definitions and theories of ideology and the fetish are 
much disputed and contested. Surprisingly, the same applies to money, a commodity 
form most people would think had little ambiguity about it. These three categories can 
be better understood if approached from the vantage point of their history as 
conceptual categories and with regard to their relationship to the set-apart sacred. 
These categories are not the only possible ones that could be considered. Objects and 
commodities more generally can also usefully clarify the concept of the set-apart 
sacred.  But these particular categories, because of the perceived role of ideology in 
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society, because of the ambiguous nature of the fetish and because of the abundance 
and power of money, are particularly useful for the argument put forward in this 
attempt at clarifying the set-apart sacred. 
Religion, as a conceptual category, seemingly pervasive or even universal, 
poses significant problems. Apart from the challenge of constructing a definition of 
religion, the question as to why people have religious beliefs and what it is about the 
claimed religious sphere of humankind‘s existence that makes people believe, is one 
that occupies the attention of scholars, clerics and lay-people alike. Religion as a 
conceptual category has been thoroughly critiqued, but it is argued here that despite 
the problems with the category it has value as a kind of a prism through which to look 
at society from a useful, strategic perspective. This approach allows for the 
consideration of the set-apart sacred as symbolic property. 
There are too many issues with regard to definitions and theories of religion to 
make such an endeavour a simple one. It is argued here that in seeking to clarify the 
nature and the functioning of the set-apart sacred and of symbolic property, the term 
religion must be set aside. Going beyond the term ―religion‖ is necessary if a clearer 
understanding of the phenomenon itself is to be developed. In the course of that 
endeavour, clearer understandings of the nature of the economy and the political 
sphere of society are also made possible by focusing on the sacred dynamics of 
society, economy and politics. The reasons for the interrelationship of these spheres of 
social activity must be considered. 
It is argued that what is termed religion is actually one of the ways in which 
the set-apart sacred is experienced by human beings. The set-apart sacred is a basic 
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category around which human society is organized. The set-apart sacred is what 
pervades society, setting terms and conditions for all language, all symbolic property, 
and for their manifestations in society. It is therefore proposed that a critique of the 
set-apart sacred is a more effective entry point for trying to understand ideology, the 
fetish and money and through these to understand the nature of religion, as well as the 
nature of politics and the economy.  
These three modes of the set-apart sacred — ideology, the fetish and money — 
loosely correspond to the political, the social and the economic spheres. I will argue 
that these three modes can be understood as systems for managing the set-apart sacred. 
These systems operate at the transcendental or the imaginary and at the symbolic and 
the material levels. The relationship between these three categories is essentially based 
in their common set-apart sacred nature. Importantly, both the imaginary and the 
material are symbolic categories. Ideology demonstrates the nature of set-apart sacred 
discourse. The fetish itself is a category that materializes the symbolic and lays bare 
the social nature of the set-apart sacred. Money, the ultimate fetish, materializes the 
set-apart sacred and the profane in one unique category. The bridge between these 
categories as material objects and their existence as imaginary objects is their 
symbolic nature. 
The limitations of this thesis are such that the set-apart sacred, a category that 
cuts across all aspects of society, cannot possibly be considered in all its 
manifestations. The set-apart sacred pervades everything humans do and think —
walking, talking, eating, sleeping, dreaming, drinking, loving, playing and working —
to mention but most obvious. This thesis is therefore limited in its focus onto three 
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things: the set-apart sacred as a category, a materialist theory of the set-apart sacred 
and the expression of the set-apart sacred in a general system of political economy.  
Obviously, there are issues of deep theory and complexity involved in such an 
exercise. At one level there is the issue of language and how it is constructed and 
utilized by human beings. At another level there is the issue of the human subject and 
the relationship between the subject and the object, whether as the world, things in the 
world and importantly other human subjects. The relationship between the symbolic 
and the imaginary on the one hand and the material on the other is no less complex, as 
is the issue of the relationship between thought and action. It is not possible to offer 
solutions to all these problems in a thesis such as this, but these issues will be 
confronted and choices are made in terms of adopting positions on them. 
The academic study of religion is a highly contested field of enquiry, as are 
politics, Marxism, political economy and even the economy in the bourgeois sense. 
This thesis cannot hope to consider all of these debates, let alone contribute to 
resolving them. But it can and hopefully does offer some arguments for overcoming 
some of the challenges these fields of enquiry face. Where positions are adopted in 
relation to debates, these are clearly identified and hopefully, convincingly argued for. 
This contribution also makes certain economical choices with respect to other 
concepts that are significantly related to the set-apart sacred, such as myth and ritual. 
These are obviously important concepts as they go to the heart of the nature of the set-
apart sacred. Given the scope of this thesis it is impossible to exhaust all of these 
issues, but they are engaged within the focus of this thesis on the political economy of 
the sacred. 
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The thesis therefore does not seek to consider Marxism as religion (Cavanaugh 
2009: 110-113), capitalism as religion (Benjamin 1996), or the religion of the market 
(Foltz 2007; Loy 1997), although these are interesting and related questions. It also 
does not consider religion as an economy or as a market. The literature on these 
perspectives is considerable and some of it is drawn upon for referential purposes. 
Where it does make an attempt at a more general contribution is in broadening the 
field of political economy from being just about the study of the production, exchange 
and consumption of commercial goods and services to include property in its broadest 
sense, that is, symbolic, material and intellectual. The focus of this thesis is on 
elucidating the set-apart sacred as a conceptual category and on re-materialising 
historical materialism as a methodology. This elucidation is hopefully one that will be 
useful for the academy, but also for social activists engaged in projects and processes 
to attempt to transform society. Given the archaic nature of the set-apart sacred, its 
persistence, its resilience and its pervasiveness, the question arises as to what limits, if 
any, does the set apart sacred place on the prospects for the social, political and 
economic transformation of society. This will also be considered. 
 
Chapter outline and summary 
 
Chapter 2 examines the set-apart sacred as an alternative category for 
understanding what is most commonly described as religion. The pervasiveness, 
persistence and resilience of religion are considered, as well as the character, 
weaknesses and failures of religion as a social phenomenon and as conceptual 
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category. In this effort, an attempt is made to briefly summarise and evaluate the many 
different types of definitions and theories of religion. In the course of this effort, a 
critique of the conceptual category of religion is developed. The set-apart sacred is put 
forward as an alternative conceptual category that explains why certain ideas, things, 
places, practices, behaviours and people are privileged, that is, are set-apart. In the 
course of this process it is revealed that as things are set-apart, primarily through the 
social activity of ritual, they are designated as sacred. 
The set-apart sacred is experienced and articulated through various rituals, 
symbols, signs, times, practices, places and relationships that are themselves set-apart. 
The set-apart sacred is defined and its creation from the biological fragility, the 
psychological insecurity and the incompleteness and hierarchical nature of society is 
explained. In this regard, the significance of human embodiment, of the human 
imagination and of the constraints of the biological, psychological and social nature of 
human existence is explored. A theory of the production, circulation, exchange and 
consumption of the set-apart sacred is developed. The role of necessary social labour 
is identified, that is, collective ritual activity that unites a group of people by defining 
them (and in so doing those who are not them) in relation to that which is set-apart by 
social agreement, consensus or compact.  
It is concluded that all religious, political and economic ideas, practices, 
behaviours and objects are actually systems, or parts of systems, for managing the set-
apart sacred. It is therefore the set-apart sacred that is pervasive, resilient and 
persistent. The set-apart sacred is found not only in what is conventionally designated 
as religion, but also in the economy, in politics and in the broader social aspects of 
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human existence. The set-apart sacred is a primary category, similar in many respects 
to language, the development of which is contiguous with the sacred as a category. 
The relationship between the material, the symbolic and the imaginary is also 
considered and the role of the symbolic as the mediating sphere between the imaginary 
and the real is explored. 
In Chapter 3 Marxism and its relationship with the set-apart sacred is 
considered. Historical materialism exemplifies the methodology for enquiring into 
political economy. Yet, despite the Marxist critique of political economy, the 
historical materialist critique of capitalism has not resulted in the kinds of 
transformation of society that it claimed it would bring about or that were regarded as 
inevitable. The weaknesses of historical materialism as a methodology for studying 
political economy are considered and the set-apart sacred is proposed as a category 
that assists to re-materialise historical materialism and make it a more powerful 
methodology. The emphasis or bias in historical materialism on production, its 
economistic character and the idealism of the theory, as well as other criticisms such 
as its arguable determinism, structuralism, reductionism, universalism, essentialism, 
its teleological nature and its historicism are all considered.  
There is even a criticism of Marxism as being ahistorical and this is given 
attention as well, along with the issue of the human subject and its relationship to the 
world. The significance of the circulation, exchange and consumption of all objects, 
including commodities and signs, is promoted as an alternative general political 
economy. The set-apart sacred as a category is located within this revised, re-
materialised historical materialism as a structural aspect of social existence that is 
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primordial and therefore prior to the economic organization of society. Key to this re-
materialised historical materialism are a re-materialised philosophical critique of how 
ideas have a material effect in the world, a re-materialised labour theory of value, 
focusing on necessary social labour as the determinant of value, the argument that the 
development of capitalism and even its current globalised form as predicated on 
exchange as a primary category rather than production and a conception of socialism 
that recognizes the complexity of creating an alternative to capitalism, particularly the 
need to re-socialise society itself. The question of the de-sacralisation of the set-apart 
sacred is also considered, with consideration to practices of the ritual destruction of 
property and of symbols. The attempt at constructing a critique that re-materialises 
historical materialism is significant in that it presents the possibility of sharpening the 
analysis of capitalism that socialists have made historically and of providing an 
understanding of the capitalist system that moves away from simply making a value-
laden claim about its non-desirability.  This could enable a new basis for challenging 
the capitalist system and of projecting a vision for its transformation. This is not the 
focus of the thesis presented here, but its mere possibility is one that is potentially very 
exciting for socialists. One of the constant criticisms of the historical materialist 
methodology and its outputs is that it has failed to present an all-encompassing 
critique of capitalism that also suggests material solutions to the contradictions of the 
system, resulting often in idealist and dysfunctional alternatives to capitalism itself. 
The set-apart sacred as exists in forms that are exchangeable and consumable, 
so it is a proto-commodity form, like money. Anything can be sacred in the set-apart 
sense, so it is a special type of commodity form that exists in abundance and its value 
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is not necessarily affected by this surplus. In fact, where the set-apart sacred starts and 
ends is not clear because there is a relationship between the set-apart sacred and all 
aspects of society, including the economic and the political. Central to this issue is the 
question of authenticity or the relationship between those things recognized as 
authentic and those regarded as fakes or forgeries. This issue arises in relation to all 
objects and particularly all commodities, where the issue of the relationship between 
what is regarded as artificial and what is regarded as real or genuine is considered. 
In Chapter 4 the sacred dynamics of society are considered through looking at 
ideology, the fetish and money as examples of the civic, the transcendental and the 
material expressions of the set-apart sacred. The examples of ideology, the fetish and 
money are investigated as concrete expressions of the set-apart sacred.The modes and 
forces in the production, exchange and consumption of the set-apart sacred, the 
socially necessary labour in this cycle, the value created, the transformation of the 
scarcity of symbolic property into surplus and the struggles over the ownership and 
control of the set-apart sacred can be mapped and interpreted in these categories, just 
like the political economy that considers the production, circulation, exchange and 
consumption of material, commercial goods and services.  
While ideology and money can be understood as systems for managing the set-
apart sacred, the fetish is identified as a key symbolic and material category for 
managing the set-apart sacred by manifesting value materially in society. The fetish 
does this as it gives unique expression to the social relations that underpin the set-apart 
sacred. The abundance of money and the relationship between this abundance and the 
surplus of signification is described. Money, as the ultimate ideology, a God and as the 
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ubiquitous expression of social relations, that is, as the most abundant fetish, is also 
analysed. 
In Chapter 5 a summary of the key arguments made in the previous chapters is 
given and conclusions based on these arguments are drawn. The limitations and 
possibilities for social, political and economic change are considered in the light of the 
set-apart sacred and its persistence, resilience and pervasiveness. The set-apart sacred 
as a means for clarifying historical materialism as a methodology to describe, interpret 
and explain contemporary society gives a clearer picture on the possibilities and the 
limits to social transformation. These, it is argued, are limited if the approach to 
transformation is limited to considerations that are purely economistic and do not 
analyse the political economy of the sacred. The need for a materialist philosophy, a 
truly radical economic theory based on the recognition of the social nature of value 
creation, and for a socialist perspective that recognizes the enormous task of 
transformation, with its potential constraints as well as the opportunities it brings in to 
being, are considered. 
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Chapter 2: Religion and the Sacred 
 
The origins of religion as a conceptual category 
 
The term religion, from the Latin religio, is said to have two possible origins. 
The one is in the Latin ‗to repeat‘, relegere and the other is in the Latin ‗to bind‘, 
religare (Smith 1982: 38, 141). These etymological origins might have something to 
offer by way of an explanation of the meaning of the term and even its use today. The 
term religion in contemporary society is used to describe beliefs and practices that 
relate to the worship of god(s), the commitment to a canon or set of beliefs and usually 
includes a set of values that determine lifestyle and behaviour. The concept is not 
without controversy however. The definition given above is one that would be 
disputed, since there are many religions that would not fit even that broad description, 
just as there are many things not usually considered to be religions that would. 
It has been convincingly argued that religion, sui generis, is a recent 
conceptual category, with its origins in the rise of Christianity and the period of the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment (Dubuisson 2003, Asad 1973, 2003, McCutcheon, 
1977). Prior to that period, a form of Christianity, along with the remains of previous 
folk and other supernatural traditions that were also appropriated by 
Christianity,would have been the total worldview of any Western European, to the 
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extent that any other religion would have been regarded as not qualifying for the title. 
Daniel Dubuisson has said of religion that "what the West and the history of religions 
in its wake have objectified under the name 'religion' is ... something quite unique, 
which could be appropriate only to itself and its own history‖ (Dubuisson 2003: 90). 
The meaning of religion, translated into the language of a particular religion as an all-
encompassing worldview, might better be understood as ‗the law‘ (Biller 1985; Bossy 
1982). Significantly, this rise of the category of religion, or its invention, is also 
closely related with the development of mercantile and later industrial, globalizing 
capitalism.It needs to be pointed out here that this critique of religion is arguably 
focused on contemporary ―Western‖ societies and their religions. Although there are 
other definitions that see ritual, objects and other practices and actions as also being 
religious, for instance in ―African‖ or ―Eastern‖ religions, the view taken is that a 
similar critique of these would apply, as these religions or rathersystems for 
strategically manipulating the set-apart sacred, may arise in different cultural milieus, 
but the basic material processes that make this phenomenon possible, do not vary 
across societies. They also do not vary between various systems of belief, whether 
religious as in the ―Western‖ and Abrahamic religions, or in ―Eastern‖ or ―African‖ 
systems of belief that are considered to be about natural laws, as will be argued below. 
 
The apparent pervasiveness, persistence and resilience of religion 
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Despite the questionable status of religion as a category, it seems to be 
everywhere. Religion can be found on television, on the radio, in printed books, 
newspapers and periodicals. There is not a day that goes by without some article or 
reference in one of these mediums citing religion as an issue. Debates over the nature 
of religion, statements by religious leaders and debates between religious leaders are 
all given wide press coverage and airtime. If religion is such a questionable category, 
the question arises, why do so many people have religious beliefs and what is it about 
the claimed religious sphere of humanity‘s existence that makes people believe in it?  
This question has dogged clerics, academics and laypersons alike, seemingly 
for as long as recorded history. The archives of most societies usually include some 
discussion of the existence and worship of god(s) or superior beings in some form or 
another, or of beliefs and practices that allow people to engage with these beings in a 
particular manner. The Ancient Greeks, the Egyptians and the Ethiopians are all 
mentioned in relation to religious practices by one of the oldest Greek historians 
(Herodotus 1954: 125, 127 and 157). Ancient Greek literature in general, as well as 
Roman literature, hieroglyphics on Egyptian pyramids and ancient art dating back to 
the earliest human communities show some or other relationship with deities.  
It is clear from anthropological accounts that societies of virtually all kinds 
refer to beliefs and practices relating to gods and the supernatural. This activity is 
referred to as being about religion by the observers of these practices (Tylor 1920; 
Frazer 1926; van der Leeuw 1938; Malinowski 1948; Evans-Pritchard 1965).  There 
are many different types of religious belief, just as there are various and competing 
definitions and theories of religion. The academic study of religion has tended to 
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differentiate between magic, religion and science and within that broad categorisation 
has described different types of perceived religious practices such as fetishism, 
animism, totemism, magic, myth, and religion ―proper‖ (read monotheism), 
differentiating between these and placing them in a controversial hierarchy of 
development and sophistication (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 1-26). The fact that behaviour 
relating to the belief and worship in god(s) has been identifiable over such a long 
period of human history certainly qualifies it as persistent. 
One of the features of contemporary society is that despite the predictions that 
science and secularism would increasingly explain the world and erode religious belief 
and thinking, it seems as if various religions are as strong or influential as ever and 
that religious belief in one form or another may even be on the increase (Asad 2003: 1; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 295). Late capitalist societies, developing countries and 
even former socialist countries have all seen a revival in evangelical religions and the 
resurgence of orthodox faiths (Norris and Inglehart 2005: 108, 131). The research by 
Norris and Inglehart points to a significant relationship between economic and social 
development and religion, recording a decline in the regular attendance at religious 
ceremonies as development takes place, but with no evidence of a simultaneous 
decline in religious belief.  Whether religion is a declining phenomenon or not, its 
perceived waning is certainly not dramatic enough to support the claim that its demise 
is imminent. In this sense it can certainly be said to be resilient. 
There is arguably even an increase in religious practices that are considered on 
the outer fringes of mainstream religion, such as paganism, occult practices and 
features of religious behaviour in relation to the economy. Echoing the so-called cargo 
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cults of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jean and John Comaroff describe the 
rise of lotteries, gambling, prosperity religions and religions as enterprises that seem to 
coincide with late capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000: 293-312). Daniel Kalder 
has also described the new religious movements and the revival of old religious beliefs 
to be found in the former Soviet Union, once an avowedly atheistic society, where 
new messiahs now claim authenticity and Russian Orthodox priests practice exorcisms 
(Kalder 2006). 
The academic study of religion has been going on for some considerable time. 
As has been pointed out above, recorded discussions of comparative religion as a 
method of studying the phenomenon include the writings of Herodotus as far back as 
the fifth century BCE (Herodotus 1954). Herodotus‘ efforts at describing the religious 
beliefs of the ancient Egyptians and Persians as observed on his travels in the 
Mediterranean region to his fellow Greek citizens, are cited as evidence for the claim 
that he was the first anthropologist (Chidester 2008: 1).  
The study of religion is clearly closely associated with the study of humankind 
in general and particularly with anthropology.  The separation of Christian theology 
and religion as a distinct object of enquiry appears to have been a product of the 
European Enlightenment (Asad 1973: 28). This separation arguably allowed for the 
application of the social sciences in its various disciplines to the field of enquiry of 
religion in general and for the development of a relationship between the academic 
study of religion and the disciplines of philosophy, naturalism and sociology, but most 
significantly anthropology, with these disciplines often overlapping. 
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Early scholars of religion, ethnographers and anthropologists have at various 
times either concluded that religion is universal, or alternatively that it is unique to 
certain people, usually Christians, monotheists or ―civilized‖ people, and have even 
come to the conclusion that some people have no religion at all. James Frazer recorded 
that all people had some religious belief, no matter how rudimentary (Frazer 1926: 
48). On the other hand, Christopher Columbus, for example, claimed to have met 
people in the Americas who were not even idolaters (Chidester 1996: 11).  In other 
words, he was claiming that they had no religion at all, not even a ―primitive‖ one. 
Naturally, these claims about the presence or absence of religion had a lot to do with 
claims over property, land and empire. Anyone who had no religion was basically not 
human and therefore accorded no such rights. Such people were defined as savages 
and treated accordingly. Common sense, however, tells us that most people, except 
those who are agnostic or atheist, believe in some or other power, being or spirit that, 
according to this belief, is able to determine the course of the events of history and 
affect the lives of believers and non-believers alike. In that sense, what is commonly 
referred to as religion, is pervasive. 
If religion is as pervasive, persistent and resilient as it appears to be, the 
question must surely be, why? There is no proof for the claims of any religion in the 
scientific sense. There are so many different types of religious belief and it is clear that 
so many of them are so vastly different from one another, to think of any one of them 
as being correct, right or true seems impossible, at least intuitively. This raises the 
issue of faith, which many would claim to be the basis of their particular religious 
belief. Faith may be an issue for theologians to contemplate, but for a scientific, 
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academic study of the phenomenon of religion, faith will not do, not least of all 
because those claiming faith have been socialized into a particular religious 
community.  
Science is very effective as a system for explaining so many aspects of the 
world and human existence. Despite this, religion and religious belief persist alongside 
science and within secular societies. There are many creationists, as well as 
considerable believers in polytheistic religions, as well as forms of religious beliefs 
such as the worshipping of animals and plants, believers in magic and witchcraft, 
making science and secularism the exceptions rather than the rule. Richard Dawkins 
has presented survey evidence that shows that only 48% of Britain‘s and 36% of 
Americans believe in evolution (Dawkins 2009: 429, 431). This type of statistic surely 
also warrants consideration, for how such beliefs as creationism can be sustained 
against all the scientific evidence available today, is an interesting social phenomenon 
in and of itself. 
Whatever the truth of the claims about the motives of the founding fathers of 
the academic study of religion, there was clearly more than enough material generated 
by ethnographers, anthropologists, naturalists and others to turn the study of religion 
into an important field of enquiry. Consideration of the descriptions, definitions and 
theories of these scholars must therefore be the starting point if the pervasive, the 
persistent and the resilient character of religion is to be understood. Before that is 
entertained, the dubious track record of religion needs some further consideration. 
 
The challenges of religious belief and behaviour 
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The phenomenon of religion poses a number of challenges to scholars as well 
as to individuals who have an interest in religion, either as believers or non-believers. 
Most religions or systems of belief in some supernatural entity or realm try to provide 
an explanation for certain aspects of human existence in the material world that we 
inhabit and how to navigate these. They also usually try to provide a guide to exit this 
world as painlessly as possible, or, once a person has died, to find their way to a better 
place where the human condition, described by Régis Debray as the insecurity, 
fragility and mortality of humankind, is usually believed be overcome (Debray 1981: 
276). Religious beliefs also usually purport to provide a value system that seeks to 
help humans to aspire to being a better person, or for a collective, to be a better 
community.  
However, despite these obvious and commonly described positive or benign 
features of various religions and the arguably noble objectives that appear to underlie 
the phenomenon, religion, both in the particular and the general form, has always been 
a matter of contestation and debate. Recently, there has been a resurgence of 
sectarianism and fundamentalism among believers and also a more activist and 
outspoken atheism and agnosticism, as evidenced by the increasing number of popular 
books arguing for or against the existence of God and/or holding religion to account 
for many of the world‘s ills (Dawkins 2006; Hitchens 2007; Stenger 2008).  The 
critics of these scientists have strenuously argued for everything from creationism, 
taking the Bible literally, to so-called intelligent design, finding evidence for the deity 
in the beauty and splendour of the universe (Schloss and Murray 2009). 
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Religion has been and is still the source of peace and solace for many 
individuals, but has been and is still also the basis of war and turmoil for many 
communities. We need only consider the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the 
Christian/Islamic fundamentalist struggle as played out in contemporary society in the 
so-called ‗war on terror‘ or the ‗jihad‘, or the Hindu fundamentalist project versus all 
other religions in India and the related communal violence, to name but a few 
examples, to realise that little has changed since the time of the Crusades, the 
Reformation or the anti-Semitic pogroms of the last few hundred years. If one 
considers the Bible, the Qur‘an, the Torah, or the Bhagavad-Gita, to name but a few of 
the more significant foundational documents of the major religions of the world, these 
are steeped in blood, gore, sacrifice and murder and are generally very violent 
accounts of the formation of these religions and the communities around them. 
In spite of the claims of all religions for the existence of deities, mythic events 
and supernatural miracles, not one of them has produced any concrete, material, 
observable evidence of a deity, a myth that cannot be contested, a verified miracle or 
anything else that can be scientifically verified. The claims made by adherents of 
particular faiths, are usually nothing but that, with little other than their own texts and 
oral records of purported events to back up these claims. These faiths only speak to 
and for those who are born to them or who convert to them. Many of the sacred spaces 
and places of the major faiths seem to have multiple claims upon them, undermining 
the narratives that are claimed with these. Periodically we read in the newspapers or 
see on television some or other spectacle related to religion, from mass-murder 
suicides in the case of the Peoples Temple led by Jim Jones (Chidester 1988), to stand 
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offs and gun fights in the case of the Branch Davidian compound headed by David 
Koresh (Newport 2006), to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodyha (Friedland 
and Hecht 1998).  In some countries women are put to death in the name of religion, 
for simply not following the instructions of the men in their lives obediently. Society 
recoils in the face of all of this brutality, but ultimately it is passed off as being about 
religion and therefore beyond the realm of the interference of those not within the 
religion in question, that is, beyond civil comprehension, let alone sanction. 
While many religions promise a better place for their followers in the hereafter, 
most offer little other than psychological comfort and relief for their disciples in the 
here and now. It is arguable that many, if not all, religions make audacious claims and 
promises and rarely deliver anything practical to their followers. The response is 
always of course that they are not meant to. Religions, it is claimed, deal with another 
realm, the spiritual world or the holy, sacred or divine aspect of our existence. Even on 
this score, religions fail to live up to their promises, since there have been no 
confirmed reports of life in the hereafter, only claims by the living. Yet, religion 
prevails, it persists and it resists, leaving any doubter without a choice but of having to 
account for the phenomenon, whether one believes, has faith or is religious or not. 
There are also so many religions that differ in so many ways that we are left 
wondering whether what people are talking about when they use the word religion is 
actually one and the same thing.  This seemingly unending surplus of religious activity 
that pervades our world warrants attention, if nothing else. But this phenomenon of 
surplus should not blind scholars to the problems with the concept, for in reality we 
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have very little to go on when it comes to religion other than the word of the adherents 
of a particular religion. 
 
Definitions and theories of religion: The problem of religion as a 
conceptual category 
 
When people say they are religious and that they believe in some idea of a 
superior being or beings, a particular way of life as instructed by a religious credo, the 
place of humans in all of these beliefs, or that what they believe in answers to the 
vacuum that would exist without this conceptual category, we are called to ask the 
question, what is it that makes people believe or act the way they do? Similarly, when 
people are engaged in ritual or worship of a deities or even when they are involved in 
acts of meditation and contemplation, the same question arises. 
Apart from its pervasive, persistent and resilient character, intuitively, all 
religions seem to have similarities that allow us to classify them as one type of thing. 
Most religions have texts that set out the religious beliefs and the important rituals that 
its adherents must follow. The Torah, the Bible and the Qur‘an have verses and 
prayers that should be read by the members of these religious communities, for 
instance. There are usually days set aside for religious adherents to perform important 
rituals - Sundays for Christians, the Holi and other festivals for Hindus – to mention 
but two examples. Although Muslims are supposed to pray five times per day, Fridays 
are generally regarded as a day when all try to attend the mosque. Jews keep the 
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Sabbath on Saturday and most Christians on Sunday. Many religions have strict rules 
for the diets of their adherents.  
In spite of these apparent common features and these superficial similarities, 
there is no taxonomic list that if it is satisfied, qualifies some belief system for being a 
religion. Sometimes it seems that these ways of doing things are done to make the 
differences between religions clear to the followers. Christians, who all allegedly 
follow a Jewish person that is regarded as the founder of their religion, it is claimed, 
were told to make Sunday the Sabbath, to break the dietary laws of Judaism and not to 
circumcise themselves to ensure that it was clear that they were no longer Jews 
(Wilson 2009: 173-175). Clearly, issues of classification, whether by focusing on 
differences or on similarities, are key to definitions of religion. But whether these 
chosen categories are real or manufactured, or whether they exist because of various 
biological, psychological or social predispositions of human subjects is a crucial issue. 
It is one thing to classify species of minerals, plants or animals by assigning objects to 
these categories. It is another thing to seek to create similar categories for social 
phenomena, not least of all because these are undoubtedly the product of the human 
subject, in its corporeal form, its social relationships and even its own imagination.  
As has been stated already, religious studies, travel, exploration, ethnography, 
colonial and imperial expansion and trade seem to have gone hand in hand. This is so 
much so that it is clear that comparative religion as an academic discipline was given 
its impetus and status by the increasing mobility of people largely brought about 
through the economic and technological developments that made this possible, as well 
as through the colonial and imperial conquests that precipitated the expansion of the 
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global market (Chidester 1996: 1). At various points in history, notably during the 
European colonial encounter with ―savages‖ in newly ―discovered‖ lands, the invaders 
came to the conclusion that the people they encountered had no religion. Instead, their 
beliefs were dismissed as superstition, fetishism, animism, totemism, magic, myth and 
witchcraft. Explicitly, the comparative exercise that classifies some belief systems as 
religious and others as not, aside from its pejorative aspect, is one that defines religion 
in a particular Eurocentric and even Christian-biased manner (Chidester 1996: 16; 
Asad 2003: 35).  
For such a dismissal of the beliefs of others to be effected, some working 
definitions of religion had to be in operation. Yet if we are asked to provide a 
definition of religion, there is no end to the variations that can be found in this regard. 
Even if a definition can be arrived at that all agree on, the problem still remains as to 
whether this phenomenon can be studied in the scientific sense. There are those that 
argue that religion is a manufactured concept, in other words, it is a concept that does 
not relate to any real thing in the world (McCutcheon 1997: 19). As such, it can hardly 
be studied then. Like most social phenomena, attempts to explain the origins and 
functioning of religion have presented arguments ranging from the most simple and 
obvious to those that are complex and obtuse.  
There are clearly challenges with regard to the definition of religion and 
theories that seek to explain the origins and nature of religion that warrant continued 
enquiry by the academy. There are also challenges for the academic discipline that 
claims to study religion that comprise some fundamental issues about our knowledge 
of the world we live in and of ourselves as humans. For the individual, only those with 
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enduring faith can derive any comfort from their religion. The rest of humanity, 
agnostic or atheist, is left in a frustrating, paradoxical relationship to the phenomenon 
of religion. If one is not a believer, or does not have faith, the question that surely 
vexes all such people is what do these religious believers believe in and why do they 
believe it when there is no evidence for the existence of any deity, supernatural realm 
or the human soul? Equally frustrating for the believers is the persistent question 
posed by the faithless or the heretics. Why is it that they cannot see what is so 
obviously ‗the truth, the light and the way‘ to those in a given religious community?  
The relationships of people to other knowledge paradigms, such as science, are also 
challenged in this manner. 
There are various terms utilized in the study of religion of concepts seen to be 
forms of or related to religion. Animism, the worship of animals, plants and inanimate 
objects such as rocks, mountains or rivers, is one form of behaviour that historically 
has been regarded as a ―primitive‖ form of religion (Tylor 1920). These entities, it is 
argued by E.B. Tylor, are believed to have souls or spirits, just as humans are believed 
to have by animists. 
Totemism, regarded by some as similar to animism, is where a particular 
animal, plant or a mythical creature are said to represent a particular group of people 
and play a role in ensuring that their lives take a particular course in the here and now 
(Evans-Pritchard 1965; Durkheim 2001; Levi-Strauss 1967). Malinowski argued 
somewhat differently, that the relationship to the totem was not a matter of 
classification, which was Evans-Pritchard‘s view and one supported by Durkheim and 
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Levi-Strauss, but rather it was about the association of these things with the culinary 
practices of the group (Malinowski 1968).  
Magic, or the perceived ability to cause material effects in the world through 
rituals and practices that a magic practitioner performs, is also a category of belief that 
is identified as distinct but related to religion (Styers 2004).  Marcel Mauss, as did 
Durkheim, distinguished between magic and religion by identifying magic as secret 
and private and religion as a public and collective activity (Mauss 1972: 110-111; 
Durkheim 2001: 42-43). Although many of the rituals, accompanying paraphernalia 
and beliefs are similar to religious ones, the nature of magic makes it about particular 
caused outcomes, although it is not uncommon for particular prayers to be for the 
same end, for instance. Witchcraft is similar to magic, but is more aimed at mobilizing 
the magical forces to focus on another person, most often for malevolent reasons. 
Myths, commonly described as sacred stories or narratives, are also regarded 
as being of significance for religion. These stories about the founding of communities, 
particular characters and their exploits, are regarded by some scholars as having their 
origins in actual historical events, but have become exaggerated or regarded as of 
particular significance, making them appear to be of a sacred character (Lincoln 1999). 
Alternative views regard myths as allegories, telling a story not for the details but for 
the message, as it were (Max Müller 1878). James Frazer regarded myths as either 
being related to ritual in particular, but to wrong interpretations of these rituals and of 
false beliefs about the world (Frazer 1926). Whatever its origins, what Malinowski 
described as a ―cultural‖ force, is seen to be of significance for understanding religion 
by some scholars (Malinowski 1982: 143). Levi-Strauss has argued that myths, like 
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other religious features of society, are really stories that describe the way in which 
people classify the world (Levi-Strauss 1978). Levi-Strauss‘ rich interpretation of 
myths across many societies has placed it as a central and essential feature for the 
ordering of the world by human subjects. 
Religion even has been identified of having a relationship to medicine in the 
discourse of anthropology. In one series of lectures, given to the Royal College of 
Physicians of London in 1915 and 1916, W.H.R. Rivers claimed to have identified the 
relationship between medical practices and religious belief in the form of magic as 
rudimentary medicine (Rivers 1924). There are many examples of other scholars 
studying practices such as Shamanism and healing in relation to religion and magic. 
F. Max Müller argued that if one wanted to understand religion, one would 
need to know its history as a phenomenon (Max Müller 1878: 21).  Max Müller 
believed language and religion were closely related in terms of their development and 
regarded the relationship between myth and religion as crucial, even if he was 
patronising of myth. Max Müller argued that religion is not something that can be 
considered outside of the ways in which we have developed knowledge about our 
world. His developmental theory of religion classified what he regarded as primitive 
beliefs and those he regarded as being more sophisticated as being the logical 
development of humanity‘s understanding of religion and the gods.  
Max Müller described the belief in the existence of God as being intuitive, 
founded on the adoration of the deity and the veneration of ancestors, consideration of 
the infinite nature of the universe and of the fact that all people, regardless of their 
cultural differences, hold the belief that existence of humanity was the fruit of some 
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superior being‘s effort. He regarded various religions as more or less complex but 
clearly argued that although these religions may differ in their beliefs, all are related to 
some common faculty we as humans share, a ―sense of the infinite‖ (Max Müller 
1878: 26). This argument from common experience rests on the assumption that when 
more than one person relates a common feeling, emotion or experience, they are 
experiencing the same thing in the same manner as the others who also say they do. 
James Frazer pointed to what he regarded as the original confusion between 
magic and religion and religion‘s subsequent relationship with ―civilisation‖ as being 
what distinguishes it. He regarded religion as belief in a higher power than humans 
and the efforts of humans to please this power (Frazer 1922: 46). In fact, reflecting on 
Australian Aboriginal people, he came to the conclusion that these, the ―lowest race of 
men as to whom we possess comparatively full and accurate information‖, universally 
practice magic and have magicians, but among them there are no priests because they 
have no religion (Frazer 1922: 66). Accordingly, the ignorant savages have fetishism, 
animism, totemism, magic, superstition, witchcraft and confused ideas, whereas 
―civilized‖ people have reason, religion and science.  
Frazer, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, categorised knowledge of the 
world into these three systems — magical, religious and scientific — and argued that 
the type of knowledge that involved the recognition of powers believed to be greater 
than those of humans was necessarily religious. In this view, religion is just one of a 
variety of ways of trying to understand the world. Frazer also regarded religion as a 
phenomenon that developed from the simple to the complex and from false beliefs to 
true ones (Frazer 1926: 9-10). This view of religion as being simplistic in the case of 
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―primitive‖ people and more complex in the case of ―civilized‖ people pervades the 
discourse of the early scholars of religion. The claim to its evolutionary character 
clearly echoes the idea of the development of knowledge in other fields, particularly of 
the natural sciences. 
Writing in 1923, Rudolf Otto in The Idea of the Holy, talks of human 
experience of ‗the holy‘ as being unique to the phenomenon of religion (Otto 1958: 5). 
Like many scholars who have attempted to define and theorise religion, Otto believed 
that there was a unique emotional and spiritual experience that is felt in the presence 
of what he referred to as ―the numinous‖ (Otto 1958: 11). The ―Mysterium 
Tremendum‖ experienced in the presence of the holy is what Otto argued humans feel 
when they behold the hidden and esoteric, or that most powerful presence which they 
are aware of, but cannot clearly see or adequately describe (Otto 1958: 13). If one is to 
take religious believers at their word, as Otto appears to, they stand in awe of their 
God or Gods.  
Gerhardus van der Leeuw regarded religion as being concerned with the Other 
and what he described as the sacred, being that Other (van der Leeuw 1938: 23). Like 
Otto‘s Mysterium Tremendum, van der Leeuw‘s Other is potent against all that is 
profane or secular and everything is powerless in the face of this Other (van der 
Leeuw 1938: 47). This perspective on religion also focused on the inner experience of 
the individual adherent, even when another was observing that subject. This 
phenomenological approach is one that takes as given the category of religion and is 
less inclined to point to the differences between more or less primitive beliefs, 
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focusing more on the perceived unique experience of the sacred, the holy or the divine, 
as being the defining characteristic of religion. 
Similarly, Mircea Eliade, a controversial but influential figure in the academy, 
also regarded the sacred as being the key characteristic of religion. He defined religion 
as the ―apprehension of or orientation to the Sacred . . . the Center, the primal time‖, 
with the dichotomy of the sacred and the profane as what founds our perspective of the 
world (Eliade 1961: 21). Eliade describes what he calls the hierophany - the sacred as 
manifested - as the basic feature of our world (Eliade 1961: 11). His description of the 
sacred as the ―opposite of the profane‖ seems trite, but he convincingly argues that a 
key feature of our world is that the ordinary can become sacred through the rituals 
practiced by humans in their engagement with the sacred (Eliade 1961: 12). This 
perspective on the sacred defines it as a transcendental category, distinct from that 
which is profane or ordinary, but it offers no material explanation of its origins.  
Eliade successfully captured the heuristic of the sacred and its perceived 
difference from the ordinary reality of everyday life. He also articulated the manner in 
which the profane world could be consecrated and made sacred through ritual (Eliade 
1961: 33). In Eliade‘s view, the ancient or archaic nature of the sacred was what made 
it authentic, pure and truthful and he sought to identify and elucidate those archaic 
aspects of religion that he argued had their origins in the earlier and the most sacred of 
times, where he believed myth and ritual endowed humans with the ability to 
understand the sacred character of the world. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the philosopher David Hume argued that 
religion is certainly not something that develops out of reason, for arguments such as 
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the apparent traces of a designer of the universe or those that seek to credit a first 
mover of the universe, just as those for sacred realms, the divine and the holy, cannot 
be proven. Instead, Hume posited that religion is simply part of the observed 
behaviour of human beings and proof of nothing at all about the basis for these beliefs 
(Hume 1975: 158). 
This sceptical, empiricist view is perhaps one of the most significant 
perspectives on religion in that it gives little quarter to the need for concrete evidence 
of a god, if reason is the measure applied for proof. That Hume thought this way in the 
eighteenth century calls into question the views the some scholars of religion continue 
to hold even hundreds of years later. The fact that the critique of religion along these 
lines was a product of the Enlightenment resonates with the argument that the category 
of religion is itself an invention of the rational project of this period (Braun 2000: 7; 
Chidester 2008: 2). In this view, religion was defined as the opposite of rational and 
scientific thought (Braun 2000: 13). 
As these attempts at definitions made by some of the first European scholars to 
study the phenomenon of religion show, any attempt to define religion or to construct 
a theory of religion usually results in an inconclusive outcome, in that these definitions 
capture some aspect of what religion is believed to be about, but there seems to be no 
final, clear taxonomic category that is identifiable and certainly no material basis for 
the phenomenon (Smith 1982: 14). These various attempts at defining or providing a 
theory of religion are essentially of one of two types. The first is the substantive 
theories that seek to describe the religious experience that subjects believe that they 
have and account for these experiences. Substantive theorists such as Otto, van der 
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Leeuw and Eliade focus on the perceived uniqueness of the religious experience and 
try to account for this, taking the category religion as given.  
Functionalist or situational theories, on the other hand, have attempted to 
define religion in terms of its role in society. In other words, religion is explained by 
the role it plays in terms of our human psyche or the character of social or political 
organisation. In the functionalist theory that considers the psychoanalytic role of 
religion, for instance, Freud argued that religion is really an unconscious response to 
repression that leads human beings to seek answers for their perceived 
disempowerment through projecting a more powerful being than themselves on to the 
world to account for their unfortunate circumstances (Freud 1928: 17). In Freud‘s 
theory, religion is a ―universal obsessional neurosis‖ that seeks wish fulfillment as a 
gratifying experience (Freud 1928: 39). In this view, religion is a response to the 
inevitable, certain death all humans face. Religion functions therefore to obviate the 
fear of mortality that arguably stalks all sentient beings. 
Karl Marx similarly described religion as the expression of human suffering, 
but at the same time he argued that religion is an ideology that reflects the ―upside-
down‖ perception of the nature of the world by projecting the alienation that humanity 
feels as a result of the perverse nature of capitalism and in particular of the class rule 
and exploitation that accompanies it. Religion, in Marx‘s view, also serves as a means 
to promote the ideas the ruling class in society projected as truths to perpetuate their 
privileged position (Marx and Engels 1964: 41, 42, 147). Marx developed his own 
theory of religion from a critique of G.W. Hegel, who argued that religion was the 
process of Spirit or God within humanity, becoming conscious of itself through the 
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self realisation of itself as the Idea of God (Hegel 1991: 341). Marx built on the 
critique of Hegel made by Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach, like Marx a radical, 
materialist Hegelian, defined religion as the recognition by humans of the infinite 
within humanity that it then projects on to the world and reveres as a superior being 
(Feuerbach 1957: 1, 2, 13). Like Freud, Marx held little regard for the claims of 
religion, but they both acknowledged its status as an ontological category, even if it 
projects, in their view, a false or imaginary view of the world.  
One of the most influential scholars of religion, Emile Durkheim, identified 
what he regarded as the common-sense definition of religion and the fact that the 
apparent similarities between various religions in such a view was not sustainable as 
there were marked differences between these various religions as well (Durkheim 
1975: 75-79). He described religious phenomena as falling into one of two categories: 
beliefs or rites (Durkheim 2001: 36). Within this broad framework, he classified all 
known things as falling themselves into one of two categories, the sacred or the 
profane. For Durkheim, religion is the organised set of beliefs and practices in relation 
to these sacred things that create a moral community of people (Durkheim 2001: 46). 
The sacred, Durkheim argued, is determined materially, through rites that a collective 
engages in; uniting the group and giving it it‘s identity (Durkheim 2001: 42). The 
sacred is to be kept untainted by keeping the profane away from it (Durkheim 2001: 
40). Durkheim regarded religion as being a social and collective phenomenon, within 
which collective representations of the sacred and the profane are structured. In his 
view, since these are the primordial, organisational categories of humankind, they are 
also the bases for all logic and order (Durkheim 1975: 111).  
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Marcel Mauss, a relative and student of Durkheim, further developed this 
theory of religion and society through studying the history of religion and key aspects 
of phenomena related to religion, including ritual sacrifice and economic exchange. 
Mauss defined the structure of society as based on the ritual exchanges made by 
people that created obligations to one another in relationships configured in and 
through the sacred (Mauss 1983: 170). This theme of religion, the sacred and the 
economy was a powerful one that began to emerge as a key focus in the social 
sciences. In this view, to talk of religion or the economy as distinct spheres of activity 
is to miss the common essence of the social relations that are expressed in the 
economic, the political and the social aspects of human communities, including 
religion. Mauss described ritual behaviour and social contract or obligation created by 
exchanges of gifts and tribute, as the basis of stable, social existence. 
Max Weber, a leading figure in the founding of sociology, engaged religion as 
a phenomenon that has an observed effect in society, without looking to necessarily 
define it in an essentialist manner. Religion, symbolism and categorisation go together 
in Weber‘s view (Weber 1964: 9). He saw religion‘s role as being similar to or related 
to culture, for instance in enabling the success or failure of societies fashioning social 
cohesion and regulating the manner in which people behave. Capitalism, as the 
predominant and most advanced economic system, Weber argued, required a specific 
brand of Christianity, in the form of Protestantism, to best succeed as a system (Weber 
1992: 120). 
The prolific ethnographer, Bronislaw Malinowski, also studying various 
―primitive societies‖, concluded that although religion had a social function in that it 
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existed to help cope with the inevitability of death and that it embeds traditional 
values, the various different types of religion did not allow for a definition of it 
(Malinowski 1948: 47, 88). This means that while we can observe what we regard as 
religious behaviour, the subject matter is so broad as to include just about anything. 
The relationship between religion and culture is also highlighted in the work of 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, who also did not provide for a general definition or theory of 
religion, but focused on specific religions in their context. In so far as he theoretically 
conceptualised religion, he regarded it as a social activity, contiguous with or 
reducible to rites (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 47). Like many before him, Evans-Pritchard 
held a view that religion was more or less primitive, but that more developed religions 
had within them features common to all religions and interestingly argued that 
fetishism was the basis for religion (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 20). 
Claude Levi-Strauss, in a wide-ranging, life-long study of concrete human 
communities and their rules of kinship, marriage and custom, identified classification 
as the first social order, with the sacred and the profane, as identified by Durkheim, 
being key categories for this exercise to take place. Significantly, Levi-Strauss 
included other binary relationships such as the raw and the cooked, culture and nature 
and gender (male and female) as key to understanding humanity and the activities 
unique to it (Levi-Strauss 1970: 126). He also identified language and myth as being 
central to religion. In Levi-Strauss‘ view, a language produces symbolic property, 
based on the rituals and the rules that identify the prohibitions and the permissions in a 
society. In the myths that he identified as being fundamental to the particular societies 
he studied, lesser deities mediate between humans and their Gods, playing a role as 
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super-beings, creating a cosmic order mirrored in the manner in which communities 
were themselves ordered (Levi-Strauss 1979: 32). 
Levi-Strauss argued that this classification of things was fundamental to the 
ordering of the world, including putting sacred things in their correct or designated 
places (Levi-Strauss 1966: 10). In totemic systems, believed to be primordial forms of 
religion, everything was regarded as ordered in this manner - people, plants and 
animals - as well as the living and the dead. Levi-Strauss argued that it was imperative 
to distinguish between the personal and psychological aspects of our existence, the 
social or civil and the cosmic or transcendental. In that respect, he regarded religion as 
a key aspect of human social existence. In this system of classification, myths and 
signs are created that function according to the binary categories that form the basis of 
how humans order society (Levi-Strauss 1966: 18). 
Significantly, Levi-Strauss shared Mauss‘s view that the function of exchange 
is the basic mode of human social interaction, again linking religion and the economy 
in a particular significant relationship (Levi-Strauss 1966: 109). The exchange of 
women by men, done according to the rules that govern marriage and kinship 
relations, Levi-Strauss argued, was one of the earliest forms of exchange. This is 
significant, for as with Mauss‘ argument for the primacy of exchange, this has major 
implications for the study of economics, politics and society in general. Such a theory 
places the privileging of production, wage labour or of capital in the economy, for 
example, in a contested position. 
Peter Berger has also developed a particular historical materialist critique of 
religion, explaining that religion is the process of constructing a conception of the 
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world in its totality. In this view of religion, human culture is the process by which 
society is produced and reproduced (Berger 1967: 11). This system is what produces 
humans, who in turn maintain the system. Religion therefore functions as a powerful 
discourse through which society reproduces itself. This view is significant in that it 
places religion at the centre of the reproduction of society, that is, in terms of the total 
economic, social and political aspects of society.  
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz‘s eclectic definition of religion as being, ― 
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic‖, seems at face value to 
provide a comprehensive, functionalist framework for religion (Geertz 1966: 4). 
Geertz grounds his theory of religion in the structuralist perspective that takes culture 
as a historically determined system of transmitting meaning through symbols that are 
generated by people in the course of their social interaction (Geertz 1973: 89). Like 
most functional theories, this view of religion says nothing about the question of 
whether its subject matter is real or not. Geertz‘s definition of religion is also based 
more on culture than on the structure of society, making it somewhat different to 
functionalist theories as outlined above.  
The encyclopedic work of Ninian Smart presents another theory of religion. 
Smart argues that there is no religious essence but rather a family resemblance among 
religions that enables us to define religion through a ―scheme of ideas‖ of seven 
dimensions (Smart 1989). In this scheme, religions are practical and ritualistic and 
41 
 
involve worship, pedagogy and proselytising. Religions, Smart argues, are also 
emotional and experiential; they are mythic and narrative and thus tell a story. They 
are doctrinal and philosophical, as well as legal and ethical. They are also social and 
institutional and thus material. Lastly, religions can even be secular in this perspective, 
such as Marxism and nationalism (Smart 1989: 12-24). 
In a critique of social anthropology in general, and of Geertz‘s methodology in 
particular, Talal Asad has argued that locating religion out of its actual social context 
has dislocated it from the relationships of power and authority in society and has 
obscured the Christian and Eurocentric nature of religious studies as developed in the 
dominant tradition of the discourse (Asad 1993: 19). Asad proposes instead that 
religion must be understood in the context of the overall social relations within a 
society and in terms of the power that elites wield in relation to all cultural systems. In 
other words, religion is not an isolated phenomenon; it is embedded in the cultural 
system and is related to all aspects of it (Asad 1973: 14 and 16). This critique of the 
methodology of anthropology argues for an understanding of religion as a conceptual 
and social category manufactured in the European Enlightenment subsequent colonial 
encounters (Asad 1993: 23). 
Criticising the universal notion of religion itself and the manner in which 
Geertz uses concepts such as symbols as cognitive objects rather than relational and 
communicative categories that are socially constructed Asad builds up a persuasive 
argument for the re-evaluation of the category of religion in its entirety (Asad 1993: 
32). He is more concerned with how particular religions are given authority, than with 
the category itself. In that respect, his view is that religion must be considered in terms 
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of the power relations in society-that is as a motivational activity that assumes a 
particular form in the discourses and practices of a society (Asad 1993: 35). 
More recently, Richard Dawkins has defined religion as a system of self-
replicating ideas that function more or less successfully in relation to the evolution of 
our species. Analogous to genes, these memes, as he terms them, are ideas that have 
survived and evolved because of the social function they perform in relation to our 
survival as a species (Dawkins 2006: 199-201).  This biological metaphor for the 
development of a system of meaning and symbols to transmit them is similar to 
Geertz‘s, but it argues that religions, or any other ideas for that matter, stand or fall 
depending on their efficacy as evolutionary tools rather than as cultural material. 
Each of these definitions and theories is persuasive, as they appear to elucidate 
certain obvious aspects of religion, but they have all been criticised for their 
limitations. Substantive theories such as those of Hume, Tylor, Frazer, Otto and van 
der Leeuw, while they differ in many respects, all seem to simply accept religion as 
being in existence because people believe in the beings, deities or realm that the 
phenomenon is said to occupy. This is a circular argument. Just because we have an 
intuition that there is a God or Gods is proof of nothing other than the intuition. That 
intuition does not necessarily qualify as anything different than, say, the intuition that 
there are ghosts, pixies or fairies.  
Functionalist theories such as those of Freud and Marx observed religion as a 
phenomenon, but were critical of it for various reasons: it‘s perceived negative social 
impact, its archaic nature and its reactionary tendency or delusionary quality. But none 
of these definitions or theories is accepted without critique. To simply regard the 
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function of religious belief and behaviour as being of some or other social significance 
is to ignore the psychologically significant experience of religion for individuals. It 
also disregards what that experience says about the world. For instance, the fact that 
we may or may not believe in fictional (or real) entities that are more powerful than us 
has a lot to do with how we behave as humans. But whether these beliefs are real or 
not and what that says about the world also needs consideration. Functionalist 
definitions of religion can seem crude, missing the human subtlety of belief and faith. 
The idea that religion is either a psychological crutch or false-consciousness is also 
limiting in that this does not explain the persistence of religion even once people have 
developed scientific views of the world and our universe. 
The theories of religion based on the interpretation of culture are problematic 
in that theories that are rooted in ethnographic projects are descriptive, but at the end 
of the day description is not an explanation. The fact that belief in religions is almost a 
universal human characteristic simply begs the question, what is religion and how 
does it work? Some consideration does therefore need to be given to the efficacy of 
the various theories of religion, for if the objective of understanding why it is that 
religion has the power it does to move whole groups of people to behave in particular 
ways is to be achieved, an explanation of the object of enquiry is necessary.  
Substantive theories that move from the premise that we have a sense of the 
power of what we deem to be the supernatural Other are also no proof of the existence 
of a general category of religion. These sorts of beliefs can even be of a civic nature, 
such as a nationalistic belief in the flag of a country, national sacrifice, or even of the 
very concept of a nation itself. As in Geertz‘s definition, because these definitions and 
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theories are so broad, these also allow that any belief system that satisfies his five 
criteria, or grant the experience of some higher power, can be described as a religion. 
By such definitions we can therefore include baseball in the USA, Coca-Cola globally, 
Tupperware, Manchester United or even computer gaming as types of religion 
(Chidester 2005: ix, 52).  
Finally, the idea of religion as memes is one that still does not take us any 
further in understanding what makes these memes articulate what is regarded as 
religion. This definition of religion sounds trite because the idea that theories that are 
socially efficacious function positively in terms of evolution tells us little about the 
nature of religion itself.  
If there is no agreement on the definition of religion and if there is no 
agreement on the basic concept of what a religion consists of, let alone on a theory of 
religion, there is obviously an issue here that needs to be addressed. It is clear that 
religion, in the sense of some activities that people engage in, is a real experience for 
those having it. Whatever is going on that is described as religious belief or behaviour, 
it seems to encompass a wide range of human activities—perhaps too broad a range. 
Some scholars have argued that for this reason the category of religion must be done 
away with. This, they argue, would remove the debate about whether we are talking 
about the same thing and allow social science to get on with describing and explaining 
how society functions.  
In this vein, Russell McCutcheon has argued that religion should be regarded 
as a conceptual tool and not as something that exists in reality (McCutcheon 1997: 
19). In this view, religion can function as an area of research but is not an academic 
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discipline analogous to sociology or anthropology, for example (McCutcheon 1997: 
28). McCutcheon argues that in the process of manufacturing this field, a particular 
ideology is developed that authenticates an exclusive representation of history. In such 
a process it is particularly important to ensure that the interests of the participants and 
the observers are clearly identified. This is analogous to the manner in which class 
interest is cloaked in the common sense of bourgeois ideology, at least according to 
the Marxist critique of ideology. 
In a similar but more radical approach, Timothy Fitzgerald has argued that the 
category of religion is a modern construct and that not only is there no such 
ontological category, there is no valid basis for the discipline (Fitzgerald 2000: 3). He 
argues that religion and ritual are terms used interchangeably and that the category 
religion arises from the ―liberal ecumenical ideology‖ that has been constructed 
alongside the process of the development of capitalism, the modern state and liberal 
individualism. (Fitzgerald 2000: 6). This process simultaneously defined the religious 
and the secular that is an essential aspect of the capitalist system (Fitzgerald 2000: 8). 
The manner in which the category functions mystifies, confuses and ensures that 
proper research cannot be conducted on society because of this category that is set 
apart from all others by the suggestion that it deals with something that cannot be 
explained as a social phenomenon. This privileging of a purported realm of religion is 
a circular argument if used as a means to justify the academic study of religion. 
Religion is clearly a contested category, fraught with the politics of the 
phenomenon itself and arguably the interests of adherents and critics alike. It is 
rendered inadequate as a conceptual category for the purpose of studying the 
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phenomenon itself by these very debates. As one erudite and articulate scholar has put 
it, the study of religion is ―confused‖ and the categorisation of religion and religions is 
arbitrary (Smart 1973: 9-10). That sociologists, economists, anthropologists and those 
who study it in a more focused manner have considered religion as a conceptual 
category and a thing in itself has made for an interesting and eclectic dialogue. As 
Chidester has observed, whatever might be understood by the anthropology of 
religion, religion is a significant category that functions as a ―linking‖ term where the 
personal and the social meet (Chidester 2008: 5).  
Some among the twentieth-century French critical theorists in particular have 
engaged religion from various angles that have enriched the debate considerably. In 
this perspective, religion as a form of social critique, builds upon the work of earlier 
critical theorists, particularly from the Frankfurt School (Mendieta 2005: 8). 
In this tradition, Paul Ricouer situates religion with language and within 
discourse as text (Ricouer 1995: 35). He describes the phenomenology of the sacred 
and the manner in which myth and ritual are contiguous and are part of generating the 
sacred and expressing this symbolically. In this view, the sacred and symbolism are 
bound together as a discourse, configuring the sacred as a component within a system 
of meanings that is encoded within the social context within which they arise. 
Roland Barthes has related myth to religion and to meaning in general, 
situating religion as part of the generation of knowledge in societies and defining myth 
as a language (Barthes 2000: 11). In this view, myth, magic, religion and even science 
are all systems of meaning within which people operate. Barthes suggests that since 
people manufacture all forms of communication, what is read into the text in such 
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systems of meaning depends on the social context and the place symbols have in the 
structure of language and there are taboos and conventions that determine this 
structure. 
Echoing Foucault, who described religion as just one regularized discourse 
aimed at disciplining our minds and bodies, Pierre Bourdieu has described how the 
production of techniques that situate people in what he calls fields of power, shapes 
them, shapes society and presents limits to transformation (Bourdieu 1984:  226). 
Within this schema religion plays a powerful role as one of the mediums of symbolic 
power. Bourdieu does away with the economic and non-economic classification of 
systems in society and argues that all social practice is better understood as ―economic 
practice directed towards the maximization of material or symbolic profit‖ (Bourdieu 
1977: 183; 1990: 122). In this way, he sets out a critique of the political economy of 
religion, focusing on those social practices that are laden with sacred significance. 
Developing the economic theme, Bourdieu describes how economic and social goods 
are produced in the same way that religious and political discourses are (Bourdieu 
1991: 50). These are all included in forms of exchange, whether linguistic, economic 
or religious and significantly Bourdieu describes these as outcomes as stylized rituals 
of institutional practice (Bourdieu 1991: 118). 
Jean Baudrillard takes this critique even further by arguing that what is being 
produced in the social context are signs that are given meaning and value, but he 
breaks down the distinction between the so-called real world and the so-called 
artificial world of signs. Instead, he locates the process of symbolic production within 
the modern context and argues that media and technology have denuded the world of 
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reality and produced multiple meanings, making all that we see nothing more than 
simulations of the real. In this world there is a system of objects, made up of both the 
signs of these objects and the actual objects themselves that carry multiple meanings 
in a political economy of the sign (Baudrillard 1996: 117; Baudrillard 1981: 142). In 
such a view, religions as experienced in contemporary society are not real. They are 
simulations of the past, produced by effects of what he calls the simulacra and 
simulation, that is, the breaking down of the distinction between reality and image 
(Baudrillard 1994: 6).  
In a similar vein, Jacques Derrida has argued that in modernity meaning is 
unstable and therefore to talk of defining any category, religion included, is 
problematic. Derrida has used religious concepts or terminology, but has made these 
terms devoid of any religious content (Derrida 2002: 92). Where he does speak of 
religion it is of what he terms a ―globalatinisation‖ (mondialatinisation) of a Western 
European meaning of religion on a ―tele-technoscientific‖ field that is imperialistic 
and serves to homogenize all belief on its terms (Derrida 2002: 78). 
These theorists show that even when religion is being interrogated critically, 
the extent to which the object of enquiry is contextualised, textualised and 
appropriated is of considerable significance. Even the ways in which humans see the 
world, which Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues are determined in the first instance by 
our bodies, is of significance (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 48). Religion may define who and 
what we are as people, but our corporeal form also defines knowledge, language and 
religion. This is because the social facts we experience as structures are determined by 
both our biological and social existence (Merleau-Ponty 1974: 114). For example, the 
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very concepts of ―up‖ as the transcendent and most sacred place in the form of heaven 
and ―down‖ on terra firm or below as the profane relate to our upright, bipedal ability. 
Humans live down on earth, while the Gods live up in heaven, logically and 
necessarily because they are set apart from humans. 
Perhaps the most radical view on religion among the critical theorists is that of 
Jean-Franscois Lyotard. He describes the post-modern condition as one in which all 
signs have been hollowed out and where meaning is no longer stable due to the shifts 
in systems of signs (Lyotard 1989: 7). Lyotard describes what he terms the differend, 
that is a dispute that cannot be settled due to the unstable meanings at play in society, 
as the fulcrum around which discourses operate (Lyotard 1988: 13). This hiatus 
creates a constant repetition of debate that has no impact on society except at the 
symbolic level. In this view, modernity is characterized by myth, with religion 
functioning as just one articulation of this form.   
The work of Michel Foucault is of singular importance in influencing these 
critical theorists and the social sciences in general. Foucault demonstrated that systems 
of power were a multiplicity of regularised discourses, created and embedded in 
society as disciplines. He established genealogies of these discourses, considering 
confinement in prisons, institutions for the mentally ill and sexuality, but also 
discourse generally (Foucault 1967; Foucault 1977; Foucault 1990). In this schema, 
religion is but one category of discourse that is used to attempt to exercise power over 
people, who in turn use the discourse to counter the effects of this domination.  
The academic study of religion in contemporary times has also had to be 
located in the context of the defining features of the world at this time. The end of 
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colonialism, the end of the Cold War, the rise of neo-colonialism, capitalist 
globalization and the recent financial and economic crisis have all created conditions 
within which the academic study of religion has had to grapple with increasingly 
diverse and complex issues that relate to it. 
This rich, emerging dialogue and the various definitions and theories of 
religion, have a lot to offer. The power of Geertz‘s theory of religion as a cultural 
system, combined with the structuralism conceptualised by Claude Levi-Strauss, 
arguably dominated the anthropology of religion in the late twentieth century and 
effectively established an enduring alternative approach to both functionalism and 
substantivism. The nexus of these structural theories and the critical discourse that 
flows from it created the possibility of a productive engagement analyzing religion in 
terms of human biology, language and psychology and through functionalism, 
integrating this with issues of the social, the political and the economic. Critics of the 
Eurocentrism and essentialism in these theories, such as Asad, have presented 
powerful arguments against approaches such as that of Geertz‘s to the study of 
religion (Asad 1973: 31). This criticism can be remedied by introducing context into 
the debate.  
The critical theorists introduced the study of language, semiotics, discourse 
and political economy onto the terrain of structuralism. This has allowed for a 
dialogue that builds on the substantive theorists, who acknowledged the religious 
experiences of humanity, the functionalists, who elucidated the social value of 
religion, and the culturalists who explained to some extent how religion works in 
concrete societies. But none of these has effectively explained why religion exists, or 
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why it is so pervasive, persistent and resilient. They have however presented the case 
for the relationship between religion and the economy in the form of exchange and the 
creation of value. 
As has been shown, among the challenges that the academic study of religion 
faces is that there is no consensus on whether the discipline has a subject. This seems 
counter-intuitive at first brush. We all know that what is commonly called religion 
exists. The majority of people are believers of one religion or another. But definitions 
of religion and explanations of its origins are so diverse as to render any attempt at 
providing one that can be regarded as approximating a consensus almost meaningless. 
Consequently, those who study religion are not always studying the same 
phenomenon, or if they are, do so in radically different ways  (Boyer, 2001: 6, 10, 13, 
22, 26; Durkheim, 2001: 40; Braun, 2000: 4; Anarl, 2000: 24, 25, 26; Chidester, 2005: 
vii, 13).  Chidester has pointed out that the various histories of the anthropology of 
religion raise the issue of genealogy sharply. With all the diversity of research 
programs and the consideration of religion and various other disciplines and 
phenomena, he has questioned whether any single genealogy can be traced (Chidester 
2008: 11). 
For those who argue that, in spite of these differences, there is a discipline of 
religious studies, the academic study of religion has been successfully critiqued to the 
point that it is now clear that the history of religion and of society in general is now 
understood to be so complex, under-researched and, frankly speaking, crudely 
interpreted in the past as to make the notion of the study of religion highly contested 
(Chidester, 1996: xiii, 3-29).  
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Chidester points out that the academic discipline of comparative religion was 
constructed in the context of colonial and imperialist relationships that were 
dominated by violence, aggression, avarice and prejudice that have colored the study 
of religion and debates within it. Apart from the fact, as Chidester points out, that 
these encounters took place on the colonial and imperial frontiers, as he puts it, the 
conceptual category of religion and the production of knowledge, about people, their 
beliefs, practices, values, in short their culture, has been interpreted in a manner that 
suggests that it is impossible to utilise this category in a relative or an interest-free 
manner. Chidester makes a convincing case for adopting a sceptical attitude towards 
any claims of impartiality on the part of scholars of religion.  
In addition, religion appears to be diffuse in nature, that is, there appear to be 
an infinite number of possible religions, based on the worship of any animate or 
inanimate entity, and even on the void. But the abundance of religious activity and the 
source of religious material require an explanation. It is counter-intuitive that an 
activity that concentrates on what is deemed by many to be the most valuable aspect of 
human existence, that of the spiritual or non-materialist, eternal aspect of our lives, is 
bountiful in the most extreme. This surplus of symbolic property needs consideration. 
It would seem logical that such material should be scarce rather than in surplus.  
It is also not clear how what are generally regarded as ordinary things in one 
context — a stone, bones, a sign or a place — take on significance in another context 
that makes them, literally, invaluable. It is not sufficient to argue that things have a 
religious significance because believers say they do or regard them as sacred. Such 
53 
 
circularity leads quickly to a situation where it is therefore a matter of belief. But this 
still does not explain the belief. 
There are many aspects of social life that are not regarded conventionally as 
being religious but that exhibit many, if not all, of the characteristics of what most 
would agree religions have in their makeup (Chidester 2005: viii, 5, 9). Money, flags, 
countries, celebrities, sports events and many other seemingly banal things exhibit 
religious features or people behave in ways often defined as religious in relation to 
these social objects or processes. Money is literally treated as a god by some people in 
capitalist society and perhaps since its appearance as a socially constructed category. 
There are rituals in relation to money that have religious characteristics (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1993).People are sacrificed for their countries and this is justified in 
religious terms or national terms that have a religious character (Chidester 2005). 
Religion and social activities that have a quasi-religious character pervade television, 
competing for prime time viewing with game shows and soap operas. If there are 
things that are like religion, but are not religion, whatever gives these things their 
quasi-religious status must also be explained. At the very least this could provide clues 
to what religion is. 
There are many social groups that would regard themselves as a religion, who 
are deemed not to qualify for this title, either by academics or by other religions. 
Exactly what is an authentic religion is contested (Chidester, 2005: viii; Chidester, 
1988: 24; Chidester, 1996: 11). The legitimisation of a particular religion is partly 
about the overcoming of the scepticism of those who do not join a particular religious 
grouping, but it is also about who has the power to legitimate a religion. All major 
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religions were once regarded as cults, deviant behaviour or even criminal activity. 
When and how religions become accepted as such is just as significant as how they are 
formed. 
The gap between secular life and religious life appears to widen as time goes 
by, resulting in the perception that religion has ceased to have any relevance in the 
modern world (Debray 1981: 335).  But this is only the appearance. Religion in the 
modern world has taken on new forms, partly reverting to reinterpreted forms of 
historical religions, but also in breaking down previous totalizing religious projects 
into private ones. The apparent secularisation of society, the marked privatisation of 
religion and the return of archaic beliefs that rely on religion and the sacred in the 
form of nationalism and religious fundamentalism needs to be explained, as do the 
problems of religious competition and conflict and of social conflict in general, that 
religion seems unable to contribute to effectively dealing with.  
Similarly, the recurring patterns of social development and underdevelopment 
that characterise the contemporary world are challenges that religion fails to explain or 
to assist in overcoming. Religion justifies oppression, exploitation, injustice and 
inequality as well as liberation, justice and equity. Our present reality, that of a 
capitalist, globalising world of simultaneous development and underdevelopment, is a 
reality within which any attempt to study religion, must be located. Yet a subject with 
no agreed definition or theory hardly seems the place to start when confronting such 
weighty matters. 
A significant challenge for an enquiry into the subject of religion, apart from 
the various definitions being so diverse and broad, is that the academic study of 
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religion is confronted with anachronistic relativism inherent in its alleged subject 
(Asad 1973: 46). The contemporary version of the category of religion in general and 
of specific religions that have endured or developed are obviously significantly 
different to what believers have historically held in relation to their own set of 
religious beliefs and of their understanding of the religious beliefs of others. The 
manner in which academics considered religion one hundred years ago can hardly be 
the same as the manner in which contemporary scholars understand religion. At the 
same time, Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims today do not worship at the same 
Church, Temple or Mosque (except in the physical sense of the word) under the same 
Papal edicts or testaments and arguably do not even worship with the same conception 
of a God as a century ago. 
The view that religion is essentially a category constructed through comparison 
informs the thinking of many contemporary scholars (Smith 1982: 19, Arnal 2000: 
22). According to Jonathan Z. Smith religion is a category created by scholars who are 
essentially dealing with the past, that is, with history. To do this they seek to identify 
and then classify the things they see have similarities. In so doing the academy invents 
this category called religion, but within it there are many variations, subtleties and 
even differences that are missed. The argument that religion is a comparative category, 
in other words, can only come into existence as a taxonomic category when two or 
more systems of belief are being compared, is a highly persuasive one (Smith 1982: 
20; Chidester, 1996: 5). Even if this is not intuitively so in relation to individual 
religions, it is at least in relation to the academic study of the phenomenon, where 
comparison naturally takes place. This problem could arguably be overcome by only 
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studying contemporary religion, but this itself is an activity full of subjectivism, 
interpretation and the politics of the moment. Importantly, as has been argued above, 
comparison takes place within a normative context, making all enquiries into religion 
political or value-laden activities (Chidester 2000: 428). 
Given all of these issues about the conceptual category of religion — its 
complexity, its validity, its efficacy, its clarity — scholars are faced with the problem 
of not being sure that what they seek to study has the status of being a viable object of 
enquiry. But what is clear is that while most definitions identify part of what religion 
seems to be and while some theories appear to adequately describe and explain key 
aspects of religion, its breadth as a topic is such that in the end the category of religion 
may not best assist in describing what the nature of the phenomenon under 
consideration is. It may also not help to explain the persistence, pervasiveness and 
resilience of religion itself.  
For the purpose of this enquiry, the most significant issue is not whether 
religion exists as a category. It is rather that the entry point for studying whatever it is 
that religion is an expression of is also that of considering the most basic determining 
features of any religious activity. To explain these features or characteristics of 
religion and to engage with the very essence of belief, of the impact of beliefs on 
human praxis, a theoretical premise is required that isolates all these features and 
provides an explanation for them. This theoretical premise is to be found in the 
category of the sacred (Chidester 2005: 19). The dialectic of the sacred and the 
profane is arguably the most important for any enquiry into the nature, characteristics, 
definition or description of religion (Smith 1982: 38). As has been pointed out earlier, 
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the category of the sacred is regarded as being broad and possibly simply a substitute 
for that of religion. But the set-apart sacred, it is argued below, is a material, socially 
constructed category that is common to all behaviour and beliefs regarded as religious. 
Accepting this category as an entry point into a critique of religion does not 
mean abandoning the category of religion, or limiting the definition of religion to the 
sacred, but it is a position that recognises the challenges the category religion presents 
to fruitful academic enquiry. That some substantive, functionalist and structuralist 
theories regard the sacred as a significant conceptual category is also significant. This 
means that the sacred as a category presents us with an opportunity to begin a dialogue 
that attempts to situate the discussion at the centre of all of these theoretical 
contributions, building on their positive aspects and what they have developed in 
terms of understanding the relationship between what Lacan has called the real, the 
symbolic and the imaginary aspects of our social existence. In Lacan‘s theory of the 
development of the human subject, the various stages of development of the subject 
coincided with the realization that this development included an unmasking of reality, 
exposing the subject to the trauma of the various realisations of their own fragility, 
powerlessness and difference. This process, one of alienation, Lacan described as 
creating the difference between these various aspects of social existence and 
difference.  This framework, one that distinguishes between modes of experiencing 
subjectivity, is a powerful one that allows for the development of a useful elucidation 
of the manner in which human subjects perceive themselves and the world. In this 
sense, the categories of the real, the symbolic and the imaginary, are the totality of the 
lived experience of human beings. In Lacan‘s theoretical framework, the relationship 
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between the unconscious and these categories is also explored and the manner in 
which images, the imagination and self-deception, or the filtering of reality occurs 
between the conscious and the unconscious. How these categories relate to the 
symbolic expression of ideas is also explained in Lacan‘s work. Given that Lacan 
posits the real as the unattainable, human experience and the expression of this is 
confined to the imaginary and the symbolic, as he puts it (Lacan 1977). This 
framework also raises the possibility of explaining the powerful nature of the 
symbolic, as it is arguably the only truly conscious, lived experience of human beings. 
 
The sacred 
 
It has been argued above that there are substantive, functionalist and 
structuralist theories of religion that feature in the academic discourse on the subject. 
There are also versions of these approaches that seek to theorise the sacred. Both Otto 
and Eliade described the sacred as being the essence of religion (Otto 1923; Eliade 
1959). As with their theories of religion, the approach they took simply accepted the 
sacred as a category and then described what it represented or meant, in their view.  In 
such theories, there is no evidence presented for the actual category of the sacred. The 
sacred is simply proposed and accepted as a reality, based on the claimed experiences 
of religious adherents who argue that they have interacted with the sacred.  
Functionalist definitions of the sacred are more interesting in that they present an 
alternative theory that attempts to explain why people adopt and accept the category of 
the sacred (and of the profane) and how this then plays a particular role in society. In 
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these theories the sacred plays a role in creating a hierarchy or order of things that 
serves to identify them as being more or less socially valuable. But it is the 
structuralist arguments that present the most fruitful entry point for considering the 
sacred. This type of theory has its origins in the work of Durkheim and Mauss, who, 
strictly speaking offered a version of functionalism in their theories of religion. But 
the structuralist aspect of these theories was present and was brought out by Claude 
Levi-Strauss in particular (Durkheim 2001; Mauss 1969; Levi-Strauss 1969). 
Durkheim‘s definition of the sacred and the theory he constructs of how it is 
created offers the possibility of a materialist understanding of the basic ordering of the 
universe by humans. The effect of the sacred as conceptualized by Durkheim is far 
reaching. In characterizing the world as made up of the sacred and the profane, 
Durkheim proposed that there exists a basic, primordial logical, taxonomic system that 
orders the world into two basic categories. With these categories, Durkheim argued, 
human beings made sense of the world by setting apart or privileging certain aspects 
of it over others.  This conceptualization of the sacred goes beyond the use of the term 
sacred to mean simply ―valued‖ or ―desired‖. In ordering the world in this way, 
humans are firstly privileging some things over others. But is so doing, they are also 
defining the world and themselves. Fundamental to such a definition of the world is 
the notion of a biological, psychological and social subject, that is privileged before all 
else. 
Both Fitzgerald and McCutcheon have emphasised the difference between the 
phenomenological approaches to the sacred, which they decry, and the structuralist use 
of the concept (McCutcheon 2000: 51; Fitzgerald 1997: 12). In other words, they view 
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the sacred as something that can be understood as being a concrete social fact. The 
sacred is observable in the terms and conditions by which humans talk, eat, sleep, 
drink, work, play and worship. Whether the sacred is a transcendental category is an 
entirely different matter, but it is clear that the phenomenon of the sacred can be 
utilised to describe material, symbolic and transcendental or imaginary categories. 
Religion, by comparison, is a claimed social activity that is presented as a privileged 
discourse without any agreement on its materiality, or proof thereof. 
It is clear that while no agreement can be reached on a definition of religion, it 
is argued here that what is described as religion, and other social activities that are not 
generally considered to be religion, revolves around an engagement between people 
and that which they regard as sacred. The sacred is therefore proposed as the subject of 
enquiry through which to obtain some clarity about what is termed religion, simply 
because whatever the ontological or epistemological views one holds in relation to 
religion, whether one describes religion in substantive, functionalist, structuralist, 
psychological or culturalist terms, or a mixture of these, there can be no question at all 
that people engaged in what is described as religious behaviour or activity are 
engaging with the sacred (Antonnen 2000: 272, Smith 1982: 37). It is only fair to point 
out that critics may raise the objection that this is just a rather obvious and even 
unsophisticated semantic maneuver designed to avoid or sidestep the challenges of 
academic research in the field of religious studies. These critics will have to be 
persuaded otherwise.  
The sacred and religion are certainly not one and the same thing. The sacred as 
a category refers to things that are set-apart. Religion refers to a number of activities 
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relating to this category of set-apart things, but also to various other values, principles 
and possibly a credo in certain instances. But what it is clear that there can be no 
uncontested study of religion without some engagement with the category of the set-
apart sacred. It is argued here that the pervasiveness and persistence of the sacred is 
one of its key characteristics and one of its strengths. There is an argument that the 
sacred is as ambiguous a concept as religion, but it is argued further here that that 
ambiguity does not apply to the set-apart sacred, since the basis of that concept is a 
material one and not a matter of faith or belief. The set-apart sacred cannot be reduced 
to simply being about value, although value is a key aspect of the category. The 
political economy of the sacred is an attempt to elucidate how value is produced, 
determined, enforced and disposed of. 
Like religion, the sacred as a conceptual category has its origins partly in the 
discourse of the Christian faith. The etymology of the word sacred in European 
societies locates its origin in the Latin sanctum and the French sacre, respectively, that 
which relates to the Gods and to sacrifice (Asad 1993: 30; Debray 1981: 257). Social 
anthropologists and ethnographers encountered the sacred as a category outside of the 
Christian context when observing ―primitive‖ societies they were studying. The 
attempts to find out more about humanity through studying people who lived in less 
economically developed places created an exotic field of enquiry in which the strange, 
the other and the unknown were encountered. In observing these societies, pioneering 
social scientists encountered belief systems they categorized variously as fetishism, 
animism, or totemism, which combined ―belief in spiritual beings‖ with the belief that 
some unique relationships exists between certain groups of people and various plants 
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and animals (Durkheim 2001: 76; Malinowski 1948: 20).  These belief systems were 
compared with other religions and with Christianity in particular, whether explicitly or 
otherwise implicitly. 
Along with witchcraft, magic and mythology, these belief systems were 
variously described as being the precursors to modern religion or as being belief and 
knowledge systems that functioned as symbolic systems through which humans 
engaged with and made sense of their world. While many of the early ethnographers 
made somewhat startling claims about the so-called primitive people they studied, the 
value of these exercises was that they created a prism through which later 
anthropologists started analyzing their own societies and constructed theories about 
society in general. In this respect, Claude Levi-Strauss pioneered the study of the ways 
in which people identified and categorised food, animals, humans, magic and religion 
and the relationships between these categories as subjects of crucial enquiry (Levi-
Strauss 1964: 93, 104). The objective of his enquiries was to uncover ―the world of 
symbolism. . . infinitely varied in content, but always limited in its laws‖ (Levi-Strauss 
1964: 203). In other words, Levi-Strauss argued that there are structured aspects of 
society that could be demystified by the study of other societies, initially the so-called 
primitive ones that would allow the development of a theoretical framework for 
describing and explaining society in general. Since these categories are common to all 
societies — so-called primitive and modern — the study of these presented an 
opportunity to develop laws about how society functions. Levi-Strauss noted the 
similarities between so-called primitive and modern societies and motivated for an 
understanding of society that did not place these in a particular hierarchy. 
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The conceptual category of the sacred as utilised by Emile Durkheim defines it 
as that which is set apart in society in a particularly, superior, hierarchical position, 
circumscribed by prohibitions, around which a moral community is situated 
(Durkheim 2001: 46).  This social unit is at one and the same time the actual 
community, the abstract community as represented in symbols or signs of religion and 
often the imagined community located in a special, set apart time and space. Religion 
is distinguished from magic by Durkheim in that he views magic, which is similar to 
religion in that it consists of particular rites and beliefs, as being distinguished from 
religion by not binding its adherents into a community. In Durkheim's view, magic is a 
private activity and religion a social one (Durkheim 2001: 43). By defining the sacred 
as ―that which is set apart and forbidden‖, Durkheim strategically located the sacred 
not as an emotional experience or a philosophical system, but as a concrete social fact, 
that is, as an outcome of the structural nature of society (Durkheim 2001: 36). 
Durkheim also simultaneously defined the nature of the profane in that it is that which 
is outside of the sacred.  
Building on Durkheim‘s concept of the sacred, Mauss developed a theoretical 
framework that described the relationship between ritual and the sacred (Mauss 1950: 
92). Mauss argued that belief in the sacred underpins the manner in which societies 
function in their totality, setting up effective systems of obligation and exchange and 
creating a socialised conception of the world and an institution of value as a powerful 
glue that holds that world together (Mauss 1966: 70). In this view, the symbols that 
represent the sacred in society are generated by the social relationships that people 
have, importantly producing a surplus of signification (Levi-Strauss 1987: 62). These 
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sacred symbols create a milieu within which the pictures people have of the world are 
constructed. Mauss also described the manner in which the exchange of the symbolic 
takes place, where things of value, produced by ritual, achieve an important status in 
society and are therefore representative of some higher value (Mauss 1966: 66). In 
Mauss view, the sacred is an economic category, with economic value having its 
origins in the religious activities of people.  
Clifford Geertz argues a similar point. These sacred symbols, he claims, ―relate 
to a lifestyle and a designated metaphysics that mutually reinforce one another‖ 
(Geertz 1973: 90).  Geertz also argues that what defines humans and what 
distinguishes them from animals is the meaning that they can express through signs 
and communicate to one another through language. Claude Levi-Strauss extended the 
category of the sacred from being simply about that which is set apart and argued that 
it is a category analogous to the numeral zero, creating the extraordinary out of 
anything, just as the zero creates a system of infinite numerals out of the nine basic 
digits or even the single integer one (Levi-Strauss 1968: 200). In this sense, the sacred 
becomes a conceptual category that enables the construction of a crucial theory of how 
humans make sense of and order the world, since everything that is social has a 
symbolic value generated by the sacred. 
Essentially, what has therefore been argued is that the sacred produces a 
system of symbols that function as signs of the sacred and relate to one another 
through meanings and interpretations. The sacred therefore functions just as a 
language does. Like a language, the sacred can produce an infinite variety of 
signification, without ever losing its strategic value as a system. This potential for 
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signification manifests itself as abundance. Signs, like words, are available in infinite 
supply, as they are the product of the human imagination, expressed in and through the 
social interactions between people. 
Georges Bataille included the profane and whatever is taboo and off-limits into 
the category of the sacred, arguing that the sacred is all about the power of being 
designated as set apart, whether as sacred or profane (Bataille 1989: 36). This 
ambivalence of the sacred makes distinctions between the sacred/profane on the one 
hand and the ordinary on the other hand and is used by Bataille to describe extreme 
acts of sacrifice and destruction as ways in which these two aspects of our world that 
cannot really be integrated, are experienced simultaneously. Importantly, Bataille also 
points to the ritual destruction of surplus, as does Mauss, as being an essential feature 
of society. This has important ramifications that will be considered later. At the very 
least, the routinised destruction of material goods, in order to symbolically create 
some egalitarian spirit in a community, must create conditions for solidarity between 
its members and remove the threat of competition escalating to violence, war and the 
destruction of people. 
Peter Berger has defined the sacred as all that is assigned power and that 
promotes order in society (Berger 1967: 26-27). In this view, the sacred is the 
foundation of society and social existence necessarily produces religion (Berger 1967: 
48). Berger argues that ritual and alienation configure the human interaction with the 
world in such a manner that the outcome is prefigured as being that of a relationship 
with the sacred. These rituals are related to and reinforce various prohibitions and 
permissions. 
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Régis Debray has argued that this process of demarcation of the sacred and the 
profane functions in much the same way as the manner in which social groups are 
demarcated. Groups of any kind, he argues, are defined by that which is on the inside 
and that which is on the outside, creating a social dynamic of incompleteness that is 
structurally inherent within society (Debray 1984: 184). The effect of this process of 
demarcation is therefore felt in the very manner in which society is constructed and 
reproduced. The social process of incorporation, in this view, creates terms and 
conditions that set apart individuals from the group as subjects and from each other as 
leaders and the led in a structured hierarchy (Debray 1984: 205). In other words, the 
sacred is at the center of social life, it is inescapable, as is the logic this fact initiates. 
As Debray puts it, the moral community being designated manifests a social physics 
that is definitively related to the sacred (Debray 1981: 170).  As such, human social 
existence makes people religious by definition, whether in the form of the political 
functioning of this primordial religious unconscious or in the transcendental form, 
including in the reification, personification and veneration of deities (Debray 1984: 
192). 
Debray also makes the case for what he calls a universal or natural religion and 
a religious-political unconscious. These concepts are contentious and arguably add 
little to the theoretical framework he constructs. Like Chomsky‘s universal grammar, 
Debray‘s universal religious unconscious is the syntax within which a religion is 
developed. Just as syntax can generate many different languages, the sacred can 
generate many different symbolic systems. Frederic Jameson has also posited the 
notion of a political unconscious (Jameson 1996: 20). As with Debray‘s religious 
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unconscious, Jameson‘s political unconscious pervades human society, manifesting 
itself in the structures that are created for managing the collective. Obviously, the 
notion of the unconscious has its origins in Freud‘s theory of how the human subject is 
created and configured. 
Debray has developed this critique of the sacred and of religion, tracing the 
development of the concept of the monotheistic deity in the social conditions of 
nomadic life in the deserts of what is today described as the Middle East (Debray 
2004: 38). Describing the effect of incompleteness and the sacred in society, Debray 
has created a powerful interdisciplinary field of enquiry cutting across sociology, 
religion, language and media. This field of mediology explores ways in which power 
is configured and deployed by elites utilising different technologies to communicate or 
transmit ideas. Debray identitifies the different gazes of society depending on the 
mediasphere that is in operation. That is, he differentiates between the effects of the 
spoken word in direct communication, the written text, pictures, moving images or the 
spoken word broadcast by radio, television or the cinema (Debray 1996; 1997).  
This view of the origins of belief systems in the material determination of the 
sacred conveniently provides an entry point into the issues of belief, not only of 
religion, but also of ideas in general (Durkheim 2001: 40). Durkheim viewed rites and 
practical activity as being central to religious life. The practices of the identification, 
production and veneration of the sacred, the rites that go with this and of the 
management of the profane are the stuff of religion (Durkheim 2001: 42). Durkheim‘s 
theory of the evolution of religion through totemism and ancestor worship has been 
criticized but the fact remains that through defining the sacred as being at the centre of 
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religious life and arguably at the centre of society, Durkheim laid the foundation for a 
materialist critique of religion. It is a theory of the sacred that argues that believing 
comes from doing and not the other way around. 
A serious challenge to the concept of the sacred is that of its relevance for the 
study of religion, or anything else for that matter, due to it being arguably arbitrary 
and tautological (Smith, 1982: 37, 40). This criticism has to be answered and part of 
the answer, at least, lies in the recognition of the fact that human activity can be 
differentiated as being regarded sacred or profane at various levels, ranging from the 
trivial to the significant. What is regarded as religion is itself activity that is set apart 
from other social activity precisely by the designation and recognition of it as being 
sacred belief and activity that relates to things set apart that are transcendental, that are 
regarded as having a particular significance to communities, whether these be physical 
objects, imagined beings or even values. Smith has convincingly argued that while the 
term may seem arbitrary and tautological, what he describes as ―the persistence of the 
sacred‖, its consistent appearance in both society and in the discourse around religion, 
has to be explained (Smith 1982:37). He argues that the categories sacred and ritual 
are interchangeable as it is ritual that sets apart the sacred (Smith 1982: 55). 
Durkheim‘s theory of the sacred has also been criticised as being circular in 
that he argues that society is the sacred and that the sacred is the society represented 
symbolically (Debray 1981: 172). This criticism can be overcome if the framework 
that Debray suggests is utilised. The sacred as a ―collective, pre-conscious schema‖, 
provides an explanation for how the collective represents itself through the sacred 
(Debray 1981: 172). The sacred is therefore a structural category, created by the 
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language and rituals of people in their social interaction. To order the world all objects 
are compared, found to be similar or dissimilar, categorized as special, that is as 
valuable, or ordinary and in that setting apart, as sacred or not. The issue of the 
category of the sacred as being one that includes the profane is an interesting one, but 
it is not essential to the structural outcomes of social existence that this is the case. The 
issue of certain things being taboo illustrates this. Taboo is a category of dread of fear 
and of the potential negative reprisal of breaking a taboo. Even though certain objects 
may be worshipped as being sacred, they can also be taboo, for instance in the case of 
animals that are regarded as sacred ancestors of a particular group of people and 
therefore prohibited as a potential food. 
Mathew T. Evans has provided a useful review of the various uses of the term 
sacred and through this has developed an analytical framework that clarifies the ways 
in which the term is used. He identifies these uses as the interchangeability of the term 
with that of religion, its reference to the transcendental and the use of the term in 
Durkheim‘s sense of the sacred as set apart (Evans 2003: 33). He describes how the 
sacred is used personally, spiritually, in the civil space as well as in religious terms 
and that what distinguishes that which is set apart as sacred in the sense of holy, is that 
which is regarded as transcendental (Evans 2003: 41-42). Most significantly, he points 
to the fact that what sets apart the sacred is the observation that it has a perceived 
value for those in the community or society that hold it to be sacred (Evans 2003: 39). 
Evans‘ framework therefore neatly clarifies the ways in which the term sacred is 
utilised.  
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Evans does, however, revert back to using terms such as spirituality and 
religion to describe the sacred, when the categories he ought to be referring to are the 
personal, the collective or civil and that which lies beyond in a realm that is either real 
or imagined but cannot be accessed or experienced except through ritual activity in a 
collectively agreed manner. Evans mentions the value-generating aspect of the sacred 
but does not expand on this. However, one aspect of the sacred that is clearly 
identifiable is its socially agreed value. Whether in the form of sacred relics, sacred 
space, and sacred time or in terms of sacred aspects of our bodies, the sacred is what 
people desire, covet, steal, treasure and even kill or die for ownership and control of 
(Fitzgerald 2000: 19). Importantly, Evans‘ review clarifies the distinction between the 
sacred, in the sense of the transcendental, and the set-apart sacred, that is, all things 
designated as sacred, including the transcendental. It is this set-apart sacred that is the 
focus here. This conception of the set-apart sacred is developed out of the sacred as 
defined by Durkheim, Mauss and used by others such as Levi-Strauss, Debray and 
others, but differs in that the material processes of how the set-apart sacred is 
produced are further articulated. These processes, involving human embodiment, 
psychology, processes of categorisation and ritualisation, determine a material and 
taxonomic quality of being set-apart. 
Referring to van der Leeuw‘s work on sacred space, David Chidester and 
Edward T. Linenthal describe how sacred space has value because it is firstly 
designated sacred through social acts of ritual, but then is also ―appropriated, 
possessed and owned‖ (Chidester and Linenthal 1995: 8). Chidester has elsewhere 
provided a definition of religion that situates it ―between the state and the market, 
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between political power and economic exchange‖, as a sphere of activity where people 
engage with issues of a transcendent nature or the sacred and with their own being 
(Chidester 2005: 1). This definition locates the sacred as the focus of what is described 
as religion, but importantly does so in economic terms.  The political economy of the 
sacred is then defined as ―the terrain and resources, the strategies and tactics, in and 
through which the sacred is negotiated‖ (Chidester 2005: 19). While this is useful, the 
limited focus on the transcendental sacred constrains the extent to which this powerful 
analysis can be utilised. The challenge is to create a more general framework for the 
political economy of the sacred that allows for the set-apart sacred to be analysed. 
Among the first social acts, then, is that which generates the set-apart sacred, 
both in terms of the founding of the social collective and of the leadership of the 
collective, both of which are set apart in the sense that Durkheim meant it. But Debray 
goes further than Durkheim. He claims that the sacred is embedded in the hardware of 
the social, as it were. He describes it as a ―physics of belief‖, or a ―collective, 
preconscious schematism‖ that limits the extent to which humanity, as organised 
collectively, can think and act any differently to what is commonly observed, that is, 
to the religious terms and conditions of social existence. His argument is that any 
group, be it a religious community, a political party or a nation, has basic 
characteristics because it is organised by and through an ‗ideology‘, that is, ―the 
collective, preconscious, schematism‖ of a religious, political or scientific nature. This 
ensures that the group can remain organised, but importantly, this process and its 
consequences are unavoidable. In other words, social existence is mediated in and 
through the set-apart sacred. The result of this is that the set-apart sacred is the 
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primordial form of organising, understanding and communicating about the world for 
human beings. Humans cannot have any stable social existence without a shared 
conception of the set-apart sacred and consequently of the profane and the ordinary. 
The sacred generates terms of ―affectivity, effectivity and community‖; through the 
social beliefs it constitutes and empowers to be of practical consequence (Debray 
1981: 128). In this view, to belong is to believe and to believe is to accept the set-apart 
sacred. 
The social physics of this set-apart sacred nature of society is that institutions 
are set up to manage the set-apart sacred, namely churches, political organisations and 
economic formations. In the course of this there are certain mediators that are required 
who safeguard, interpret and manage the set-apart sacred. This nomenclature — the 
priests, the politicians and the economic managers — become privileged by their 
relationship to the set-apart sacred and their position between it and the subjects that 
make up the collective. Understood in this way, the set-apart sacred pervades all 
aspects of our social existence. As Evans has shown, the set-apart sacred has a 
presence in the private, the civic and the transcendental spheres. Debray‘s framework 
allows us to consider the set-apart sacred in the economic, the political, the social, the 
sexual or any other sphere. This is because the syntax of the set-apart sacred, as he 
describes it, is the basic framework for any collective existence and the functioning of 
that collective. 
The ordinary, that which is not set apart or sacred, is an important category, 
since what privileges the set-apart sacred over the ordinary must also partly define its 
opposite and vice versa. While it may seem tautological, it seems fairly obvious that 
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that which is not the set-apart sacred is what is ordinary. Clearly, this is most of what 
people engage with all the time. This is partly what gives the set-apart sacred its power 
and character, since it is the set-apart sacred that stands out from the ordinary, whether 
it be in terms of time, space, objects, people or activities. 
Of course, the set-apart sacred is produced by ritual, that is, by any agreed and 
shared social process in which the collective invests time and effort. These can be in 
terms similar to those that Lacan has defined — the real, the imaginary and the 
symbolic — creating a structure of value that functions at all of these levels (Lacan 
1977). This total reality that is socially constructed through the set-apart sacred is one 
that orders the world at all these levels and does so for space, time and objects, 
including people. 
Key to this process is the function of ritual in society. Like religion, ritual is an 
invented category, in that just about anything can be regarded as a ritual (Smith 1992, 
1997). Ritual encompasses many aspects of human activity. There are special rules for 
the activities that go together with the worship of deities (Boyer 2001: 269). From this 
perspective ritual, is behaviour designed to create a certain effect among participants 
in them, making them believe that what they are doing is sacred activity. 
Smith has described ritual as activities that humans engage in that are set-apart 
by the attention to the detail of these acts and their repetition Smith 1987: 191). 
Describing the role of sacrifice in relation to ritual, Smith has suggested the power of 
ritualisation lies in its set apart character and this with the practices of sacrifice. In 
Smiths terms, ritual is ―a mode of paying attention‖ and of identifying interest in 
something (Smith 1987: 103). Smith has also articulated the relationship between 
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ritual and place, describing how the marking out of space and its ritualized existence is 
what turns the arbitrary into the particular, thereby sacralising it (Smith 1987: 104). 
The sacred then can be understood as relating to the dimensions of time and space and 
to the process of making something sacred by its location being specified and it‘s 
being marked as different from that which is not sacred. This difference of the sacred, 
the setting apart of it, turns things such as blood from being a source of impurity, to 
one of purity, for example (Smith 1987:110). Significantly, Smith argues that ritual 
and the sacred relate to institutions such as kingship, pointing to the set-apart sacred 
nature of certain individuals. 
Clifford Geertz has described ritual as the various ways of making sense of the 
world by investing certain activities with ―consecrated behaviour‖ (Geertz 2000: 112). 
In this way, the lived and the imagined world, are brought together through certain 
activities that the participants understand to be significant. This is certainly the case, 
but what is significant is not the relationship between the material and the 
transcendental aspects of ritual. It is rather the symbolic nature of the set-apart sacred 
and the human activity in producing this that is significant. There is also a significant 
interpretation of ritual as being work that is carried out by communities and the people 
in them (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 156). In this perspective, ritual is an activity 
designed to repair the social fabric, rent asunder by death, misfortune or calamity 
(Chidester 1988: 12). This social labour is significant in that it relies on all of the 
community to participate in it and its power is derived from those who do so and their 
will to re-imagine the world in a particular way. Durkheim recognized the significance 
of ritual, placing it at the centre of the social activity that defined the community 
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through its beliefs (Durkheim 2001: 11, 36). But this perspective on ritual still views it 
as related to beliefs in deities, the transcendental or other immaterial factors or forces. 
Mauss also placed ritual in relation to the sacred claiming that the ―basic idea 
of all ritual. . .was this idea of the sacred‖ (Mauss 1972: 10). As was shown earlier, of 
significance is Mauss‘ location of the production of value in the activities of 
ritualisation and therefore the creation of the category of the economic as originating 
in the religious activities of people. It is arguable that the same applies to political 
activities that clearly have their origins in the communal processes of societies. 
Catherine Bell has located ritual as ―a strategic arena for the embodiment of 
power relations‖ (Bell 1992: 170). This perspective is a significant one, for it explains 
why it is that in performing rituals certain people play certain roles, have access to 
paraphernalia and conduct the important parts of any ritual. This setting apart of 
certain people is similar to that described by Debray, as shown above. Bell goes on to 
say that ritual is not merely about the repetition of tradition, but that ritual activities 
are the medium through which ideas about the world are constructed, embodied and 
reinforced. Ritual is therefore activities that are set-apart from ordinary ones in that 
they are activities of material consequence, even if not in the form intended by the 
participants. Ritual activities are therefore set-apart sacred activities of social labour 
performed within the collective that generate and locate meaning and value for the 
collective.   
The set-apart sacred is that which is set apart through ritual, held to be of value 
by the collective and related either to the personal, civic or transcendental spheres of 
our social existence. It exists at both a material and at an imaginary level, but is 
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always and everywhere as symbolic. Where it is mutually agreed upon to have a value, 
it may be traded or exchanged. The means and methods of this circulation of symbolic 
property are set out in agreed terms. These are the traditions, customs or laws of a 
society.  
Because the set-apart sacred is determined in this manner, it is ubiquitous. So 
we find personal items or treasures that we hold as set-apart sacred, such as an 
heirloom. The family or close personal friends who agree on the value of such objects 
determine this. We also find communal or civic set-apart sacred items such as national 
flags, constitutions and anthems. In such instances, the community or its ancestors that 
participated in the process of fighting for the power of these social institutions 
determines the set-apart sacred. Significantly for the purposes of any enquiry into 
religion, there are set-apart sacred things of a transcendental nature, those imagined, 
symbolic and material things that are regarded as holy. Examples abound, from those 
beliefs to do with places, such as churches, mosques or temples, to periods of worship 
and observance such as holy days. Human bodies are deemed to be set-apart sacred, 
particularly by those located within them. There are set-apart sacred relics, such as the 
bones of saints and shrouds that people steal, kill for and die for (Chidester 2000: 
218). What all of these have in common is that a collective act, an act of social labour, 
has designated them as set-apart, that is not ordinary, and of some more or less agreed 
value. This is the necessary social labour that creates the symbolic property that is 
rendered sacred in its being set-apart. 
In other words, what makes these things set-apart sacred therefore, is simply 
that they are agreed to be such by a group of people and then marked as such. This 
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group may be successful in transmitting this set-apart sacred character of a place, time 
or a thing to others, whether geographically or over a period of time. That is what any 
particular religion is - an historical community of people who share a belief in what 
counts as set-apart sacred and who observe this belief in practice through private and 
social demonstrations of this belief and who have an agreed institution for managing 
the set-apart sacred as they see it. Initially, these things of value are created by ritual, 
that is, by practical acts of social agreement or compacts that set-apart a place, time or 
an object through such communal activities that reinforce the initial agreement that 
demarcates the set-apart sacred. This process, whether of praying, abstaining or 
indulging — any act of observance — creates the terms and conditions of the set-apart 
sacred. Of course, once there is agreement on what the set-apart sacred is, it can then 
be represented by itself, or by a sign or symbol. Once the set-apart sacred has been 
produced and symbolically represented, it can be exchanged. This is how the set-apart 
sacred is located at points where it can be consumed in society. It is therefore clear 
that the production and exchange, the appropriation and consumption of the set-apart 
sacred are all relationships that have an intrinsic economic character. 
Crucial to this process is the fact that while the set-apart sacred is produced 
collectively, it is invariably appropriated by elites and individuals, whether by force or 
by sleight of hand and these become the custodians of the symbolic property of a 
collective. The role of kings and priests in this regard cannot be over-emphasised. It is 
this social process of the privatization of communal property, in the first instance 
symbolic, but later physical, that arguably creates the institution of private property. 
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In order to better understand this economic character of the set-apart sacred, or 
rather the economic potential of the category, there is a need to consider the ways in 
which the set-apart sacred is manifested in society. One of the closest if often 
contradictory relationships is that of the religion and the economy. Religion and the 
economy are two spheres of social activity and of academic enquiry that have been in 
significant dialogue with one another. On the one hand, religion either exhorts the 
virtues of economic activity or it warns of the vices of economic activity, usually in 
terms of some notion of excess (Chidester 2005: 112). Economists have either viewed 
religion with a sense of skepticism or of opportunity. There are common themes in 
religion that deal with the power of religion to assist in acquiring material things. This 
is evident in so-called cargo cults (La Barre 1971; Lawrence 1964; Worsely 1957). It 
is also present in various brands of prosperity Christianity, where members of these 
churches are told that their relationship with God and Jesus Christ are the most 
important for their desired economic success (Comaroff and Comaroff  2000: 303). 
This is not to argue that religion is a market (see, for example, Finke and 
Iannaconne 1993) or that markets are religion (see Benjamin 1996; Foltz 2007; Loy 
1997). These types of theories are plentiful and are significant. Rather, it is a 
perspective that argues that the very notion of economic activity is premised on a 
conception of value that has to be generated through the set-apart sacred. 
 What has been argued here is that the set-apart sacred has a genealogy that is 
of immense value. The set-apart sacred, as a category, enables an understanding of 
how society is organised and functions. The set-apart sacred functions in a manner 
analogous to language, in that the symbols and signs of the set-apart sacred, the 
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symbolic property of society, are generated through the rituals that hold society 
together, including those of sacrifice. The set-apart sacred presents itself as a narrative 
about society, whether in the form of myths, legends or dominant discourses, religion 
and ideology being examples of these. These discourses occur in the media of the oral, 
textual and technological, all means of communicating these set-apart ideas. The 
taboos and conventions that manifest themselves as magic, animism, fetishism or 
religion are ways of saying and doing things to get other things done. In the course of 
this doing, the surplus generated by society, both in symbolic and in material terms, is 
disposed of. It is these aspects of the set-apart sacred that allows for the development 
of a general political economy. 
The set-apart sacred is therefore a material effect in society. Like language, the 
set-apart sacred has effect by being the material symbolic. Symbolic property has two 
aspects. It is both an object and a sign. To the extent that all things are signs, they have 
both a symbolic and a material effect. It is material property that has to be understood 
in this manner, since it exists in both realms. To that extent, Baudrillard is right in 
asserting that the ideological aspect of things, their symbolic aspect, is primary, but 
only if understood as simultaneously a physical, a psychological and a social category. 
This is manifested through human embodiment, that is, the corporeal and mortal 
nature of human existence, the psychological fragility and insecurity of humans and 
those relations that are simultaneously personal and social in nature (Bell 1992: 95). 
Since the set-apart sacred is an economic category and since the dominant 
relationships in modern capitalism are all defined in monetary terms, it is crucial to 
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consider the relationship between the sacred and the most powerful analysis of 
political economy, historical materialism. 
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Chapter 3: Marxism and the Sacred 
 
Religion, the sacred and the economy 
 
Marx, Durkheim and Mauss all recognized the sacred nature of the economy 
and the economic nature of the sacred. Marx‘s work, primarily a critique of capitalism, 
but one that originated as a critique of religion, is littered with references to the sacred 
and religion. In Capital Volume 1, money is sacred, gold is a Holy Grail and 
commodities are deities (Marx 1976). In The German Ideology, man creates God in 
his own image (Marx and Engels 1970). In the famous quote in the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, religion is described as ―the sigh of the oppressed creature, the 
heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opiate of the 
masses (Marx 1977: 131). William Clare Roberts in his Marx in Hell: The Critique of 
Political Economy as Katabasis, provides a rich analysis of the religious imagery that 
is scattered throughout Marx‘s works (Roberts 2005). Richard Comstock has provided 
a review of religion in Marxism, citing its ambiguous role in the critique of political 
economy (Comstock 1976). 
Marxism‘s relationship to religion is complex. Not only is the Marxist critique 
of religion not clearly articulated in one place, it also often appears in Marxist 
literature in relation to concepts such as alienation, fetishisation, false consciousness 
and ideology. This makes clarification of the Marxist relationship to religion a difficult 
but nonetheless important task if the theory is to be strengthened and developed. In 
truth, Marxism or historical materialism is founded on a critique of religion that was 
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later developed and expanded to include a critique of the economy and of the form of 
democracy that accompanied capitalism, that is, bourgeois or liberal democracy. 
 Like Marx, Durkheim understood that economics alone was not the answer to 
the human condition. Durkheim however, unlike Marx who arguably dismissed 
religion as a distorted way of viewing the world, emphasized the fact that the 
relationship between economics and religion mattered (Durkheim 2001: 162). But it 
was his student and protégé, Marcel Mauss, who uncovered the economic aspects of 
the sacred and the sacred aspects of the economy. Observing the practices of exchange 
and of worship among Melanesian people, Mauss came to the conclusion that religion 
and economic exchange are significantly related to one another (Mauss 1969). This 
relationship was obviously at odds with perceived wisdom at the time, since the social 
sciences had created hard divisions between religion and economics, religion and 
politics and religion and science. Yet Mauss and other Durkheimians such as Robert 
Hertz demonstrated the inter-relatedness between these categories and significantly 
undermined the primacy of economics (Hertz 1960). But if that is accepted as the case, 
the dominant discourse of recent centuries has been that of the economic and certainly 
historical materialism has been a powerful force in that discourse. While many 
different religions have existed side by side, sometimes in peace and at other times in 
a state of war, there is one economic system that has come to dominate the world. It is 
that of capitalism. 
 
The dominance and resilience of capitalism  
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Like religion and despite all of Marx‘s predictions, capitalism has endured and 
is arguably more pervasive, resilient and persistent than ever before. While slavery and 
feudalism exist, they are no longer the dominant systems of human exploitation and 
oppression. Capitalism in the form of the private ownership of property and the 
processes of the production, circulation, exchange and consumption of commodities 
has outlasted these systems and the various socialist experiments of the twentieth 
century. While Marxists and some other social scientists have usually taken the view 
that capitalism is a fairly modern development and has arisen as a result of the 
development of the economic systems from more rudimentary systems, there is a view 
that the exchange of goods and services is as old as human society itself (Graeber 
2006). In this view, various modes of production, exchange and consumption have 
coexisted with each other in more or less dominant positions at various periods of 
time. In other words, these are not separate, successive systems that develop from one 
to another or within each other, but at various times the practices of slavery, of feudal 
relationships and arguably of other social and economic relationships, such as 
indentured labour, have existed alongside commodity production, exchange and 
consumption. The modern form of capitalism, the mass production of commodities, is 
unique, but earlier systems of the private production and exchange of goods and 
services were proto-capitalist, in that they involved production, exchange and 
consumption, albeit on a reduced scale. 
The modern variant of capitalism is dysfunctional as a system. It does not and 
arguably cannot produce enough of the goods and services desired or even needed by 
humanity and as result of the shortages experienced, many go without the basics: food, 
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shelter, and clothing. Almost half of the world‘s population lives on less than US$2.50 
per day (Shah 2009). Capitalism is accompanied by inequality, poverty, 
underdevelopment, conflict and environmental degradation. Under capitalism, the vast 
majority of the world‘s wealth is owned and controlled by a tiny percentage of the 
population. The poorest 40 percent of the world‘s population accounts for only 5 
percent of global income, while the richest 20 percent accounts for 75 percent of world 
income (Shah 2009). Capitalism is routinely denounced and criticised by workers, 
politicians and priests, yet it persists. Capitalism experiences periodic crises that cause 
wide spread unemployment, increased economic hardship and consistent uncertainty. 
The recent financial and economic crisis (as if these are two distinct and separate 
things) is only the latest of the many of these that have affected the increasingly global 
economy. In the last one hundred years there have been at least three, if not four, such 
crises (Krugman 2008).  
Despite these recurring crises, capitalism is now arguably at the peak of its 
power globally and the once existing proposed alternative to capitalism in the form of 
‗really existing socialism‘ has all but disappeared, apart from existing in the form of 
undemocratic dictatorships of Communist Party and Workers Party elites in a few 
countries. Wikipedia lists only five communist or workers parties as ruling parties, out 
of a possible hundred or more that once held power or were dominant parties 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_communist_parties). 
Arguably, the most powerful and one of the most widely accepted critiques of 
capitalism is that of Karl Marx, developed together with his comrade, friend and 
collaborator, Frederich Engels, and further elaborated by an illustrious list of activists, 
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scholars and intellectuals as a field of social enquiry. Marxism is one of the most 
significant collective efforts in academic history. Marxism, historical materialism and 
the study of political economy generally, as influenced by the theory of capitalist 
development proposed by Marx and his collaborators, is a powerful discourse, a social 
network, an institution and an academic field in its own right. 
Despite this history, all the predictions of the immanent crisis and the 
impending collapse of capitalism, to be followed by the development of socialism and 
of communism, have yet to materialise. Capitalism, like religion, seems not only to 
survive all these predictions, but it has grown and arguably developed and even 
strengthened itself, in spite of the intermittent crises of the system. 
In recent times, the critique of capitalism has taken on new forms. 
Globalisation has resulted in social movements that respond to this process and that 
have taken on a global dimension themselves. Despite this development and in spite of 
the recent global financial and economic crisis, no serious socialist, social democratic, 
anarchist or any other similar alternative has been put forward that has captured the 
imagination of the multitudes of poor, exploited and oppressed people of the world. 
Certainly, whatever they have experienced, it has not been enough to move them to 
change the system, despite the predictions that their number and the manifest 
weaknesses of the unipolar power of the United States of America, seen as the bastion 
of capitalism, would ensure this. This lack of revolutionary fervour on the part of the 
masses is in spite of today‘s incredible global communication capacity in the form of 
relatively inexpensive radio, television, mobile and fixed line telephony and the 
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internet and the manifest, vast disparities of income, wealth and lifestyle that exist 
between the wealthy and the poor. 
The obvious question then arises: what possible value could a theory of society 
that has not proved itself to be true or efficacious have, even if purely for academic 
purposes? Despite this manifest failure of historical materialism, it has endured, 
periodically emerging as the more or less dominant discourse within the social 
sciences as well as politically. The methodology of Marxism, historical materialism, 
does provide an account of the world and of capitalist society in particular that seems 
to many people, intuitively at least, to be a true reflection of their lived reality. 
Marxism is constantly re-theorised, sometimes from within itself by new 
interpretations of Marx, Engels‘ and others work, or sometimes from without by the 
relationship between the discipline and other fields of social enquiry, such as 
structuralism or semio-linguistics. Historical materialism does need to be considered 
as an important entry point in to studying the capitalist system, since despite its 
manifest failures, it still commands respect and stature within the academy and in 
broader society. If there is one phenomenon that appears, superficially at least, similar 
to religious movements, it is that of the social movements, political parties and other 
organisations that persistently wait for and work towards the end of capitalism. 
  
Historical materialism, religion and the sacred 
 
Marxism and particularly the Marxist historical materialist method has been 
one of the most powerful intellectual and practical phenomenons of the nineteenth and 
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twentieth centuries. It may still emerge as the same for the twenty-first century. Since 
the time of Marx‘s critique of capitalism, virtually the entirety of humanity has been 
engaged in debates, arguments and wars over whether his theory has validity or not.  
Not unlike the world‘s great religions, Marxism has cut a swath through 
history, leaving a body count as high as any religion. Marx and Marxism have been 
read in many different ways, most often depending on the political interests or 
intentions of the interpreter, but even so, usually in terms of genuine debates about 
capitalism and the challenges that arise from the system. Historical materialism is 
considered as a potential answer to these challenges and aspects of society that 
continually dog human beings: exploitation, poverty, under-development and 
inequality, to mention a few of the most significant. These theories and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from them are also debated, seemingly without end.  
Not least of all, Marx has been read in terms of the consequences of the 
application of Marxist theory for society. Traditionally, the view taken is that Marxism 
is a philosophy, an economic critique of society or a social critique grounded in 
economics and a theory of history (Lenin 1968: 23). This description comes in part 
from Marx and Engels‘ own claims in this regard, but also from scholars who have 
engaged in the critique of, the reinterpretation of, or a fundamental opposition to 
Marxism. Lenin, arguably one of the most erudite Marxist scholars, defined Marxism 
as ―the system of Marx‘s views and teachings. Marx was the genius who continued 
and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as 
represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German 
philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with 
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French revolutionary doctrines in general‖ (Lenin 1974:21: 43-91). Lenin argued that 
the most significant content of Marxism was Marx‘s economic doctrine. This 
economistic bias is something that will be considered below, but the significance for 
Marxism of the critique Marx made of religion cannot be over-emphasised. 
Marxism and religion have had what can at best be described as contradictory 
relationship. On the one hand Marx and Engels described religion as false 
consciousness, that is, as ideas that are not a true reflection of reality, generated by the 
productive relations under which people labour and are exploited and that are 
expressed in the social relationships that arise from these (Marx and Engels 1968: 
619). On the other hand, they saw religion as an expression of the suffering of 
alienated humanity. The famous quote of religion as a pain reducing soporific is 
always assumed to cynically sum up Marx‘s view on religion, describing Marx as 
being anti-religion. In fact, as can be convincingly argued, the meaning is quite the 
opposite. Opium, in Marx‘s day, was a medicinal substance, known for its properties 
of relieving pain. Seen in this context, Marx‘s metaphor for religion is a sympathetic 
one, identifying religion with real pain and only temporary relief. 
While in his latter years Marx did not spend too much time directly theorising 
religion, it is clear from his and Engels‘ many statements on religion that they held no 
truck with it in the final analysis, even if they regarded it as a significant phenomenon. 
Their view was that once capitalism had been destroyed, the conditions would be 
created for people to hold ideas about the world that reflected it as it really is. The veil 
of ignorance would be lifted, as it were, and religion would cease to exist. 
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There are myriad religious analogies and metaphors as well as references to 
religion in Marx‘s work. William Clare Roberts has cited many of these in an 
exposition of Marxism as a Katabasis, a descent into the underworld (Roberts 2005). 
Roberts points out the Judeo-Christian references of Marx and argues that he utilizes 
religion as a literary strategy, a way of figuring descending into the underworld of 
capitalism. Be that as it may, Marx drew on Jewish and Christian religious experiences 
and descriptions of life to give an impetus to what he had set out to do, criticise 
capitalism and propose an alternative. 
Richard Comstock has described Marxism as having a quasi-religious status 
and the Utopian aspect of Marxism as a significant religious aspect of the theory 
(Comstock 1976: 327, 329). Comstock sets out very clearly and concisely the different 
ways in which religion appears in Marx‘s work. He describes Marx as treating religion 
as alienated consciousness in Feuerbach‘s sense of this concept, where humanity 
creates God in the image of itself and then reifies and fetishises this image (Comstock 
1976: 330). Comstock argues that Marx also treats religion as an ideological 
consciousness that is based on the economic and political alienation humanity 
experiences under capitalism (Comstock 1976: 332). This explanation of Marx‘s view 
of religion is helpful in that it traces the historical development of the critique, locating 
it in the overall development of Marx‘s critique of capitalism. Comstock describes 
how the common structure of alienation is one in which religious alienation is the 
paradigm for alienation in general. Significantly, Comstock describes religion and 
social being in general as functioning as language does, giving meaning and enabling 
interpretations of social existence (Comstock 1976: 329). 
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This interpretation of Marxism is significant, as it points to the multi-layered 
and complex relationship between the two phenomena central to Marxism that Marx 
and Engels sought to unmask — a critique of the capitalist system and a critique of the 
system of ideas that help to sustain it. In that respect, religion was arguably understood 
by Marx to be a general problem of society not being scientifically understood, along 
with bourgeois ideological views, primitive science and magic and similar social 
phenomena. Considering the relationship between the sacred and Marxism is therefore 
critical to understanding the historical materialist methodology. 
The set-apart sacred makes an appearance in Marxist discourse in a number of 
ways, but never as a direct field of enquiry or interest. James Luchte has pointed to the 
relationship Marx had with the sacred, particularly in his younger years (Luchte nd: 6). 
Luchte cites poetry and classical studies as places where Marx identifies the sacred as 
being significant. For the most part though, the sacred is identified in Marx‘s works as 
a descriptive category and by a process of interpretation. It is in concepts such as 
alienation, fetishisation and in relation to commodities and money that Marx refers 
directly to the sacred nature of certain things under capitalism. Marx also considers the 
problems of religion and capitalism in terms of the dehumanizing effect these have on 
the human subject, distorting the subject away from what he regarded as the species 
being of humanity — a thinking, working, and creative — animal (Raines 2002). The 
set-apart sacred as a category, however, has a lot to offer a historical materialist 
analysis of society, but before that is considered, the historical materialist 
methodology needs to be explored. 
91 
 
In understanding the power of this methodology, the key concepts Marx‘s 
developed need some further consideration, as do the roots or origins of Marx‘s 
methodology. As Lenin explained, Marx‘s theory was developed out of a number of 
strands of theory and practice that preceded or were contemporary with his efforts 
(Lenin 1974: Volume 21 43-91; Fine 1975: 13). Marx and Engels‘ own organizing 
activities in Germany, France and England were also important in shaping this theory. 
Each of these three strands needs some elaboration. It is instructive to note that this 
clinical division of Marx‘s theory and method is not borne out in the work of Marx 
itself. Arguably, the chronological development of Marx‘s work is a far better 
framework for understanding the complex nature of the relationship between his 
philosophical and economic theories and his vision of socialism. In this exercise, the 
critique of historical materialism will also be developed, revealing it to be less 
materialist and less radical than Marx claimed it to be. 
 
Philosophy 
  
Marx claimed his philosophical standpoint was truly materialist. He claimed all 
previous philosophy to be either idealist or crudely materialist. His materialism, 
developed as a critique of Feuerbach, another Hegelian, lifted the veil of ignorance 
Marx claimed had been created by idealist philosophers. In the Theses on Feuerbach, 
Marx explained that, ―the main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of 
Feuerbach included — is that the object, actuality, sensuousness, is conceived only in 
the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, 
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practice, not subjectively― (Marx and Engels 1968: 28). In attempting to differentiate 
his revolutionary philosophy from Feuerbach, Marx was grappling with a school of 
philosophy that has its roots in G.W. Hegel‘s extensive and influential set of ideas. 
Feuerbach and other Hegelians had developed their views as a critique of their master. 
Hegel had set himself the task of bringing ―philosophy closer to the form of Science, 
to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‗love of knowing‘ and be actual knowing‖ 
(Hegel 1977: 3).  
In so doing, Hegel argued that the philosopher who would succeed in knowing 
would accept that such knowledge must be Science. He argued that this knowledge 
brings freedom in the only meaningful way, as the recognition of duty and as the 
recognition of self as Spirit (Hegel 1991: 17). Such recognition is achieved through 
the dialectic, the natural process that allows the truth to come to the fore through a 
process of resolving contradictions by recognizing them as part of the whole, that is, 
the positive and negative that make up the Subject (Hegel 1977: 40). What Spirit or 
self-consciousness is, when it realises itself, is the apprehension of God in the world.  
In other words, for Hegel, all philosophy is essentially the process of trying to 
apprehend the true nature of existence and this is about ultimately realizing that what 
the development of the world is about is God‘s will and our apprehending it and 
moving towards it (Hegel 1991: 50). In Hegel‘s view, humanity lives its existence 
constructively when it recognises the essence of this existence as being the movement 
towards the realization of the world in the image of the divine. History therefore has a 
purpose, according to Hegel. Within this process, self-consciousness only recognises 
itself in relation to another self-consciousness. But this relationship is contradictory 
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for the dependence of self-consciousness generated by this relationship places it in 
subservience to that other (Hegel 1977: 138). 
Hegel argued that Spirit, humanity‘s self-creative energy that is driven to 
become self-conscious, was the distinguishing feature of humanity (Hegel 1977: 297). 
Nature, according to Hegel, is self-objectified Spirit in the form of the successive 
societies that have dominated collective human experience (Hegel 1977: 210). Hegel 
viewed the process of becoming a self-conscious being or a community as the 
overcoming of the alienation of Spirit by the illusion of the objective world. In other 
words, making the world subjective as opposed to objective creates unity in the world 
between humanity and God, or Spirit, through its self-realisation (Hegel 1977: 216-
217). 
The influence of Hegel on Marx cannot be over-emphasised. Whatever Marx‘s 
critique of Hegel, it is clear that he accepted much of the framework of Hegelian 
thinking. It has been argued by Robert Fine that Hegel influences Marx so profoundly 
that the idealism of Hegel pervades Marx‘s thinking, ensuring that Hegel‘s dialectic 
and his theory of history live on in Marx‘s work (Fine 2001). This has significant 
implications for historical materialism, as will be shown below. 
Developing his own critique of Hegel, Feuerbach described God as self-
alienated humanity or self-consciousness, projected as a fantastic being (Marx, 1970: 
122). This perspective reveals all philosophy to be essentially religion articulated as 
general thought, with humanity at its centre. In contrast to Feuerbach, Marx described 
religion as having been made by humanity and detached from its source. This begs the 
question of exactly how religion is created. That Marx saw humans as those beings 
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that can self-individuate themselves through their consciousness and realise their self 
through their labour, lies at the heart of political economy (Marx and Engels 1970: 
42). The fact that humans as self-conscious entities can only experience themselves as 
physically set apart - from other people, from collectives or from inanimate entities - 
creates the psychological preconditions for alienation, fetishism and ultimately 
religion through the relationship with the set-apart sacred (Marx 1970: 47).  
In his critique of Hegel and Feuerbach, we see many of the key concepts that 
Marx develops in their initial form: the development thesis of history moving towards 
an identifiable goal, the idea of freedom as being the recognition of necessity, the 
dialectic and struggle as the engines of development, alienation as the condition of 
humanity, science as the exemplar of knowledge and the notion that appearances of 
things often mask the actual essence of things. The opaque reality that is a feature of 
capitalist existence ensures that the truth eludes humanity. The task of the philosopher 
is therefore to reveal the true nature of things, but crucially, for Marx, this is done 
through a combination of scientific enquiry and political practice (Marx and Engels 
1968: 30). 
The Hegelians who attempted to build on their master‘s ideas were essentially 
divided into two tendencies, idealists and materialists. The idealists supported Hegel‘s 
ideas as they also sought to clarify them, recognizing the weaknesses in them, but 
essentially regarding the basic philosophy as adequate. Materialist Hegelians, on the 
other hand, accepted the basic premises of Hegel‘s philosophy — the world was 
developing towards an objective, there were ideas that formed the basis of the 
objectives of this movement — but they renounced the idea that this was based on 
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recognition of the divine or even that the divine was in existence in the world. Marx, 
as a Young Hegelian, fell into that radical camp of thinkers who recognised Hegel‘s 
contribution to philosophy. But Marx‘s criticism of Hegel and his followers was that 
they saw the world ‗upside down‘, to use his metaphor. The world was not being made 
or fashioned in God‘s image by humanity. Humanity had imagined and ―created‖ God 
in its own image. Even the materialist Hegelians, who criticized Hegel‘s idealism, 
were not spared Marx‘s razor sharp analysis and vitriolic attacks. Tackling Feuerbach, 
Marx stated that he ―starts off from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the 
duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world, and a secular one. His work 
consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact 
that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact 
that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an 
independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic 
contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself be understood in its 
contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised‖ (Marx and 
Engels 1968: 29). 
Therefore, instead of resolving the idealism of Hegel, Marx argued that 
Feuerbach in fact entrenched it by subsuming humanity in its definition as being the 
image that is projected of the divine being. Marx argues that, ―Feuerbach resolves the 
essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction 
inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations‖ 
(Marx and Engels 1968: 29). Marx‘s materialism is therefore one that seeks to identify 
all philosophy as grounded in the material world and not as Feuerbach does, in 
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religious thought. Rather, for Marx, it is religious thought that arises from material 
conditions in the world. Ideas, in Marx‘s view, are not abstract entities, but are a 
product of society and the social relations that make it up.  
In The German Ideology, Marx went further, stating that in relation to German 
philosophy in general, of which he had been a scholar, proponent and a critic, ―the 
critics [of Hegel] started from real religion and actual theology. What religious 
consciousness and a religious conception really meant was determined variously as 
they went along. Their advance consisted in subsuming the allegedly dominant 
metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other conceptions under the class of 
religious or theological conceptions; and similarly in pronouncing political, juridical, 
moral consciousness as religious or theological, and the political, juridical, moral man 
— man in the last resort — as religious― (Marx and Engels 1970: 40). This 
philosophical subsuming of all aspects of the critique of society into the religious itself 
is the key weakness of idealism for Marx. It leads to a confusion of cause and effect 
and obscures the real nature of human relationships. Be that as it may, the fact that 
Marx dismissed this interpretation of society and privileged economics had other 
unintended consequences. 
Marx and Engels proposed instead that in studying society, ―the first premise 
of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the 
first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their 
consequent relation to the rest of nature‖. They went on say that ―the writing of history 
must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of 
history through the action of men‖ (Marx and Engels 1970: 42). Leaving aside the 
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sexist view of the world that sees people as men, placing humans at the centre of the 
world and articulating the facts about the world that flow from this is the central aspect 
of Marx‘s materialism. In contrast to bourgeois philosophy, Marxism recognises that 
―definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these 
definite social and political relations…the social structure and the State are continually 
evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they 
may appear in their own or other people‘s imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as 
they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material 
limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will‖ (Marx and Engels 
1970: 94). The human subject is therefore at the centre of Marx‘s view of the world. 
But it is a subject alienated and constrained by the unnatural nature of its relationships 
to people and to material and symbolic goods. This condition, one that necessarily 
objectifies and reifies relationships, people and objects, is one that sees the world 
predominantly determined by the relationships between things, rather than by the 
relationships between people. 
This complex picture of society and how ideas are determined opens up the 
possibility that Marxism allows for the fact that even if ideas are determined within 
the parameters of prevailing material conditions, there does exist the space or 
opportunity for these ideas to be shaped by other things, as others have argued. Debray 
has cited human biology as under-theorized by Marx (Debray 1981).  Lacan has 
argued that the psychological development of the individual is as significant as the 
socialization of the subject (Lacan 1977). Adorno has argued that mass culture, the 
development of which post-dated Marx‘s theoretical initiatives, has fundamentally 
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changed the nature of capitalism and democracy, making the characterization by Marx 
of humans as labouring subjects far too simplistic (Adorno 1991). But importantly, all 
aspects of society are grounded in the conditions in which people find themselves. 
Determinism is therefore central to Marx‘s philosophy and method. But it is not a 
crude determinism in which people do not have choices. Their choices are limited by 
the material conditions they find themselves in and the extent to which these 
conditions allow ideas to develop.   
Marx and Engels identify the division of labour in society as one of the most 
significant features of human existence. This social institution shapes everything about 
society: relations of power, access to resources, food and shelter and even the dynamic 
between men and women.  They state that, ―there develops the division of labour, 
which was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then that 
division of labour which develops spontaneously or naturally by virtue of natural 
predisposition (e.g. physical strength), needs, accidents, etc. etc. Division of labour 
only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental 
labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent)‖ (Marx and 
Engels 1970: 43). This centrality of labour in Marxism — for the development of 
consciousness, for the character of human society and of the division of labour for the 
development of society — cannot be overstated. Marx argues that everything else 
arises from the base of economic activity in society and how this is shaped, in this case 
by the division of labour, and given the particular modes of production, the uniqueness 
of these modes and the relations of production that accompany them.  
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In Marx‘s view, it matters not what people think about the world as they see it. 
What is important is how the world actually is — its essence — as Hegel also puts it. 
Marx‘s theory is therefore one that develops through a critique of idealism, as 
exemplified in Hegel‘s philosophy of history. Moreover, Marx criticised even those 
followers of Hegel who called themselves materialists, arguing that they had not 
improved Hegel‘s philosophy. It is this critique of German philosophy and 
materialism in particular that lays the philosophical basis for Marx‘s revolutionary 
materialist conception of society. In grounding social theory in humanity‘s ―species-
being‖, the logic of the theory is inevitable. From this flows the primacy of conscious 
human effort, that is labour, but also aspects of that effort that appear to have a life of 
their own, such as production, trade, commerce and finance. 
It has been argued that the German idealist and the bourgeois economistic 
basis for Marx‘s thinking and the theories he developed was never quite shaken off by 
German economists generally, including Marx and subsequent Marxists (Kahn 1990: 
247). The charge of idealism is therefore leveled at Marx, in that he accepted the 
duality inherent in the epistemologies of Kant and Hegel. This manifests itself in a 
number of ways in Marxist theory; whether by artificially separating material reality 
and ideas people have about it, in the base-superstructure metaphor, or in the 
revolutionary program that Marx sought to have implemented. 
 
Economics 
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Marx grounded his economic theory in the work of the classical English 
economists, Malthus, Mill, Smith and Ricardo. Marx obviously valued the 
contributions of these and other bourgeois economists. In the Grundrisse, he states 
that ―the economists of the seventeenth century… always begin with the living whole, 
with population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by 
discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations 
such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments 
had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic 
systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, 
need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the 
world market‖ (Marx 1973: 100). 
This method of the classical economists that abstracts from this model and 
defines economic activity down to its essence is one that Marx approved of. This is 
significant as the basis of historical materialism is the same method. What is 
distinctive in what Marx proposes are different assumptions about the true nature of 
the economy, such as the primacy of labour. Even this principle is to be found in the 
analysis of the classical economists, but the emphasis that Marx puts on it is 
significantly different. In the preface to the German edition of The Poverty of 
Philosophy, Engels points out, ―Insofar as modern socialism, no matter of what 
tendency, starts out from bourgeois political economy, it almost without exception 
takes up the Ricardian theory of value. The two propositions which Ricardo 
proclaimed in 1817 right at the beginning of his Principles, 
1) that the value of any commodity is purely and solely determined by the quantity of 
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labour required for its production, and 
2) that the product of the entire social labour is divided among the three classes: 
landowners (rent), capitalists (profit) and workers (wages)‖ (Marx and Engels 2005: 
11). 
In other words, Engels acknowledged that Marx and he had built on Ricardo‘s 
theory of value. But Marx‘s argument for the primacy and the exclusivity of labour as 
the source of value and the nature of the claim that capitalists make on the surplus 
generated by labour, rather than money or capital, is what makes all the difference. 
From this flows the labour theory of value and many other economic concepts Marx 
utilizes. Marx‘s critique of these bourgeois economists, for instance in the Grundrisse, 
was that their conception of  ―the solitary and isolated hunter or fisherman, who serves 
Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting point, is one of the unimaginative fantasies of 
eighteenth-century romances a la Robinson Crusoe‖ (Marx 1973: 83). This abstract 
but socially detached individual is not a good basis for studying society in Marx‘s 
view. Instead of starting with real people, located in a particular historical context, 
these bourgeois economists create a straw man to explain why it is that workers in a 
capitalist system find themselves free, but are still exploited and as a consequence live 
in poverty. They dismiss the exploitation as being the consequence not of the system, 
but of the failure of the worker to work hard enough, to save money or to take 
advantage of the opportunities the system presents.  
Marx stated further that in the case of the study of production by John Stuart 
Mill, ―production, as distinct from distribution, etc., is to be presented as governed by 
eternal natural laws which are independent of history, and at the same time bourgeois 
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relations are clandestinely passed off as irrefutable natural laws of society in 
abstracto‖ (Marx 1973: 87).In contrast, Marx and Engels‘ detailed and painstaking 
critique of the classical study of the capitalist economy, while applying the political 
and philosophical theory they developed, is a testimony to their partisan thoroughness 
and their unwillingness to countenance the study of political economy purely in the 
abstract, that is, outside of the framework of the division of labour, private property 
and the appropriation of surplus value.  
Ben Fine argues that Marxism is a method of abstraction and approximation. It 
is therefore not purely theoretical, because it grounds its arguments in an interpretation 
of reality and it seeks to build improved explanations based on the essential aspects of 
society (Fine 1975: 13). In other words, the difference is that while Marx and Engels 
valued the detail of the classical economists and built on this, they did not agree with 
their particular interpretation of ―scientific‖ as applied to economics. Instead, the 
scientific nature of economics was to be found in the laws that Marx claimed to have 
developed. This debate continues today, with bourgeois economics as a subject that 
stands alone and political economy as its radical alternative. 
The laws of Marxism, for want of a better description, are to be found scattered 
throughout Marx and Engels‘ work. Insofar as the economy goes, these are fairly 
simple and straightforward in terms of articulation. The creation of value through the 
surplus produced by workers and appropriated by capitalists, the role of money, the 
relationship of time, productivity and the rate of profit, the division of labour and the 
general law of capitalist accumulation are all articulated by Marx as laws of capitalism 
(Marx 1976). At the centre of Marx‘s critique is the role of money as a specific 
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commodity form. He describes how the relationship between the economy and 
political and social power is concentrated in the form of commodities and in particular 
in the commodity form of money (Marx 1976: 162, 247). 
Marx‘s theory therefore locates the economy in the political sphere. The 
reductionist tendency in the Marx‘s materialist methodology is often glossed over by 
classical and even critical Marxists. In defining the economy, the actual practical 
activities of economic agents must be distinguished from the interpretation of these 
agents of their own and other people‘s wishes, desires and actions and the actual 
consequences of these. An example may help to clarify this point. A worker 
manufactures a component for a machine. In completing this act of labour, there can 
be many levels to the conscious activity the worker is engaged in and even of those 
who are observers or have some relationship to this act. At one level, the activity is an 
economic one. It creates value that can be exchanged for something else. It therefore 
defines the relationship between the worker and the capitalist in that enterprise. At 
another level, the act may be political, for instance if the component is used for a 
machine that will be mobilized for national interests in warfare. Overall, labour is 
always a social act. This issue will be deliberated upon below, because it is clear that 
Marx‘s own ‗one dimensional man‘ (sic), homo economicus, is to some degree a 
Robinsonade itself. Along with the critique of Marx‘s economic theory as productivist, 
essentialist and universalist, this is a heavy charge sheet for the theory to bear. 
The economistic nature of Marxism is also articulated in this manner, since the 
premises Marx accepts are those of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, 
liberals and capitalists to a man. Marx can also be charged with reductionism and 
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essentialism for reducing all phenomena down to some or other defining essence, be it 
the economic nature of societal relations or class struggle as the motor of history.  
 
Socialism 
 
Marx and Engels spent time in Paris that was a crucial experience for the 
development of their thinking. There the French socialists influenced them and vice 
versa. Their critique of French materialism in The Holy Family, was that while it was 
an advance on the metaphysics of the seventeenth century, it did not go far enough 
(Marx and Engels 1956). In Socialism, Scientific and Utopian, they argue that ―a 
Communism, ascetic, denouncing all the pleasures of life, Spartan, was the first form 
of the new teaching. Then came the three great Utopians: Saint-Simon, to whom the 
middle-class movement, side by side with the proletarian, still had a certain 
significance; Fourier; and Owen, who in the country where capitalist production was 
most developed, and under the influence of the antagonisms begotten of this, worked 
out his proposals for the removal of class distinction systematically and in direct 
relation to French materialism. One thing is common to all three. Not one of them 
appears as a representative of the interests of that proletariat which historical 
development had, in the meantime, produced. Like the French philosophers, they do 
not claim to emancipate a particular class to begin with, but all humanity at once‖ 
(Marx and Engels 1968: 396).  
In other words, Marx and Engels were concerned with a project that sought to 
devise a vision of socialism, but crucially, they were also concerned with ensuring that 
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this vision could be practically implemented. Here we see Marx and Engels‘ criticism 
of those socialists, communists and anarchists who identified the need for change in 
society, but in their view did not provide the clarity of vision or the political theory to 
effect the transformation of society. Their characterisation of this form of thinking as 
utopian is deliberate. In Marx and Engels‘ view, socialism can never be achieved if it 
is not led and directed by the proletariat and its political formations. Socialism is 
developed through the proletariat wielding its power, as it needs to in any 
circumstances, to ensure the dictatorship of this class over the rest of society. 
This is another key aspect of Marx‘s theory that has been subjected to 
criticism. Not only is it not clear that the working class, or any other class, can through 
their efforts bring about socialism. It is not even clear that the conception of what 
socialism is realistic or even a probability. This is not due to there being anything 
wrong with the desire for socialism, but rather with the analysis of how it will function 
as a system and how transformation will take place from capitalism to socialism. As 
much as Marx criticized the French and English socialists for being utopian, it is 
arguable that historical materialism may well analyse the faults, weaknesses and 
problems of capitalism, but its own suggested remedies for these are utopian at best 
and just plain inadequate at the worst. 
What the French socialists did help to clarify with Marx and Engels was the 
strategic political objective of socialism. The argument that philosophy had to be 
materialist and that a critique of capitalist society must be grounded in the economy 
are important. But without a vision of what or how to build on this critique and 
without a vision of progressive transformation, Marx‘s methodology would be a 
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largely academic enterprise. The fact that Marx welded onto his critique a 
revolutionary program cannot be over-emphasised. It is the idea that there is a socialist 
future that can be realised through a revolutionary program that has mobilised millions 
of people in the last 100 years of history. It has also resulted in untold heroism, 
progress and sacrifice, as well as untold tragedy, the loss of millions of lives and a 
questionable legacy of any achievement of capitalist transformation.  
It is important to consider the key concepts Marx advanced in his theory of 
society and how to transform it and to gauge their correctness and what the 
weaknesses may be that have led to the many socialist failures. With respect to the 
future being inevitably socialist, Marx has been accused of making a teleological 
argument. In that Marxism is said to be true for all societies and under all conditions, 
he is charged with universalism and utopianism. These weaknesses in the theory lay 
the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of the theory. 
 
Historical materialism and its critique 
 
The most concise explanation of Marx‘s historical materialist methodology can 
be found in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Here 
Marx states that he ‖examine(s) the system of bourgeois economy in the following 
order: capital, landed property, wage-labour; the State, foreign trade, world market” 
(Marx 1976: 1). This sets the agenda for his approach in studying capitalism, the 
object of his attention. This approach is significant because the order is not arbitrary. 
He goes on to explain that ―in the social production of their existence, men inevitably 
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enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political 
and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, 
but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of 
development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the 
existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal 
terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated 
hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into 
their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic 
foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure‖ (Marx 1976: 3-4). 
This is the simplest and clearest outlining of the historical materialist 
methodology by Marx, hence the lengthy quote. The relationships between the 
components of the methodology are clearly explained here. Capital, appropriated by 
capitalists but reproduced by labour, with the attendant systems of management, is the 
foundation of a system that therefore puts workers into a particular alienated 
relationship with capital. The product of their own labour, capital is therefore central 
to the character of the economic base, upon which arises the articulation of these 
relationships in a system of ideas that becomes entrenched as the only conceivable 
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way to do things. He continues by emphasizing that there is a difference between the 
actual material experiences, events and occurrences that humans experience and the 
manner in which they conceptualise these and articulate them. He argues that ―in 
studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the 
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be 
determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, 
artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of 
this conflict and fight it out‖ (Marx 1976: 4). 
Since these experiences and the ideas people have about them differ, there is a 
lot of room for debate and disagreement, for the exercising of power and even 
violence, and for the course of history to be anything but linear. This distinction 
between the material economic base of society and the ideal superstructure is at the 
core of historical materialism. Apart from the simplicity of the summary in The 
Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, it is this division of the 
world into two distinct spheres that has been challenged by many critics of Marx. The 
issues are complex: if there is a base and superstructure, what is the relationship, and 
how does the one generate, sustain and direct the other?  
The famous passage that sets out Marx‘s own view of his methodology of 
studying bourgeois economy importantly states that his critique of Hegel, whose 
philosophy was grounded in a particular religious worldview, dispenses with the 
notion of civil society by subjecting it to a critique of the political economy of society 
(Marx 1970: 19-23). In this regard, Marx raises a number of questions about the 
theory that underpins such a worldview. 
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In describing his methodology, Marx presents the social relations that people 
enter into as being on an involuntary basis, even though they are said to be by free 
association. These social relations he claimed are grounded in and determined by the 
productive forces that correspond to a particular mode of economic production.  The 
social consciousness that corresponds to this set of productive forces and social 
relations is expressed in particular religious, political and legal terms.  The distinction 
between the economic basis and the ideological expression of these productive forces 
and social relations is central to Marxist theory (Marx 1970: 20-21). The consequences 
of this theory include the fact that relations of production lag behind the productive 
forces and this creates the conditions and possibility for revolutionary change. 
In truth, this simplistic explanation of the world as being moved by forces, 
pulled by history, inevitably developing to greater heights, simply cannot be sustained. 
Apart from the fact that these descriptions are metaphorical, all the evidence points to 
the fact that the world does not develop evenly, linearly or that there is any 
inevitability to the emergence of socialism or communism. The production relations 
may well fetter the productive forces, but this is not always the case and even when 
they do, the outcome is not necessarily social revolution. 
It is quite conceivable that even though social relations are involuntary, their 
origins are not economic. The institution of patriarchy and the gender oppression of 
women is a good example of a relationship that is based on sexual differences being 
highlighted and exploited, comes to have economic consequences and not the other 
way around. 
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In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels state that ―the 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles‖ (Marx and 
Engels 1968: 35). The simplification of the class struggle, between these two opposing 
camps of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, is where Marx and Engels argued society 
was headed (Marx and Engels 1968: 36).  
Marx and Engels saw the development of capitalism bringing with it the 
clarification of the class struggle. In their view, the two contending classes, the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, would face off against one another with an inevitable 
result, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the consequent transition to socialism 
(Marx and Engels 1968: 44). In reality, the class struggle has become more complex 
and class fragmentation has increased. This notion of a definite movement towards a 
showdown between the two contending classes is echoed in passages where Marx 
describes the inevitability of social transformation (Marx and Engels 1968: 40). Even 
without this clearly reductionist theoretical explanation, Marx‘s oeuvre allows for 
many different interpretations and it is arguable that the many interpretations of 
Marx‘s conception of history that survive today are all wrong in as many respects as 
they are correct. These differences turn on the various views Marxists hold on 
philosophy, economics and socialism itself.  
In History & Class Consciousness, Georg Lukács describes orthodox Marxism 
as a method that ―does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx‘s 
investigations. It is not the ‗belief‘ in this or that thesis, or the exegesis of a ‗sacred‘ 
book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific 
conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be 
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developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is 
the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or ‗improve‘ it have led and must 
lead to over-simplification, triviality and eclecticism‖ (Lukács 1919:1).  
The claim that Marxism cannot be developed and that there is no room for 
revisionism is surely wrong. As Régis Debray has put it, the metaphors Marx used are 
in themselves cause for concern, as they are outdated and cannot have predicted 
changes in technology and physics that the world has witnessed  (Debray 1981: 104). 
This simply means that the way in which Marx saw the world was as he could at the 
time he lived. The world has developed, as has capitalism, and what was once 
regarded as appropriate knowledge is now limited. Be that as it may, if method is the 
key to historical materialism, then clarifying concepts must be the starting point. 
Without clarified concepts, many of the arguments that take place in the literature that 
is a significant industry of Marxism can go on forever.  
Within this methodology, the key concepts describing material processes Marx 
and Engels identified are the following: commodities, money, capital, labour, the 
division of labour, scarcity, production, exchange and consumption. The point about 
these concepts is that their order is not insignificant. If the economy is studied starting 
from the perspective that production is more significant than exchange in determining 
the social relations in society, then the theory developed will make certain 
assumptions that will influence the thesis developed. For instance, because Mauss has 
identified exchange as the basis for social relations, he comes to a different conclusion 
than Marx does about the way the economy functions. That together with the brand of 
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materialism Marx developed, arguably not that materialist at all, means that the view 
Marx had of the way the economy functioned may well not be a correct. 
However, it is difficult to imagine that labour is not prior to exchange. If 
labour is regarded as a socialized activity, then the benefits of exchange may well be 
more equitably distributed in a society. Perhaps Marx was right to argue that the 
production of commodities is the foundation of modern capitalism, but it can be 
argued that it is a foundation built on prior relationships of exchange and the use of 
money. 
There are also concepts that relate to the form in which these material 
processes and activities are experienced and articulated. Among these are value, 
ideology, fetishism, alienation. These concepts, developed in the early stages of 
Marx‘s career have tended to be regarded as allegorical by some or as concepts that 
are heuristic devises rather than real, material processes. A re-reading of Marx that 
places alienation, objectification and fetishism as the real human condition, with the 
set-apart sacred as the medium through which humans order and interpret the world, 
allows for a material description of the world in its totality — economic and political, 
ideological and religious — and thereby ensures that the way in which society is 
considered does not end up in an exercise of crude reductionism. All of these aspects 
of humankind‘s existence make up the social relations of a political economy of the 
sacred. 
There are other important concepts utilised by Marx and Engels, such as credit, 
time, class, the state and civil society that cannot be considered here, simply because 
the scope of this effort is focused on the set-apart sacred and its relation to historical 
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materialism. But these key concepts are significant as they all stand in relation to the 
set-apart sacred. By way of an example, the issue of time can illustrate this point. In 
Marx‘s theory, time relates to the rate of profit and the creation of the surplus that is 
appropriated by the capitalist (Marx 1976: 333, 340, 683). Antonio Negri has argued 
that time does not simply perform the function of allowing labour to be measured. 
Importantly, he argues that time acts to homogenize labour, making it possible for 
social labour to be subsumed in to capital (Negri 2003: 23, 51). By marking out 
activities using a socially constructed measure, time therefore facilitates this coercive 
process, enabling the actual appropriation of value through a symbolic activity. With 
origins in monastic prayer and evangelical piety, this time-discipline is clearly a 
symbolic activity with material effects in the political economy of the sacred (Landes 
2000; Thompson 1967).  
Marx attacked bourgeois social science because he believed it to be inadequate 
in a number of respects. Together with Frederich Engels, he developed a critique of 
the social sciences that precedes his general theory of capitalism. This critique 
highlighted the deficiencies of the social sciences as practiced by the economists and 
philosophers of the day. Central to this critique was a view of what they regarded as 
the first forms of ideology in society: magic, fetishism and religion (Marx and Engels 
1968: 618).  
Religion, Marx argued, is humanity‘s genuine but limited attempt at offering a 
theoretical explanation for the world in which humans exist (Marx and Engels 1970: 
42, 51). In Marx‘s perspective, such a worldview is under-developed compared to a 
scientific one, for the simple reason that theory is a product of the consciousness of 
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humans who are as developed as the society they exist within (Marx and Engels 1970: 
43). In early or under-developed society, people rely on magic, animism, fetishism and 
other forms of rudimentary science to describe the world and their conditions. 
Certainly, what Debray has described as humanity‘s ―fragility, mortality and 
uncertainty‖, has prompted attempts at explaining the world with a view to predicting 
and controlling future events (Debray 1981: 276). Marx placed these different 
attempts at explanation, prediction and control in a hierarchy, with secular, bourgeois 
ideology at the apex and scientific socialist theory as the logical improvement on that. 
In Marx‘s view, these ideas that seek to explain and manipulate the world, with 
particular attention to how society functions, are always presented with a spin or bias 
that seeks to legitimate the current order of things in society. In earlier or less 
developed society, priests and kings were usually one and the same thing and the gods 
were deemed to have placed them in the position they occupied (Marx and Engels 
1970: 44). Marx and Engels argue that, as society develops, from primitive 
communalism, to feudalism and then to capitalism, the understanding humankind has 
of the world becomes richer, more sophisticated and more scientific (Marx and Engels 
1970: 47). But this does not change the fact that ideology and all social theory is 
biased to represent the interests of the ruling class in a particular society. Thus the 
warrior-kings in primitive society, the nobility in feudalism and the bourgeoisie in 
capitalism are deemed by themselves as pre-ordained to rule.  
As Marx put it in The German Ideology, ―The ideas of the ruling class are in 
every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, 
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class that has the means of material 
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production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental 
production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means 
of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships 
grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, 
therefore, the ideas of its dominance‖ (Marx and Engels 1970: 64). 
Of course, Marx then went on to claim that what distinguished his 
methodology was that he presented a perspective in the interest of the working class, 
who would inevitably become the ruling class under socialism, which he predicted 
would follow capitalism as surely as night follows day (Marx and Engels 1968: 46). 
Under communism, which Marx argued would just as certainly follow, class would 
cease to exist as a social phenomenon and all of humanity would be equal. The 
egalitarian formula, often wrongly attributed to Marx himself (it was a statement made 
by another socialist, Louis Blanc), nevertheless sums up a vision of harmonious social 
exchange: ‗From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs‘ (Marx 
1875). The revolutionary materialist basis of Marx‘s theory was a decisive shift from 
previous idealist and materialist philosophies. This development of Marx‘s thought is 
significant as an end in itself. That Marx studied Hegel, Fichte and Schiller, idealist 
but substantial intellectuals, and developed theory as a critique of these thinkers, laid 
the basis for a decisive shift in materialism that literally changed the world (Marx and 
Engels 1970: 39). However, there are questions about the historical materialist method 
and Marxism generally that require further consideration. 
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To be effective, a critique of political economy must include an explanation of 
all value in the economy. It must explain use-values, exchange-values and all other 
values, in all forms, material and symbolic as commodities and as money in particular. 
In other words, it must deal not only with the phenomenon of commodities and their 
production, but also with the circulation of value (Fine 1975: 16). Traditionally, 
Marxism, as well as bourgeois economics, has considered commodities, capital and 
money in a narrow, exclusively economic sense, focusing on those commodities that 
are usually bought and sold to ensure our reproduction, such as food, accommodation 
and tools, to name the most obvious. In reality, commodities consist of all natural 
objects that are manipulated by people, including collected and manufactured objects, 
in so far as these are deemed to be significant, to be property and to be available for 
exchange. 
Political economy is therefore about significant objects, in the material form as 
well as in the symbolic. In the world of objects there are those things we find, things 
we make, those that we keep, those we give away, things we exchange or sell and also 
things we steal. There are even things we ignore that are potential commodities. There 
is also the issue of the significant characteristic of modern society, where increasingly 
some commodities take on a wholly intellectual form, or are a service that is provided.  
These material objects and intellectual properties and provided services, Marx 
and Engels argue, become commodities by the time and effort that is spent on them, 
that is, through the labour expended in their production (Marx and Engels 1968: 64-
93). Commodities are created by conscious human intent and are recognised by 
conscious human agreement. The secret Marx claimed to have revealed with respect to 
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capitalism was that all value was created by labour, but that under capitalist conditions 
this fact was masked by the apparent role of private capital as being the creator of 
value (Marx 1976: 747). This sleight-of-hand, as it were, is made possible by the fact 
that social labour, that is, the cooperation necessary to make production possible, is 
privatised by the organisation of the productive process and by the private ownership 
of property under capitalism.  
Under capitalism, the development of the division of labour, the use of money, 
a unique commodity, both in terms of precious commodities and later paper money, as 
well as private ownership or title, make for conditions that ensure that social labour 
becomes privatised labour (Marx 1979: 44). This feature of the capitalist system 
ensures that what was previously extorted by sheer physical force from those whose 
labour is utilised to create value, either through slavery or through indentured labour, 
is given ‗voluntarily‘ under capitalism through the contract between the worker, who 
sells his or her labour power to the capitalist who buys it. This contract enables the 
capitalist to organise production in such a manner that the difference between the 
absolute surplus value a worker creates, measured by the length of the day worked and 
the relative surplus value created, measured by the productivity of the worker, is such 
that he can appropriate the difference (Marx 1979: 33). 
While individual or private labour seems to be the form in which labour power 
is manifested in society, in reality, without cooperation between those involved in 
various moments of the productive process, nothing much would be produced. Labour 
is therefore a social activity, in which the community, at various levels, local, national 
and increasingly globally, is involved. Value is therefore derived not from private acts 
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of labour, but from the socially necessary quantities of abstract labour required for the 
capitalist system to function (Marx 1979: 44). How this value is manifested in 
capitalist society is in the form of commodities. 
 
Rethinking historical materialism 
 
Marx has been accused of over simplifying the nature of capitalism, the 
possibilities for the development of socialism from capitalism and of both being 
simultaneously historicist and ahistorical. The debate that has taken place within and 
about Marxism has followed a few parallel trajectories, so it is not easy to put the 
critique of Marxism into a conceptual or a chronological order. Following Marx‘s 
death and the demise of the First International, debates about political and economic 
developments in Western Europe took on a particular character with impending 
revolutions and the First World War dominating the discourse. The Bolshevik 
Revolution in Russia and the subsequent formation of the Second International shaped 
the debate between those described as revolutionaries on the one hand and reformists 
on the other. Exchanges between Lenin and Kautsky and Lenin and Bernstein, for 
example, saw the labeling of these critics of the Bolshevik Revolution as reformists, 
apparently a heinous crime. 
After the death of Lenin, the period of the Stalinisation of the USSR, 
coinciding with the Second International, saw Marxism atrophy into a stagnant 
metaphysics. The subsequent developments of the Second World War, the struggle 
against Fascism and the Cold War saw orthodox Marxism and so-called Western 
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Marxism going their separate ways. In the period of anti-colonial struggles, Marxism 
assumed different forms or had different emphases, depending on the context within 
which it was being applied. In Europe after the Second World War, largely because of 
the experiences of mass Fascism and the working class colluding with those who 
perpetrated genocide, the Frankfurt School and the critical theorists radically revised 
Marxism. Their perspective infused the study of mass culture, communications and 
subjectivity in Marxism. The Frankfurt School also focused on the changes in the 
productive processes of capitalism as well as the effects of technology on the capitalist 
system. 
In recent history Marxism has been engaged with and by feminism, queer 
theory, Black consciousness, structuralism, post-structuralism and post-modernism, to 
mention a few of the most important influences on the theory. This dialogue has seen 
Marxism critically developed as well as being simultaneously undermined. That 
anyone could think that Marxism should remain in some orthodox canonical form, 
given the developments of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries is hard 
to fathom, though some ‗revolutionaries‘ hold dear to this notion. These developments 
will not all be dealt with in detail here as part of the debate about Marx and the set-
apart sacred incorporates aspects of this critique. But in so far as these criticisms have 
a bearing on concepts deemed crucial to the set-apart sacred, these need to be 
highlighted. As has been pointed out, these concepts, critical to the historical 
materialist method, are not without their problems. Some of the more telling of the 
criticisms of these concepts will be considered. Ultimately, historical materialism must 
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be rescued from the weaknesses identified within it if it is going to be a useful 
methodology for studying society in general and the set-apart sacred in particular.  
The main criticisms of historical materialism are set out below. It should be 
understood that given the development of historical materialism, there is no one 
version of the methodology. Part of the effect of the critique has been to continually 
interpret and re-theorise the methodology. There are however the basic ideas and 
concepts as outlined above that are common to almost all versions of the 
methodology. It is also important to note that these criticisms come from different 
angles or paradigms. The liberal critique of Marxism in general seeks to rubbish it and 
portray it as having absolutely no validity whatsoever (Popper 1971). The classical or 
orthodox Marxist critique seeks to refine and strengthen the basic concepts and ideas 
to keep the methodology intact as is (Cohen 2001). The critical theorists range across 
the spectrum from those who are prepared to keep certain aspects of the methodology, 
although they seek to refine these. The more radical theorists are happy to leave 
nothing but a few loose concepts and to seek to re-theorise Marxism in general 
(Baudrillard 1971, Foucault 2004). 
The most often cited criticism of historical materialism is that it is reductionist. 
In this regard, it is said to be crude in that its arguments reduce the explanation of 
some or other aspect of capitalism down to a basic phenomenon, for example, the 
claim that everything in society is explained in the final analysis by economics 
(McLennan 1996: 55). Reducing all there is to say about society to the abstract level 
of its component parts, for example the economic, or to the significance of class, 
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discounts important aspects of society and humanity, be they biological, psychological 
or cultural.  
Marxism is also accused of being functionalist, for example, in the manner in 
which ideology is said to exclusively operate in relation to class interest (McLennan 
1996: 61). This type of functionalism does not allow for the fact that there may be 
effects of the resistance to bourgeois ideology, for instance, or as Foucault has argued 
that power might not operate in such a linear manner (Foucault 1977). In reality, the 
ruling class does not always dominate ideology, although it is clear that these interests 
in very powerful ways influence the ideas that prevail. The discourse on economics is 
but one example, where ideas that run counter to orthodox neo-liberalism are 
marginalized in development economics (Stiglitz 2002).  
Historical materialism is said to be essentialist in that it characterizes structures 
and relationships as having a set of characteristics that is determinant of their nature 
(McLennan 1996: 65). It is regarded as seeking to explain the system as a structured 
whole within which the needs of the system are catered to. It continually seeks to find 
singular, significant features to which the very identity of something is bound while 
characterizing the entity or process in question as having some other, less significant 
features without which the thing in question would not retain its identity. So, for 
example, the modes of production - capitalism, feudalism and Asiatic - are described 
as having some feature of their existence without which they would not be 
characterized the way they are. Capitalism is essentially a system of commodity 
production and exchange, feudalism of a system of production by indentured labourers 
who surrender a proportion to their landlord and the Asiatic mode of production a 
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system of despotic elites preying on unfortunate villagers. But this essentialism does 
not take in to account that these modes of production may coexist, that features of 
them may cross over from one to another and that development may not be along a 
straight path from one to another mode. Africa, as a continent, has experienced the 
effects of colonialism and imperialism, for example that have arguably reduced 
significant parts of the continent from benign feudal systems to despotic authoritarian 
ones. Zimbabwe is a good example of a country that continues to limp from bad to 
worse in terms of GDP, life expectancy or any other measure that is chosen to record 
development.      
Marxism is also charged with being universalist, that is, as being either true for 
all possible worlds or true regardless of what the subjects in the system believe 
(McLennan 1996: 69).  The charge of universalism is an interesting if somewhat 
obtuse criticism, but it demonstrates the complexity of the debates within Marxism 
about the methodology of historical materialism. It is impossible to verify many of the 
claims Marxism makes, so such a feature as universalism, if it is true, is one that will 
only be dealt with through the passage of time. 
Historical materialism is also criticised for being deterministic, historicist, 
teleological and guilty of naïve realism (Callinicos 1989). These criticisms Callinicos 
responds to by arguing that while Marxism may display some of these features in 
various parts of the theoretical works of Marx and Engels, the core of the methodology 
can be rescued and functions as a powerful analytical tool. 
Some have criticised historical materialism for being idealist itself or not 
materialist enough (Debray 1981). This criticism, dealt with above, argues that the 
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philosophical legacy of Kant and Hegel weighs heavily on Marx‘s theory. The 
bourgeois economics of Smith and Ricardo also created terms for the theory that were 
carried as a legacy into Marxism and historical materialism. 
Marxism is accused of being productivist, that is, of privileging production as 
the driver of society (Baudrillard 1981). Of all the criticisms of historical materialism, 
this one is arguably the most significant. Baudrillard‘s critique of Marx is located in a 
number of his works, but it is primarily in The Mirror of Production that he makes the 
case against productivism and challenges the centrality of labour. This critique, like 
that of Mauss‘, places labour and production in a different relationship to capital, 
commodities and money, undermining the claim that value is only generated in society 
through labour and the production process. 
Determinism is the claim that given the social structure, in this case of 
capitalism and the possible outcomes of the structure, whatever happens within it and 
whatever decisions subjects make, the outcome that occurs is necessarily the only one 
that could happen. In other words, whatever choices subjects make they cannot alter 
the outcomes of the system. In this view, regardless of any decisions by actors, the 
inevitability of the outcomes of the capitalist system are determined by its structure.  
Historicism, similar to determinism, is the claim that events as they occur are 
uniquely and solely due to those that preceded them, giving a causal impetus to how 
the future is determined. In such a view, society has developed to where it is because 
of the way the past has shaped the present and that this was necessarily the case. 
Similarly, the charge of historical materialism being teleological is that it is said to be 
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necessarily moving towards a particular goal: capitalism to socialism, socialism to 
communism. 
The consequences of these types of criticisms for the methodology are that 
they challenge the basic foundation of the theory. The fact that a theory exists at all 
may necessarily demand some form of reductionism, functionalism, essentialism and 
historicism. It is not necessarily the case that determinism, realism and teleological 
arguments are as important, but cumulatively, these charges amount to a powerful case 
against Marxism and the historical materialist methodology. It is in the application of 
these criticisms to the key theses of historical materialism that they can be tested. 
Perhaps the most powerful attempt to salvage historical materialism from these 
charges is that of G.A. Cohen. For instance, in relation to what he terms as the 
Development Thesis; the idea that the productive forces ―select‖ relations of 
production that they favour and that ideological and political relations fluctuate or 
vary as they strengthen or weaken the potential for development of production 
relations, Cohen argues that Marx‘s theory is true, since there are very few cases 
where weaker productive forces replace stronger ones (Cohen 1978: 150). Callinicos 
also points out that not only is this not borne out in practice, but also that even if there 
is a correlation between these, it is not clear which precedes the other. It is therefore 
anthropomorphic to argue such a view as the productive forces make some more or 
less conscious choices. What is clear though is that there is a relationship between the 
productive forces and the relations of production. If that was not the case, relations of 
production would be the same across different modes of production and there is no 
evidence of this. The relations of production may lag, but the process of the 
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development of the productive forces determines the relations of production in the 
final analysis, and those that become superfluous wither away (Callinicos 1985: 55). 
This does not have to occur successively. There can be remnants of previous or no 
longer dominant modes of production that are nested within the dominant mode of 
production.  
What Cohen describes as the Primacy Thesis holds that the character of 
production relations in society is explained by the stage of development of the 
productive forces (Cohen 1978: 150). This Cohen argues is also borne out in practice. 
Once again, Callinicos argues that even if the stage of development does explain in 
this functionalist sense why production relations have the character they do, it is not an 
explanation that requires some leap of faith, but more a general hypothesis that 
without a particular stage of development, for example, the development of 
machinery, certain production relations would not have the form they do (Callinicos 
1985: 56-57). 
Cohen developed a number of other theses to address the challenges to 
historical materialism, dealing with the compatibility of the level of development of 
the productive forces with a limited scope of productive forces, a contradiction in 
which the productive forces have matured to a level where they are no longer 
compatible with the relations of production, transformation, optimalism and capacity 
(Cohen 1978). Cohen also challenged the criticism of reductionsim by arguing that all 
theory requires reductionism in some form. A similar point has also been argued by 
McLennan  (McLennan 1996). 
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The point about these theses is that they address one level of general criticism 
against historical materialism. These criticisms are significant, but they have largely 
been answered in the course of debates about the veracity of Marxism. Of far more 
significance are the criticisms that emerge from the critical theorists, firstly from the 
so-called Frankfurt School and later form the French critical tradition. These criticisms 
tend to focus on the changing nature of capitalism and the development of liberal 
democracy. These have had the effect of blunting the Marxist critique of capitalism 
and of authoritarian bourgeois class rule. 
Through the Frankfurt School, the Freudian unconscious found its way into a 
dialogue with Marxism, as did Kant‘s categorical imperative. The individual subject 
that had replaced the working class for these critical theorists, was finally abandoned 
to a general theory of communication, influenced by the simultaneous developments 
of mass culture and consumerism (Marcuse 1964). The extent of these criticisms was 
to eventually abandon Marxism in any orthodox meaning of the term. The advantage 
this critique brought was a re-conceptualisation of many aspects of historical 
materialist thinking whether in terms of abandoning the metaphysics of Stalinist 
orthodoxy or in terms of re-theorising concepts such as labour, culture, production, 
exchange and consumption.  
This tradition influenced Western Marxism generally, of which it was itself an 
integral part. Building on Lukács‘ development of alienation and reification in 
capitalism, this influential critical Marxist tradition has emphasised a number of 
weaknesses and shortcomings of historical materialism, particularly in that aspect 
dealing with the exchange and the consumption of commodities. 
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 From a more orthodox Marxist perspective, Gramsci criticised the economic 
determinism and the philosophical materialism of Marxism-Leninism, while retaining 
a strident historicism married with a nuanced conception of power, the role of the 
political party, the state and civil society (Gramsci 1988: 189-193).  This led to a 
conception of cultural hegemony as being a key determining feature of class based 
societies, placing the onus on the working class to create their own unique brand of 
cultural hegemony to lead society. 
Other theorists in this tradition such as Althusser emphasised the unique nature 
of historical materialism as a definitive epistemological break that established a new 
science (Althusser 1965). This view did away with the subject-object distinction of 
classical Marxism, instead focusing on knowledge as production and the creation of a 
material sphere of existence for humanity under what he describes as the Ideological 
State Apparatus (Althusser 1975). It has to be said that Althusser‘s agenda was 
somewhat different from the critical theorists in that he sought to reassert the primacy 
of orthodox Marxism.  
More recent and radical Western Marxists have challenged Postmodernity, 
emphasizing the role of culture in the reproduction of capitalism (Jameson 1996). 
Even more recently, Marxists such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have 
revitalized historical materialism by re-theorising the critique of capitalism and neo-
liberalism, the phenomenon of globalization and the response of the masses to these 
phenomena. Negri and Hardt have famously characterized the decline of late 
capitalism and its centers of power as the end of imperialism and the rise of Empire. 
Within this process the role of the multitude, the proletarianised mass of humanity, as 
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the primary motive force of history is argued for, moving away from Marx‘s 
productivism and even those critics who have argued for consumerism or the 
embodiment of power in social process (Negri and Hardt 2000, 2004). 
Within this discourse a more radical post-Marxist tradition of critical theorists 
has also developed and been prolific in terms of published output. These Marxists, 
semio-linguists, structuralists and post-structuralists have built on the work of 
anthropologists, sociologists and literary theorists in the main, radically re-theorising 
Marxism. Two of these scholars have posed serious criticisms of Marxism that need 
consideration. 
Pierre Bourdieu has expanded the definition of capital to include cultural, 
social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2005). This critique has the effect of reducing 
the significance of Marxism‘s exclusive economic or financial conception of capital. 
Bourdieu has also effectively theorised symbolic systems and built on the work of 
Weber, Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss in developing a conception of society that 
focuses on the reproduction of symbolic system as the basic social activity of humans.  
He has also effectively critiqued the notion of class and class struggle as inevitable 
and effectively demonstrated that there is a ―political economy of religion‖ (Bourdieu 
1977:183; see Swartz 1996; Urban 2001).  
Jean Baudrillard has also criticised Marxism along similar, radical lines. 
Building on Lukács focus on commodities as the central characteristic and challenge 
of capitalism, Baudrillard has posited consumption as a form of labour (Baudrillard 
1975: 44; 1996: 217). In doing so he develops the critique of political economy in to a 
critique of the political economy of the sign. This is built on a radical critique of 
129 
 
Marxism at a number of levels. Baudrillard argues that the entire Marxist project 
creates the human subject as a labouring subject, locked into the logic of capitalism 
(Baudrillard 1975: 19). He instead proposes a ―generalized political economy‖ that 
recognises the significance of language and culture and in particular of the manner in 
which value is determined not by production alone, but by exchange and consumption 
as well. 
In fact, Baudrillard deconstructs the commodity to reveal not two aspects of it 
as its essence as Marx does in the form of use and exchange value, but four. Any 
object, he argues, exists as a functional object that has a use and therefore some value, 
as an exchangeable item with an economic value, but also as a symbolic value that is 
relational to other objects and a sign value that is situational in the cultural system 
within which it exists (Baudrillard 1996: 218). Baudrillard completely strips away the 
productivist privilege Marx argues for and the privilege of labour, the division of 
labour and private property. 
For Baudrillard, these four aspects of the commodity create the ideological 
form of the commodity. In so doing, he dissolves the base-superstructure metaphor of 
Marxism and recognises the simultaneous significance of production, exchange and 
consumption as one continuous process dictated by the psychology of needs. This 
fetishism of the commodity arguably functions as a system in which the commodity is 
regarded as the set-apart sacred. 
Given the definition of the set-apart sacred outlined above and given the 
criticisms of Marxism as outlined above as well, it has to be said that Marx‘s view of 
society and humanity as being based primarily on the economic, is simply not a true 
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reflection of the way the world is. Marx hints at humanity‘s relationship with nature, 
for instance, but never explores this to any kind of conclusive point. If we take this as 
a primary feature of human society and locate the structural analysis of society 
described by Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss, Geertz and Debray, it is arguable that 
there are primordial aspects of humankind‘s social existence that are prior to and that 
inform the development of the economy, and all aspects of social existence, in 
significant ways. For instance, Marx describes abstract social labour and labour power 
as what defines the value of any commodity. Yet, there is no way of determining the 
extent to which this is embodied in a commodity or the effect of the fact that the price 
of any commodity is really a matter of social agreement or a type of compact. Indeed, 
Marx himself described the values assigned to commodities as arbitrary. 
It follows that what gives commodities the form and character that they have is 
not primarily labour, but rather it is the social definition of commodities that allow for 
the development of wage labour. Baudrillard has argued something very similar to 
this, pointing out that production is not prior to exchange or consumption under 
capitalism (Baudrillard 1975). This is not to undermine the labour theory of value, but 
it is to widen the application of the theory to the creation of all value in society and to 
radically undermine the individual or atomistic description of labour power as being 
that which a worker owns. In making this argument, it has to be understood that 
socially necessary labour can only exist in and for the collective. 
Marxism is distinguished by the important feature of its historical approach to 
understanding the development of society (Marx 1970: 6). In starting from a critique 
of society that locates humans as being at the centre of nature, albeit in a constant 
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struggle to overcome and transform their conditions within that reality, primarily 
through conscious labour, Marx first and foremost set apart humanity from the rest of 
the world, essentially privileging it, or, to put it another way, defining humans as 
distinguished by their self-consciousness. This observation is perfectly valid, but one 
of the consequences of it is that it automatically creates terms and conditions to 
elevate human existence to that of the level of the set-apart sacred (Marx 1970: 7). 
The location of humanity at the centre of society is of course displaced in 
reality by the effect of the development of the defining features of capitalism, namely 
wage labour, commodity production and exchange and consumption, through which 
the development of money, a unique commodity, sets apart the product of an 
individual person‘s labour from themselves. This alienation from the product of the 
worker‘s labour creates a power over the worker that is mediated through these 
commodities and which masks the ownership and control of the commodities and 
thereby benefits the appropriators of the surplus value that labour creates (Marx 1970: 
9). 
But this does not explain the development of the commodity form and of 
money. Mauss has described the exchanges made by Melanesian islanders and in 
particular how commodities were a product of the social relationships that developed 
as the pattern of social interaction to keep these societies from going to war. It is 
arguable therefore that the commodity form precedes wage labour, as does money. 
These could well have developed out of the symbolic practices and the signification of 
the sacred generated by the rituals developed to manage the sacred in particular 
instances. Since these signs are not stable, as Derrida has argued, what is a commodity 
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today probably does not have the same nature or character as a commodity in societies 
in which commodities were not the dominant form of exchange. 
Arguments that capital, capitalists or even phenomena such as interest, are 
Marx rightly rejects the source of value. The manner in which he argues that the social 
relations that arise under capitalism are expressed in the form of commodities has been 
summarised above. But given the critique of value creation made by a number of 
scholars cited above, two issues arise. The first is the question of how value, a social 
function, gets expressed in economic terms. The second is the question of how labour, 
contributed in terms of the exchange of commodities and the contribution to value that 
is made through consumption, gets accounted for. Here the issue that needs to be 
considered is how that which has social value is then given an economic value that is 
expressed in the form of a price. 
When commodities are exchanged this is not necessarily something carried out 
by those who produced the commodity. Indeed, in late capitalism, but arguably even 
in mercantile capitalism, exchange is and was a specialized activity. Getting goods and 
services to the point where they are required at the right time is essential to the 
commodity cycle. It cannot be argued that the labour involved in these processes does 
not add value to a good or service, since its very possibility of being exchanged may 
hinge on that actually happening. If goods are produced and exchanged but not 
consumed, the very cycle of commodities would stall, as happens when a crisis of 
over-production happens. At that point the value of most commodities fall 
dramatically. To what extent would that be possible if some notion of value was not 
being attributed to the consumption aspect of the commodity cycle? Furthermore, if 
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the value created is given by labour power, then as the value declines in an economic 
crisis, two things need to be explained. The first is the simultaneous decline in value 
across the economy, that is, what analysts of market refer to as sentiment. The second 
is how relative values can change. If all goods are attributed a value due to the amount 
of labour power expended in their production, how is it possible for some goods to 
lose more value proportionally than others? 
An alternative theory of value, based on the creation of value through the 
processes of ritual and the designation of the set-apart sacred seems to offer a more 
accurate explanation. In this respect, necessary social labour is expended in various 
forms in the commodity cycle and in the cycle of the production, exchange and 
consumption of all goods, symbolic as well as material. This creates symbols and 
signs that designate the arbitrary, but socially agreed, value of any object, including 
any commodity. That allows for the mobilization of the factors of production to 
produce these commodities, as the capitalist can fairly judge what amounts of other 
commodities, including labour, can be expended during the production phase, those 
involved in managing the exchange of the commodity are able to ascertain whether it 
is economically worth their while to do so and the consumer is happy to pay the price 
for the value of the commodity. In other words, exchange and money precede wage 
labour in the modern form and these prior social processes have to some extent 
facilitated the development of wage labour. 
Of course, under capitalism, this value is expressed as the price of the 
commodity. This does not mean that workers are getting a ‗fair‘ price for their labour 
as Marx argued that they did not under capitalism. It simply means that the argument 
134 
 
that all value is derived from an individual worker‘s labour-power is unsustainable. 
This would also allow for the fact that a lot of the labour that ensures the reproduction 
of society goes unpaid or even unrecognized, such as domestic labour, child-rearing 
and voluntary labour, as carried out for reasons of philanthropy. The privileging of 
paid, wage labour in the process of the production of material goods, is simply an 
expression of the narrow definition of labour by capitalists because of the way the 
capitalist system works. To accept this is to accept the terms of bourgeois ideology. If 
the alternative explanation is considered, where all goods are treated as valuable 
because of their socially agreed status, then this explains why capitalism works, not by 
masking only the creation and appropriation of surplus value, but by masking the 
entire process of the creation of value, turning a social function into a private one. 
The capitalist system is one in which goods and services are produced, 
exchanged and consumed. Marx‘s critique of capitalism sees these processes as 
separated, perhaps for analytical purposes. In reality, the relationship between these 
activities is far more fluid and overlapping. Some things are produced for demand, 
others to create demand. Marx saw production as the crucial process for the creation of 
value. In these terms, exchange and consumption are really just the end result, or the 
reason for production to take place. This consideration of the cycle of commodities as 
a linear process is one that needs to be interrogated, as it is clear that things are not 
that simple. One of the most important observations of Marxism is that of the 
relationship between scarcity and surplus and the cyclical nature of capitalism (Marx 
1981: 350). The tendency of the capitalist system to go in to a crisis of over-
production and under-consumption periodically is central to Marx‘s explanation for 
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why the capitalist system is not sustainable. Similarly, the explanation of the 
financialisation of the capitalist system and the expansion of credit in producing these 
crises are key. 
There is no doubt that capitalism experiences crises of over-production, over-
consumption and the expansion of credit. Over-production and under-consumption are 
easy to account for in purely economic terms. If there are too many commodities in 
circulation, or too much of a commodity, it is easy to understand why the commodity 
would stockpile and once it has reached a certain critical mass, it cannot even be given 
away. The same goes for over-consumption. If there is a huge demand for a 
commodity, it stands to reason that its price would escalate to astronomical heights, 
resulting in a crisis. But why should credit expansion cause an economic crisis? 
Credit is simply the creation of an agreement to repay in the future value 
consumed in the present. Since there is no end in sight to the capitalist cycle, the fact 
that repayments are late or are not made regularly should not be cause for concern, as 
long as the debtor pays up eventually. In reality, credit is accompanied by interest. It is 
the fact that interest can keep growing that creates the uncertainty about the future of 
repayment of a particular debt. Banks are accused of ‗creating‘ money by offering 
credit. This is a trite criticism, since some or another social institution has to create 
money. This is because money is an artificial category, created by social agreement. It 
exists either by social compact or by fiat, but in either case it is not only material, but 
is also symbolic and has to start life as an imagined object. 
Marx‘s explanation of the alienation and fetishisation process in society is 
crucial to the understanding of the materialist conception of history. A concept 
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borrowed from Hegel, alienation is the general condition of workers under capitalism. 
The very product of the workers efforts, capital, which Marx argued is objectified 
labour, since it is created by the surplus value labour produces, becomes that manner 
in which ―workers, in effect, continually reproduce the conditions of their 
subservience‖ (Marx and Engels 1976: 16). Commodities appear to possess a mystical 
power over people, Marx argues. This arises out of the manner in which the 
commodity embodies the social conditions under which labour finds itself in a 
capitalist system. The form in which commodities appear and their values are 
unrelated to the physicality of the commodity or the material process that gives rise to 
a particular commodity. In Marx‘s view, this ―is nothing but the definite social relation 
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation 
between things‖ (Marx 1970: 165). 
So the products of human effort occupy a position in the world in which they 
appear to dominate those who produce them. They do so because of the social 
relations that exist and that determine how individuals relate to these commodities. In 
the first instance, this alienation disempowers the producers by removing the control 
of the product of their efforts from them. In the second instance, the fantastic form that 
these objects take, as entities with powers over people and other commodities, makes a 
fetish of them. Lukács describes how ―the fetishistic character of economic forms, the 
reification of all human relations, the constant expansion and extension of the division 
of labour which subjects the process of production to an abstract, rational analysis, 
without regard to the human potentialities and abilities of the immediate producers, all 
these things transform the phenomena of society and with them the way in which they 
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are perceived. In this way arise the ‗isolated‘ facts, ‗isolated‘ complexes of facts, 
separate, specialist disciplines (economics, law, etc.) whose very appearance seems to 
have done much to pave the way for such scientific methods. It thus appears 
extraordinarily ‗scientific‘ to think out the tendencies implicit in the facts themselves 
and to promote this activity to the status of science. By contrast, in the teeth of all 
these isolated and isolating facts and partial systems, dialectics insists on the concrete 
unity of the whole. Yet although it exposes these appearances for the illusions they are 
— albeit illusions necessarily engendered by capitalism — in this ‗scientific‘ 
atmosphere it still gives the impression of being an arbitrary construction‖ (Lukács 
1972: 6). 
The fetishism of commodities, dealing with the appearance and essence of 
social relations as embodied in physical entities, similarly points to a strategic 
engagement with the economic and social relations that causes the relationship 
between humans and these inanimate objects to be experienced as a fantastic one, that 
is, to an engagement with the set-apart sacred (Marx 1970: 165). In setting apart or 
dislocating commodities from their producers, particularly labour and through money, 
these entities become regarded as set-apart sacred and as such, are privileged over 
human beings. This disjuncture, or turning on its head of the proper order of things, is 
central to a Marxist critique of society (Marx and Engels 1970: 47). 
It is argued here that before the alienation of labour and the fetishisation of 
commodities due to the division of labour and the institution of private property, the 
effect of the set-apart sacred needs to be considered. Given the archaic character of the 
set-apart sacred and its primordial nature, this can also account for the alienation and 
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the fetishism that is a key feature of capitalism. This would explain the fact that 
objects were regarded as set-apart sacred before the advent of capitalism in the modern 
sense of the term. 
William Pietz has documented the use of the term fetish in the engagement 
between African and European traders on the West Coast of Africa from the fifteenth 
century onwards (Pietz 1985). There is no doubt that this term captures the nature of 
the different understanding of value as expressed by these people in the cross-cultural 
exchanges that took place. But it begs the question as to whether all exchange is not of 
a similar nature and that we accept it as being legitimate and sensible only because it 
has been routinised, or put another way, embedded in social terms and conditions 
through rituals.  
It is in relation to Marx‘s conception of our world as being divided into two 
realms that the set-apart sacred in society is most commonly featured. The 
fundamental nature of Marx‘s critique, its materialist claim, lies in the notion that our 
world has a material basis and a reflection of this reality in the realm of ideas and 
language. This dichotomy is not difficult to grasp, as it sounds intuitive. We exist as 
humans in our bodies. The world is outside of us, as are other people. Ideas seem to 
exist in another realm. But there are problems with this philosophical position. 
Accepting this dichotomy does make historical materialism a methodological 
problematic. For instance, how do ideas that arise from the material world translate 
into language and then impact back onto the material world? It is clear from this 
passage that this view of society, which sees the material base and the ideal 
superstructure as distinct, raises many contradictions that need to be considered. In the 
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first instance, such an analysis begs the question; to what extent are the ideas 
determined by the base and to what extent, if any, are they autonomous?  
Marxist theoreticians who grapple with this problem hold different views. 
Antonio Gramsci argued that the relationship between the base and the superstructure 
was a loose or tenuous one and that revolutionaries had to work hard and 
systematically to move society in the direction of socialism because of this, creating a 
particular role for a working-class political party (Gramsci, 1971: 257). In Gramsci‘s 
view the state has a mediating function, but it creates a dynamic of its own and can 
even act in its own interest as an entity against the ruling ideas or the economic 
interests of the capitalist class (Gramsci, 1971: 219). The state, an entity that exists in 
relation to human subjects as a powerful entity, is also fetishised. 
Others, such as Louis Althusser, emphasised the structural nature of society 
and were more rigid and deterministic about the relationship between the base and 
superstructure, choosing to unify it in fact into an Ideological State Apparatus that 
places the state in a crucial but deterministic mediating role between the base and 
superstructure (Althusser 1971: 16). In this view, ideology and the material world are 
said to be collapsed into one realm. Significantly, this realm is a materialist one. 
The state is a development of the process of accumulation and of the territorial 
demarcation of relationships that are deemed as privileged, whether by blood ties or 
some other criteria (Hoffman, 1995: 52). The state organises public power. The 
development of the state holds within it the key to understanding the set-apart sacred 
and the political economy of this phenomenon. In early or archaic societies, the 
distinction between war, religion, politics and economics did not exist in the manner in 
140 
 
which it does today (Marx and Engels 1970: 53). These distinctions only arose as 
separate human spheres of action with the development of society, particularly 
population growth, urbanization and the division of labour. In this sense, the creation 
of religion as a distinct sphere of activity is as much a historical development as the 
state is, as money is, as politics is, as economics is or any other feature of society. 
Similarly, the development of so-called civil society is a historical outcome of these 
processes (Marx and Engels 1970: 57). 
The state occupies a particular position in society. It has the monopoly of 
legitimate violence. It has a privileged legal status and it is the location of 
administrative or bureaucratic power. Marx has often been criticised for not having a 
theory of the state. In Marx‘s oeuvre, he engaged with the state mostly in 
consideration of practical political events, and also his conception of the state is very 
influenced by Hegel. Lenin wrote about the state theoretically, but has also been 
criticised for having a crude understanding of the state. His instrumentalist conception 
of the state is arguably one of the things that led to the distorted exercise of power in 
the Soviet Union. It is with Gramsci‘s contribution that Marxism begins to move away 
from instrumentalism and towards a more sophisticated theory of the state. 
The base/superstructure theory also creates another set of challenges that must 
be addressed. Marx constantly railed against those he regarded as proponents of 
ideology as opposed to his claimed scientific view of society. By this he meant that the 
social relations that arise from the productive forces and relations of production are 
articulated in the manner in which they are because of the fact that they are a distorted 
image of these as they exist in reality (Marx and Engels 1979: 47). 
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By accepting that the economy has political or ideological aspects, it must also 
be accepted that these are not limited to secular or non-religious aspects of ideology. 
In other words, a re-reading of Marx that takes him at his word must accept that since 
the mode of production and the social relations of production generate all ideological 
forms, none of them may be privileged. Or, if they are, there must at least be an 
explanation for why this should be accepted as being the case. The economic base of 
society creates social relations that are expressed in the form human subjects 
experience them, but which in fact do not truly reflect reality. Ideology is therefore the 
distorted form in which human subjects see the world as mediated by those who 
manipulate ideas. Truly, such a view of the world must be too simplistic. Apart from 
the instrumentalist nature of this description, it is hard to see how we can decide on the 
accuracy of any ideas unless we accept blindly the idea that historical materialism as 
described by Marx is a canon. Similarly affected is the concept of class. 
If classes are groups of people who have particular relationships defined with 
the productive forces and the relations of production arising from these, then anyone 
who does not accept this worldview automatically poses a problem for the theory. 
Class may be an objective reality created by the capitalist system, but given what has 
been said about the base/superstructure hypotheses, there is a problem for historical 
materialism that must be addressed. Class is experienced subjectively. To what extent 
is an objective relationship, experienced subjectively, real? Even if it is, to what end is 
this reality of any practical significance? 
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Re-materialising historical materialism 
 
What remains of historical materialism, given these criticisms and the re-
theorisation of Marxism? Commodity production, exchange and consumption, if 
understood as being socially embedded practices that arise not from the institutions of 
private property and wage labour, but as rituals that designate certain objects as set-
apart sacred, is still useful analysis of the economic processes that take place under 
capitalism. But the idea that all value is derived from the individual worker involved 
in the process of the production of a particular commodity has to be abandoned. This 
does not undermine historical materialism, it actually re-socialises labour, as it is 
necessary social labour in the form of all ritual, whether in work, play or worship, that 
creates value in society and not the individual labour power of each worker. 
Labour as all socially necessary labour and all necessary social labour is a 
broader definition of work. It recognises that all labour needs to be accorded a value 
and brings out the social aspect of labour in particular. This also sets apart labour, but 
does not privilege wage labour in any way. Of course, this does not mean that all 
labour is remunerated, but it does establish the basis for a claim for it to be. 
The designation of the set-apart sacred, the creation of symbols, signs, 
language and ideology are the basis for understanding society, but not as existing in 
some ideal realm, but in the materiality of the products of rituals, that is, the labour of 
all in a community or society. Ideology is therefore no longer separated from the 
material world but exists as a material consequence of the world in all facets. The fact 
that it can be articulated in the real, the symbolic and the imaginary should not allow 
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the confusion of assigning each of these spheres the same ontological status. The sign 
and the signified are not the same thing, unless it is a material object and even then it 
is debatable as to whether they are the same thing in one, as the sign can have an 
independent existence from the object. In other words, all objects, including 
commodities, function at a symbolic and at a material level, but some signs and 
objects mediate between these two spheres. Examples of these types of signs and 
objects include symbols of political power, symbols of the power of objects over 
human beings and symbols of economic power. These can be found in the categories 
of ideology, the fetish and money. 
Fetishism and reification and the relationship between real objects and the 
subject are laden with significance therefore. It is not just that some objects are 
fetishised, but the entire system of objects is fetishised and necessarily so if they are to 
have any value. Objects are always more than what they seem. They are signs and 
symbols of power relations and social structures. Included within this system are 
institutions such as the state, class and civil society. These also are fetishised, but exist 
as relationships that are objectified through designating these with particular 
significance. 
Alienation, as a real condition under which people suffer, as the form in which 
relationships between subjects and objects is experienced, creates a disjuncture for the 
subject. It is arguable that this is unavoidable, as there is no way something can exist 
outside of the subject without them being aware of it in an alienated manner, 
particularly if it is deemed to be the property of the subject but they have no claim or 
title to it. Our very embodiment precludes any other possibility. But if these objects 
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are understood as being set-apart sacred, it is possible to demystify the relationship. 
Socialisation may of course reduce the potential alienation, but there is no evidence 
that this is necessarily the case. In fact, if anything, socialisation in practice has been 
an alienating experience in itself. To better understand the nature of alienation, the 
objects that that are created will need to be demystified to the point of having no value 
for the subject at all or be brought under the subject‘s direct management and control. 
The reason for this is that before the significance of labour is recognised, the 
relationship between people as subjects, whereby they negotiate the terms and 
conditions of these relationships and locate them in a symbolic order, must be 
recognised. In this respect, the set-apart sacred as a category is key. Everything has to 
be classified, compared, identified or labeled and the first or primary order outside of 
the subject and the object, is the set-apart sacred (that includes the profane) on the one 
hand and the ordinary on the other. 
Once the set-apart sacred is structurally set down as the embedded symbolic 
logic of any group, wage or remunerated labour gets laid over this, as do production, 
exchange and consumption. The set-apart sacred is produced by necessary social 
labour, that is, any collective activity that unites a group of people by defining them 
and those who are not them and by designating objects, relationships, people, signs 
and symbols as having a particular value. The set-apart sacred exists only by social 
agreement or consensus. Once that breaks down, not only does whatever was set apart 
become devalued, but it can signal disagreement or discord in the once united group 
and lead to social unrest and even to violence and the destruction of property and 
people. 
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The set-apart sacred exists as forms that are also exchangeable and 
consumable, so it is a form of commodity and arguably a form of currency, or money. 
The set-apart sacred is arguably the first mediating property in any social situation. 
The value of these symbolic commodities are agreed upon as a social act but 
expressed in symbolic form. In economic terms this is the value or the price if it is 
expressed in money, or any other commodity. 
Anything can be set-apart sacred, so it is a special type of commodity form that 
exists in abundance and its value is not necessarily affected by this surplus. In fact, 
where the set-apart sacred starts and ends and where the economic starts and ends is 
not clear, as there is a relationship between the set-apart sacred and all aspects of 
society, including the economic. The set-apart sacred therefore assists in creating the 
possibility of understanding what is called religion, ideology and the economy as 
material processes. Once the set-apart sacred is accepted as the primary category for 
social organization, there is no need for recourse to idealism, as a material theory of 
the ordering of the social is the basis for a materialist conception of society. 
Historical materialism and the set-apart sacred can be brought into relationship 
with one another through the relationship between necessary social labour and socially 
necessary labour. This structural relationship sets the terms and conditions for all 
exchange, production and consumption. The physical embodiment of human beings, 
their psychological orientation and their collective existence, create the conditions for 
the set-apart sacred and the methodology of historical materialism, re-materialised, 
creates the possibility for developing a political economy of the sacred. These are best 
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considered through examining systems for managing the set-apart sacred. Among 
these are ideology, the fetish and money. 
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Chapter 4: Ideology, the Fetish and Money 
 
The set-apart sacred can be mapped in a number of different ways, depending 
on the objective of a critique. In this chapter the following are considered - ideology, 
the fetish and money - as examples for illuminating the set-apart sacred, its centrality 
in the process of the creation of value and in the course of that, its role in the 
economy, the politics and the social spheres of human existence. By way of a 
summary of the arguments made so far, the following is put forward.  
Religion appears to be pervasive, resilient and persistent. Religion is, however, 
a vague and inconsistently utilised conceptual category, similar to the conceptual 
category of ideology in that respect. There is no agreed upon definition of religion and 
theories of religion are inadequate in that they do not ultimately define or explain the 
apparent phenomena in a manner that can be agreed upon by all scholars. The same 
can be said for ideology as a conceptual category. 
The academic study of religion is caught up in a debate about definitions and 
theories of religion because, like its intended subject matter, the field of religious 
studies encompasses many different systems for managing the set-apart sacred and 
tries to describe these within a framework that is clearly inadequate. In that respect, it 
sets itself a task that it is bound to fail. There those who argue that religion is simply a 
natural occurrence as it is actually a common category to all cultures. The same may 
be argued regarding the sacred, but this argument is a circular one. If religion or the 
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sacred exist as social phenomena, the question still remains; where does it emanate 
from? 
The conceptual category of the set-apart sacred is proposed as an alternative to 
that of religion, as it is argued that all activity described as religious and even some 
not generally considered as religion, is actually an expression of the set-apart sacred. 
The set-apart sacred is a conceptual category that is created by the most primordial and 
archaic form of classification, that of binary opposites. This form of classification 
arguably arises from human embodiment, that is, from the manner in which humans 
view the world as a function firstly of their biology and corporeality, so that categories 
such as left/right, up/down, male/female are obviously natural to creatures that live in 
this way. This order of things is obviously also prevalent in psychological and social 
terms as well, with good/bad, friend/stranger, being obvious ones as well as us/them 
and nature/culture for social groupings. This gives rise to the possibility of the 
sacred/profane categorization. The set-apart sacred is identified through the basic 
categorization of things by humans in their cognitive and social ordering of the world. 
In the course of this process, binary categories of sacred/profane are created.  
These categories obviously privilege one thing over another, whether by 
asserting their desirability or the benefits of the category. In setting things apart, 
certain ways of behaving are used to create the necessary social effect to identify the 
set-apart sacred. This process is one of the necessary social labour that is required to 
ensure that a collective remains cohesive. 
The set-apart sacred, that which is set apart in society and held to be of a 
higher order than the ordinary, is what is designated to be so by virtue of social 
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agreements that are reproduced through necessary social labour in the form of rituals. 
Ritualisation is the manner in which human subjects strategically demarcate objects, 
people, relationships and conventions and by so doing privilege instances of these 
from others that are then regarded as ordinary or even profane. 
These rituals identify set-apart sacred objects and concepts, including people 
and relationships, the good or accepted ways of doing things, including the rituals 
themselves. These outcomes are then recorded, either verbally, in image form, in text 
or simply by associating this social compact with signs to represent it. This generates 
the value-laden symbolic property that serves as a social and cultural good. The 
symbolic property that the social grouping generates in the course of setting apart the 
sacred and the manner in which these signs are produced, circulated, exchanged and 
consumed are expressed through these systems for managing the set-apart sacred, 
whether with regard to the physical, the symbolic or the imaginary realms of human 
life. This social creativity stems from a number of features of human existence.  
There are aspects of the nature and character of humankind that are primordial, 
archaic, axiomatic and automatic. These aspects stem from the biological, 
psychological and social aspects of humankind and the nature of its existence. 
Biologically, humans are corporeal beings, that is, they exist within a body that 
physically alienates them from the rest of the world, including other people. As a 
result of this embodiment, humans are special to themselves as individuals, and 
incomplete, or to put differently, they are set-apart from the world. This set-apart 
existence alienates humans from other people and objects, creating a subject that is 
fraught with a number of conditions and characteristics as a result of this alienation. 
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The fragility, mortality and the insecurity of humans forces them into a 
relationship with the social groupings they are born into or join, where the threat of 
exclusion or of physical violence determine the set-apart nature of the collective. This 
set-apart character ensures that the group is reified by its very existence and the 
corporeal nature of humans.   
Psychologically, human beings are bound to objectify, identify, categorise and 
classify, usually by comparison and by finding similarities and difference in these 
comparisons. Humans are consequently alienated physically, but are also 
psychologically bound to objectify everything around them. In this process of 
identifying and objectifying, there is a hierarchy of things created by these basic 
categories of good and bad, up and down, left and right, and other binary oppositions 
that flow from this physical embodiment that sets apart everything in another category 
that is best described as the set-apart sacred on the one hand and as the ordinary on the 
other. The category of the set-apart sacred includes that of its deemed opposite the 
profane and a distinction should be drawn between the sacred as set-apart and the 
transcendental category of the sacred as in that which is regarded as holy. While the 
simplistic notion of binary oppositions or bi-polar ordering of the world has been 
criticized, it can be argued that even more sophisticated notions of comparison involve 
some use of opposites or of degrees of difference to categorise things. 
This dichotomy is articulated through social conventions, that is, by 
prohibitions and permissions that are defined and reproduced through rituals. The 
production of the symbols and signs of this process that identify the set-apart sacred 
are the basic symbolic property of language and culture and the development of 
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language, culture and systems for identifying and managing the set-apart sacred and 
the ordinary are contiguous, if not one and the same thing. Religion, ideology, magic 
and the fetish are terms utilised to describe systems that are established by humans in a 
collective of one kind or another to manage the set-apart sacred. 
These systems for managing the set-apart sacred, being semiotic, are best 
considered as being similar to languages or best understood to function in the way that 
languages do. The process of the production, exchange and consumption of the set-
apart sacred is where the apparent movement between the perceived dichotomy of the 
real and the imaginary takes place. The real and the imaginary, as well as the symbolic 
itself, are necessarily expressed in symbolic terms. Objects or ideas are no less real for 
being symbolically expressed, but imaginary things can also be expressed 
symbolically, creating the illusion that they are real. The fact that set-apart sacred 
things are necessarily alienated and set-apart, means that they are fetishised and 
reified, that is, they are seen to be vested with powers in and of themselves and 
endowed with a particular ontological status. 
Socially, humans are born, live, develop and ultimately die in a group or 
community and usually of more than one kind or another. This socially defined 
existence means that human identity, consciousness of self, language and culture, as 
well as the rituals that reproduce the set-apart sacred, the profane and the ordinary are 
learned in and through the reproduction of these social groups. In the structure of any 
group is a necessary incompleteness, a consequence of the closed yet open nature of 
any group that must necessarily be defined in opposition to an ‗other‘. This creates 
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terms and conditions for the group itself that set it apart, designating it as set-apart 
sacred.  
There are few, if any, truly egalitarian societies or organisations. Most, if not 
all groups are also necessarily hierarchical, privileging one or more persons in the 
group by designating them as leaders, giving them a role as elders, warriors, priests or 
politicians. This category of people is not only tasked with or more often than not 
appropriates managing the set-apart sacred on behalf of the collective. In the course of 
this endeavour, these individuals are also designated as set apart, that is, as sacred 
themselves. This creates the condition for the division of labour in society that 
manifests itself firstly in gender terms and also in class terms and for the general 
inequality that goes with privileging anyone.  
Included in the social agreements that set apart certain things are exchanges of 
a social, political or economic nature, thereby creating different markets for the 
symbolic and material property that is in existence. Because the set-apart sacred is 
reproduced collectively but is alienated from the collective that reproduces it, it can be 
privatised, appropriated and expropriated, allowing for the accumulation of this 
symbolic and material capital by individuals.  
This privatisation and the hierarchical nature of social existence also create the 
conditions for classes to be formed. Social reproduction requires systems of 
negotiation, consultation, production, circulation, exchange and consumption, without 
which there would be perpetual social conflict. These systems therefore require 
legitimisation and reinforcement. This is also achieved through processes of ritual that 
endow these social agreements, compacts or contracts with a set-apart sacred status. 
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These types of agreement are objectified or given materiality through tokens, signs or 
symbols that are also endowed with certain powers or status. This creates value, in the 
form of an agreed relationship of obligation expressed in terms of one or another 
object. This creates the possibility for the exchange of objects and therefore for the 
development of commodities, including money. The fetish is one form of the 
materialized set-apart sacred. 
The economy develops as the system for managing set-apart sacred physical 
objects. These are collected, produced, exchanged and thus circulated and consumed 
either as part of human physical and social reproduction or in terms of the symbolic 
reproduction of society. The symbolic set-apart sacred is endless in supply, as 
anything can be designated as sacred by agreement. The material sacred by contrast is 
limited in supply as it has to be physically collected or produced. This means that 
there is a surplus of symbolic property but a shortage of physical property. Physical 
and symbolic property that can be exchanged become commodities.  
Commodities can be expressed in terms of one another or of something else, 
usually a third commodity, that is, a sign of the value of a commodity. This is when 
commodities act as money and become a common means of expressing the value of 
other commodities. The disjuncture between the volume of symbolic property and that 
of physical property is significant and must have consequences for the relationship 
between the different systems for managing the set-apart sacred. Among these 
consequences is the fact that value is simply a question of sentiment. It can be 
destroyed as easily, if not easier, than it can be created. 
154 
 
The division of labour, the appropriation and expropriation of symbolic and 
material property, the development of commodities and money, along with processes 
of production, circulation, exchange and consumption, develop contiguously, infused 
with the patterns of violence, resistance, power and hegemony to be found in any 
collective. The systems for managing these social processes, the waging of war, of 
negotiating peace and of institutionalizing these practices are what are described as the 
politics, religion and economics of a society. 
Historical materialism, the critique of classical, bourgeois political economy, is 
economistic, productivist, bearing traces of idealism, and is limited by the outdated 
metaphors it uses to describe how society functions. Historical materialism needs to be 
re-materialised to take cognisance of the structural aspects of society that predate 
capitalism, that are pervasive and that have persisted under capitalism. The set-apart 
sacred is one of these phenomena and the systems for managing the symbolic property 
that arises from the set-apart sacred are others. Once the economy is understood as one 
system for managing the set-apart sacred, its relationship to other systems for 
managing the set-apart sacred can be explained and the character of the economy itself 
better understood. 
Unmasking the set-apart sacred in this manner reveals why it is so persistent in 
the economic form it is experienced, that is, in late, globalised capitalism. 
Understanding the role of ideology, the fetish and money in the capitalist system 
creates the possibility for determining better ways for describing, explaining and 
managing the set-apart sacred. 
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Ideology 
 
Ideology is a system for managing the set-apart sacred in the civic or the 
political sphere of human social existence. Ideology therefore necessarily functions at 
the material, the imaginary and at the symbolic level. Ideology, or the phenomenon of 
the power of symbolic property in the civic sphere, operates by creating terms and 
conditions through which the elite or leadership in a collective can interpellate and 
mobilize human subjects. Privileging a particular discourse or narrative that sets out a 
foundational myth or thesis about the group in question, its vision and mission and the 
rules for belonging to it achieve this. It also sets out the terms for disciplining and 
excluding subjects from the collective. Since the collective needs to be mobilized to 
defend itself from time to time, the terms of this narrative or discourse even include 
the possibility of sacrifice of the individual on behalf of the collective (Debray 1981: 
141).  
In Marxist theory in particular, but also more generally in the social sciences, 
ideology features as a conceptual category that seeks to explain the relationship 
between people‘s beliefs and their actions, usually of a political or economic nature 
(Marx and Engels 1970: 47). Ideology is however a highly contested category. The 
history of what was initially ―the science of ideas‖, as initiated by Comte Destutt de 
Tracy, is a problematic one (McLellan 1986: 6; Boudon 1986; Eagleton 1991). The 
Comte Destutt de Tracy initially conceived of ideology as being a social science 
through which all ideas would be studied. This development of an attempt to create a 
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discipline coincided with the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and the rise 
of what is described as secularism.  
Marx also utilized the concept of ideology as the link between ideas and 
action. But no theory of ideology exists in Marxism, except in very schematic terms 
(McLellan 1986: 10). Marx was disparaging of what he regarded as ideology, that is, 
ideas of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, as opposed to the ideas for and of the 
proletariat. There is no end of the mention of ideology in Marx‘s work and reference 
to ideology pervades academic literature. Nationalism, liberalism, fascism, socialism 
and many other identifiable traditions of political thought are all categorised as 
ideologies and the outcomes of these ideas explained as having being ‗caused‘ by 
these ideologies (Watkins 1964: 2). 
There is a considerable body of literature that either equates religion and 
ideology or treats them as similar. This view is of course one found in Marx, Gramsci 
and Althusser, to name but a few of the historical materialist thinkers that viewed 
ideology in this way. Classical Marxists claim that religion and ideology are products 
of the material base of society and are forms of false consciousness, that is, they are 
distorted or rudimentary ideas that represent the real character of the economic base, 
the forces of production and the relations of production (Marx and Engels 1970: 47). 
Althusser believed religion to be a part of what he termed the Ideological-State 
Apparatus.  It was thus material in its effect in society and he claimed it existed as an 
ontological category (Althusser 1984: 43). Jakubowski, a critical but classical Marxist, 
has described the historical materialist concept of ideology as a total one, in which all 
of reality is only partially represented by the more or less false consciousness that 
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humans experience. It is the ―conscious expression of the objective appearance 
assumed by capitalist reality‖ (Jakubowski 1990: 103).  
Ideology has been re-theorised by Marxists who regard the classical Marxist 
theory of ideology as deficient. In these attempts, ideology is given an increasingly 
broad definition and in the course of this sometimes ceases to be based on the central 
Marxist notion that ideology is a feature of the superstructure of society that arises 
from the material base of the economic productive forces and social relations that 
accompany these. One of the more widely quoted and recognized revisionists of Marx 
in relation to ideology is Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci not only re-theorised ideology, 
but also tackled the problematic causal relationship between the base and the 
superstructure, through which ideas are argued by Marx to have force of effect. In 
Gramsci‘s view, this relationship is not to be understood mechanically, but rather as 
symbiotic, where the relationship of ideas over society and society over ideas develop 
dialectically, influencing one another (Gramsci 1971: 164, 181). The dominant or 
hegemonic ideology, in Gramsci‘s theory, obtains force of effect by eclipsing other 
ideologies and becoming what is regarded as ―common sense‖, that is the most 
accepted explanation for some or other aspect of social existence. 
Developing a more nuanced conception of ideology, Gramsci explained the 
concept as an important structural component of capitalist society (Gramsci 1971: 
168). In Gramsci‘s view, ideology and the superstructure are broadly one and the same 
thing and the recognition of this places an onus on revolutionaries to build an 
alternative ideology in the course of the struggle for socialism (Gramsci 1971:  235). 
This view and even that of a more elaborate definition of ideology such as that of 
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Rossi-Landi, still leaves the relationship between the ‗material‘ and the ‗ideal‘ world 
unexplained (Rossi-Landi 1990). Gramsci fails to explain what it is about these ideas 
that gives them hegemonic status. He alludes to the fact that the institution of the state 
backs such ideas, but even this is not a satisfactory theoretical explanation of why such 
ideas are dominant. There are cases of ideas that are state-sanctioned that are not 
hegemonic and that ultimately fail. A good example of this is the state-sponsored 
policy of apartheid that separated black and white South Africans. This policy failed 
ultimately because its perceived hegemony was false. Ideas that prevail must do by 
social agreement. 
A structuralist approach within a Marxist paradigm, such as Althusser‘s, 
explains ideology as the discourse of the society and state apparatus, organized to 
interpellate subjects, reproducing the terms and conditions that uphold the prevailing 
class relations in society (Althusser 1971: 45). This form of Marxist theory, a 
development of the historical materialist methodology, has been criticized by among 
others Frederic Jameson. His criticism is that this view of ideology as a totalizing 
system of the production of knowledge is too rigid and dogmatic. Jameson argued that 
all ideology was ultimately utopian in that it necessarily distorted worldviews in the 
interests of the collective on behalf of whom it has deployed (Jameson 1996: 289). 
Structuralists such as Levi-Strauss and those who built on his work may not 
refer to ideology per se, but implicit in structuralism is the idea that the realm of civic 
and religious ideas is one that is manufactured in the course of the general social 
reproduction of culture. Ideology, in this sense, is one of the many facets of culture 
(Geertz 1973: 194). This definition has the virtue of removing the pejorative terms of 
159 
 
the concept of ideology, but it is still inadequate in that it continues to conceptualise 
ideology as some objectified realm of socio-political thinking that is distinct from 
religious thought, for instance, and distinct from the lived, material existence of 
subjects. 
Baudrillard continues to use the term ideology even though he insists that the 
base-superstructure distinction must be abandoned (Baudrillard 1981: 144). He uses 
the terms to describe the manner in which the system of the production, exchange and 
consumption of commodities, including the sign as the form in which the entire 
system of the circulation of commodities has been coded, operates. In this use of the 
concept, ideology remains a form that mystifies or occludes the reality of the 
commodity without altering its form as a system of the simulation of meaning 
(Baudrillard 1981: 160). Where Baudrillard‘s use of the term ideology is useful is with 
respect to the manner in which he describes value as being embedded in the social 
discourse in ways in which it is managed on behalf of those who function in elite or 
privileged positions in society. 
Foucault described ideology in a manner that sought to bring out the contested 
nature of ideas. The discourses in which various practices are inscribed on society, 
whether through individual subjects or on collectives, function as more or less 
dominant discourses, determining the ways in which knowledge is produced and 
manages and therein lies the ideological aspect of these discourses (Foucault 2004: 33-
34). 
David McLellan has also given a succinct summary of the problem of the 
concept of ideology (McLellan 1986). The criticisms made of ideology are similar to 
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those of religion as a category; ideology is a somewhat vague concept, many things 
can be defined as ideology that do not have all the characteristics of ideology and the 
relationship between the concept of ideology and the world we live in is a tenuous 
one. That there are similar conceptual categories as these surely says something about 
the way the world is and about the way that it is being theorised. It is not only 
Marxists who have made this comparison. The functionalist tradition of social 
anthropology treats ideology, or worldviews, and religion as similar as well. In this 
case, ideology and religion are seen as systems of symbols that are generated by 
people in societies that function as knowledge systems (Geertz 1973: 129). That these 
are seen as aspects of culture that share certain features must be considered as being of 
significance. But there are problems with the conceptual category ideology as well as 
religion.  
Debray eloquently outlines these problems in his The Critique of Political 
Reason, where he explains that ideology is an illusory category and better understood 
as a ―collective, preconscious schematism‖ that links ideas and action through making 
these have force of effect in society (Debray 1984: 125). Significantly, Debray 
describes the sacred nature of ideology, as expressed in the form of ideas about the 
founding and continued existence of nations, communities, churches or movements, 
that is, any and all social collectives (Debray 1984: 206). 
Debray criticizes ideology as being an illusion perpetuated by Marx to fill the 
yawning gap that Debray argues exists in Marxist theory (Debray 1981: 60). This gap, 
Debray proposes, arises out of a number of weaknesses in Marxist theory, namely, its 
limited materialism, its historicism and its static nature (Debray 1981: 19, 100 and 
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106). Debray introduces a number of concepts into the debate and constructs a theory 
of how ideas have a material force in society. He sees magic, religion and ideology as 
different expressions of the phenomenon of the material effect of language (Debray 
1981: 73). In his unique contribution, Debray identifies the incompleteness of social 
formations caused by what he describes as ―the lack‖ at the centre of human collective 
existence. This lack generates the ―social physics‖ that gives the force of effect to 
words in society (Debray 1981: 180, 245, 270, 324). In fact, it is Debray‘s view that 
the terms and conditions that give this power to words to mobilise people are sacred 
(Debray 1981: 329). 
That Marx and most Marxists treat religion in much the same way as ideology 
is significant. Seen either as a type of ideology or as an archaic proto-ideology, 
religion is as much ―false-consciousness‖ as secular ideology is argued to be (Marx 
1975: 244). The veracity of such claims is not what is to be considered here, but the 
relationship between these conceptual categories is important. There is clearly a long 
history of relationship between religion and ideology, dating back to the time that the 
―science of ideas‖ was first conceptualized by de Tracy (Rossi-Landi 1982: 34).  
As noted in Chapter 2, Richard Comstock has provided a powerful summation 
of Marxism as a critique of religion. He argues that apart from the fact that Marxism 
can be argued to function as a quasi-religion itself, the theory is utopian in its outlook 
and this is enough of a similarity to be of significance (Comstock 1976: 327, 329). He 
argues that Marx‘s entire enterprise is founded on a critique of religion that describes 
it as ―alienated consciousness. . . archeological consciousness that reflects a 
fundamental alienation. . .in political and economic orders‖ (Comstock 1976: 328). 
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From this critique of religion, Marx was able to build a critique of politics and the 
economy, with the critique of religion as the exemplar. He quotes Marx as describing 
religion as having the effect of occluding the reality of human existence. Acting as a 
fetish, religion is therefore seen as a reified, imaginary abstraction. Significantly, 
Comstock argues that in Marx‘s theory religion is accused of standing in the way of 
the development of truly well-rounded human beings and that this effect of the 
phenomenon is one repeated in the political, economic and social spheres of any 
society (Comstock 1976: 340). The significance of Comstock‘s critique is that it 
establishes clearly the theoretical basis for the comparison of religion, ideology and 
economics as systems that function in a similar manner. This effect is located in the 
human condition and it is manifested in the human activity described. 
Debray has described ideology as the primary medium of the logic, language 
and discourse of the collective in that it functions as a ―collective preconscious 
schematism‖ through which ideas can have material effect (Debray 1981: 125). If we 
take ideology to be a product not solely of the economic base of society, but as a 
system through which we order and manage meaning in the collective for the purposes 
of all communication and social activity, then the set-apart sacred aspect of ideology is 
brought to the fore. The many ways in which ideology has been conceptualized need 
consideration though, as they help to elucidate the sacred in the many faceted form it 
operates in society. 
Debray has presented a materialist critique of the concept of ideology that does 
not seek to present one form of discourse as privileged over others, but rather 
considers the way in which ideas have the force of effect in society through being the 
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discourse that mobilizes people and translates into action (Debray 1981:). Debray‘s 
―collective preconscious schematism‖ explains how the formation of any group 
necessitates a myth of origin and of the legitimisation of power in a particular 
hierarchical form as presented back to the collective. This sacred discourse is what 
remains dominant unless the group in that form disintegrates. Although this theory can 
be described as structuralist it is one that goes beyond the description of ideology as 
embedded in language and describes how the formation of social collectives and the 
production of the dominant discourse are different sides of the same coin (Debray 
1981:). 
Debray‘s theory of ideology, or rather his theory of the political-religious 
unconscious, has weaknesses. There is no need to identify the unconscious as the 
source of the dominant discourse if this process is understood as being a material one 
where the dominant discourse functions as part of the symbolic capital that is utilised 
by members of the collective to negotiate the social existence that they must all 
endure. But the theory has the virtue of not relying on any simplistic metaphor and of 
positing a relationship between the sacred and the social that provides the basis for 
understanding how it is that certain ideas have a material force of effect.  
Ideology is clearly therefore not simply a way of representing the world in the 
intellect, for any conception of the world is one that has a history that must be socially 
agreed upon or contested. Ideology is determined by the basic structure of signs, 
symbols and language that make up a social collective and are co-determined by the 
particular power relations that prevail in any society. All systems of language, all 
classification and categorization, have an accompanying set of prohibitions and 
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permissions that are ordered in the first instance by the designation of the set-apart 
sacred. 
These signs have been generated by the ways in which things are done through 
ritual. They form a syntax of the sacred within which social meaning and logic are 
developed.  This is true of the set-apart sacred in the transcendental, the civic or 
political sphere, in the personal, in the symbolic and in the imaginary aspects of social 
existence. What is called ideology, the system for managing the set-apart sacred in the 
civic or political sphere, defines the collective, the political hierarchy and the symbols 
that establish the collective as set-apart sacred. 
The explanation of the syntax of the sacred explains the similarities between 
religion and ideology. They are both systems for managing the set-apart sacred. In 
point of fact, the attempts to highlight the distinctions between religion, ideology, 
magic and myth, while useful for descriptive and analytical purposes, unfortunately 
have the effect of occluding the common features of these systems, namely their basis 
in the set-apart sacred. As society becomes more sophisticated or complex, so do these 
systems of managing the set-apart sacred. Apart from the fact that they become 
embedded, or hegemonic, as capitalism develops, globalises markets and the systems 
of commodity production, exchange and consumption, the set-apart sacred systems 
take on a more general and more uniform character, even though the discourses may 
differ. The syntax of the sacred also explains in part the coterminous nature of religion 
and the secular. If these are understood as products of a particular stage of 
development, then it is relatively easy to explain the perceived religious character of 
some secular ideas. 
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How this syntax is manifested in contemporary society is in language that is 
unmistakably descriptive of the set-apart sacred. What are described as instances of 
ideology, such as liberalism, or socialism, cannot be expressed in the final analysis 
without some recourse to things that are set apart as sacred. In the case of liberalism it 
is the set-apart sacred individual, free to do as he or she pleases unless constrained by 
a totalitarian state. In the case of socialism, it is the heroic working class, exploited by 
the capitalist, but who will free society. These are all instances of the set-apart sacred 
and take the form of secular ideas expressed in religious language. 
Some examples help to illustrate how ideology, or the set-apart sacred in the 
civic sphere, operates. Speaking about the founding of the secret society that was 
responsible for ensuring that apartheid become the official policy of the then 
government of South Africa, the leader of the Broederbond explained that the 
―Afrikaner Broederbond was born out of the deep conviction that the Afrikaner volk 
has been planted in this country by the Hand of God, destined to survive as a separate 
volk with its own calling‖ (Bunting 1964: 47). The Broederbond functioned as a secret 
order with a sacred mission, that is, the upliftment to power of the Afrikaner people. 
Among its adherents, apartheid was regarded as a legitimate policy, designed to 
achieve this divine mission. Of course, its opponents expressed legitimate horror at 
this terrible system, declaring it a crime against humanity, a judgment that was 
adopted by the United Nations in 1973 (Mortons and Jeffrey 2000: 27). 
In response to the Broederbond and the National Party, the South African 
Communist Party made a call to heroism in millenarian and sacred language. It called 
upon workers in ―this sense of solidarity and support, and by the exhilarating 
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comradeship known only to fellow workers in a militant movement. . . (to) advance to 
do battle with the capitalist Goliath, confident that if we play our part unfalteringly we 
shall in our lifetime see the robber and butcher class brought low and the workers' 
'Soviets' in power. . . (to ) hold aloft the glistening banner of the World Commune to 
be, when the class war shall have been for ever stamped out‖ (The Road to South 
African Freedom, 1962, SACP internet archive, www.sacp.org.za). In fact, the SACP 
was fond of talking in religious overtones, whether it was in terms of spreading the 
Gospel of Communism, mobilizing people to defend the sacred rights of the people or 
simply in the sense of reiterating the inevitable, cataclysmic end of capitalism. As of 
yet, this is still to happen. 
Similarly, the language used by the heroic freedom fighter, Solomon Mahlangu 
prior to his execution, depicts the struggle in unmistakably sacrificial terms. He stated 
that his ―blood will nourish the tree that will bear the fruits of freedom" (ANC internet 
archive, 2009, www.anc.org.za). In a similar vein, the then Deputy President of the 
Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, spoke in equally awe-struck tone of the 
eclectic African national pride that pervaded the moment of the adoption of the South 
African Constitution (Statement of Deputy President T.M. Mbeki, on behalf of the 
African National Congress, on the occasion of the adoption by the Constituent 
Assembly of the ―Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill 1996‖, Cape Town, 8 
May 1996., ANC Internet archive, www.anc.org.za) 
His references to the souls of Khoi and San ancestors, to the blood of fallen 
warriors, to the names of ancestors as well as the general tone of this address were 
skillfully designed to emphasise the sacred nature of the event of adopting the 
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Constitution. This resort to sacred symbolic images re-appears time and again in the 
work of political leaders who seek to entrench a sense of the sacred nature of political 
life. 
On a less positive note, the manner in which the ideology of the liberation 
movement has been perverted to justify the current status quo and to obfuscate the 
reality of the accumulation of wealth by a few while the majority of South Africans 
get poorer in relative and in some cases in absolute terms is instructive. The president 
of the country, Jacob Zuma, has left no opportunity to attend a church service or to 
associate himself with religion, go by (―Zuma visits Rhema, prays for peaceful 
election‖, Mail and Guardian 23 January 2009). Zuma visited many churches during 
his campaign and since the election of May 2009 has established a committee of 
religious leaders to advise him on matters relating to government (Louis Fourie, ―Ray 
McCauley takes aim at gay rights‖, Rainbow UCT, 11 September 2009).  
Even communists cannot escape the sacred discourse of politics. In assessing 
what he describes as the drift towards irrelevance of the South African Communist 
Party, one journalist pointed out that the interpretation of key texts of the liberation 
movement, sacred texts, was once the preserve of communists. Butler claims that 
South African Communist Party, an ally of the ANC, is no more than a shadow of its 
former self. Likened to the clerics of the national democratic revolution, he points out 
that ―in past decades (the SACP) could claim to be the key interpreter of the liberation 
movement's sacred texts, a vector of historical forces, or an organisational powerhouse 
that could punch above its weight in the struggle for freedom‖. By contrast it is now 
seen as increasingly irrelevant (Anthony Butler, ―Nzimande steering SACP ship 
168 
 
towards political irrelevance‖, Business Day 29 September 2008).  To think of the 
SACP cadres once acting as high priests of the liberation movement, dispensing 
wisdom from the sacred texts of the revolution is not an image that squares well with 
the role of a communist party. But revolution by its nature is set-apart sacred work. 
What is instructive is the manner in which this role is so clearly described in terms of 
the set-apart sacred. 
In discussing the Constitution of the Republic, reference is made by one 
commentator to the fact that it is ―not a document drafted by some detached group of 
peacemaking law advisers. . .(the) Constitution is the product of a historically unique 
process undertaken by our own people, a process that raised all of us above ourselves 
so that we could end our own suffering and save our country, when we vowed 
collectively to end our ethnic conflicts and never return to them‖. In language clearly 
designed to invoke feelings of awe, he continues to claim that the deal that resulted in 
the Constitution ―was a deal we all made with ourselves. A sacred deal‖ (Alistair 
Sparks, ―Our Constitution is Sacred‖, Business Day, 16 September 2009). This tone 
clearly echoes that established by the then Deputy President of the country, Thabo 
Mbeki, on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution. 
 In reviewing the ANC tradition of struggle and freedom songs, journalist 
Jacob Dlamini points to the sacred character of the original songs, now defiled by the 
penchant for political leaders to focus on money rather than freedom (Jacob Dlamini, 
―Remix of struggle songs hits a dissonant crescendo‖, Business Day 5 September 
2009). Dlamini cleverly captures the contradictions of the times, where once sacred 
things have been commercialized, where an elite has appropriated these and where the 
169 
 
system of managing this symbolic property has been warped to perpetuate elite rule 
rather than to empower the masses. 
In politics, the sacred finds its way into discussions over everything 
conceivable. In rebuking a colleague, legal academic Mia Swart wasted no time in 
reminding controversial judge, Justice John Hlope, that judicial independence is 
sacred (Mia Swart, ―Waiting for a dues ex machina to end Judge Hlope‘s comedy‖, 
Business Day 19 June 2009) The discussion of the independence of the judiciary is 
therefore conducted in terms that ensure that this those who enter the debate are made 
aware of the gravity of the issues at stake. Invoking the set-apart sacred character of 
the debate does this. 
When the new political party formed in 2009 in South Africa, the Congress of 
the People (COPE), challenged the ruling ANC, a journalist was quick to point out 
that COPE was tackling the ―sacred cows‖ of the ruling party (Amy Musgrave, 
―COPE resolutions take aim at ANC sacred cows‖, Business Day 16 January 2009). In 
other words, within the politics of the liberation movement there are certain policies, 
issues and conventions that are considered to be sacrosanct. The new party, in 
suggesting that some of these ―sacred cows‖ need to be slaughtered or, at the very 
least, put out to pasture, had to face the wrath of the ANC and the discourse used made 
it very clear that in transgressing these rules, COPE was defiling what was once held 
to be sacred. Of course, this also demonstrates the fact that what is sacred is only so by 
agreement or consensus. Once this consensus had broken down, those who no longer 
valued things in the same way felt no qualms about transgressing a once set-apart 
sacred boundary. 
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Similar examples can be found in the discourse of most polities, whether 
capitalist, socialist, liberal or social democratic. National ground is holy ground, 
constitutions are sacred and leaders are to be revered and often simply obeyed. David 
Chidester has referred to the mass-murder suicide of the members of the People‘s 
Temple and the language of sacrifice used by former President Ronald Reagan as 
examples of the manner in which ideas, spoken in words, give effect to real, concrete 
events in the material world (Chidester 2005: 91-110). Although these ideological 
claims are articulated in symbolic terms, in this case by the Reverend Jim Jones and 
President Reagan respectively, these symbolic depictions of redemptive sacrifice have 
a material impact on the lives of people. 
As significant as mapping the set-apart sacred is in political discourse, the 
manner in which technology has influenced the production, circulation and 
consumption of ideas, particularly of a political nature, is notable. The creation of 
what has been described as a technosphere by Derrida or a mediasphere by Debray is a 
terrain on which ideas have been given new dimensions by the medium through which 
they are presented (Derrida 2002, Debray 1996). Echoing Marshall McLuhan‘s 
description of the effect of the different media through which subjects are engaged and 
their impact, the effects of technology as described by Derrida and Debray create a 
sense of permanence, of inevitability, and of heightened power of ideas presented 
(McLuhan 1965). 
But underneath this veneer of technology lie the words and their material 
effect. Perhaps mirroring the productivist tendency of orthodox historical materialism, 
but certainly exhorting the set-apart sacred, Stalin could talk of writers as ―engineers 
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of the human soul‖ (a quote attributed to Stalin in a speech in 1932 but in fact a phrase 
coined by Russian novelist Yura Oleshka).  In fact, responding to a debate on the 
transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, Stalin claimed that ―Comrade 
Yaroshenko (an unfortunate opponent who went the way of many in the course of the 
building of ‗really existing socialism‘) does not understand that before we can pass to 
the formula, ‗to each according to his needs‘, we shall have to pass through a number 
of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which 
work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life 
into life‘s prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the 
existence of society‖ (Stalin 1972: 68). Clearly Stalin sought to establish terms and 
conditions in this debate that would allow very little room for disagreement. By 
invoking the sacred, he was in fact closing down the debate. 
Mao similarly resorted to the sacred when he exhorted ―the people of the 
whole country to throw all their strength behind the sacred war of self-defense against 
Japan. He stated that ―our slogans are: Armed defense of Peiping, Tientsin and 
northern China! Defend our homeland to the last drop of our blood! ― (Mao 1965: 13). 
As with so much of the discourse of nationalism, sacrifice in the name of the 
collective is articulated as a sacred duty by Mao, in this instance to defend the national 
integrity of China. 
Clearly, all politicians, whether conservative political leaders such as the 
Broederbonders, religious leaders, such as the reverend Jim Jones, arch-capitalists 
such as Ronald Reagan and orthodox communists such as Stalin and Mao all resort to 
the sacred, both literally and figuratively, when the ideological chips were down. This 
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language, designed to mobilize those who it addresses, invokes the set-apart sacred, 
making any counter to this type of call difficult to utter. In such discourse, usually 
claimed to be secular in modern political times, the set-apart sacred is invoked as the 
―affective command‖, as Debray puts it (Debray 1981: 138). 
Such language is of course not material itself, in the way this term is used in 
common sense. Ideology can and usually does function as the imaginary. There are no 
clearly defined nation states. Borders are porous, particularly in modern times. 
Boundaries are essentially arbitrary, in that they could be anywhere. When a call is 
made to defend a set-apart sacred something — a territory, a people or principle — 
this entity originates in the imagination of someone and some collective. In any 
project that imagines a nation, there are those who resist such a call. This does not 
make the nation any less real once it is imagined, but it is difficult to see a territory, a 
nation of people or their language as the manifestation of the set-apart sacred. But the 
effects of ideology are material, precisely because they are symbolic. For the 
materiality of the set-apart sacred to be observed, we must return to the problem of the 
fetish.  
 
The fetish 
 
The fetish and fetishism are significant but complex and problematic concepts 
that relate to the set-apart sacred. William Pietz describes the origins of the fetish as a 
conceptual category in the discourse that developed as a result of the commercial 
relationships and cultural interactions between European and African traders on the 
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West Coast of Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Pietz 1985: 1). In the 
course of this interaction, a term that originated in Europe to describe an act of black 
magic or witchcraft was transposed onto the perceived religious or superstitious 
practices of Africans as observed by the Europeans in this dynamic relationship (Pietz 
1985: 1).  
The word fetish has its origins in the verb ‗to make‘ or ‗to do‘: fetiche in 
French, feiticio in Portuguese and facticius or facere in Latin (Ellen 1988: 214). The 
concept of the talisman, a version of the fetish, was used to describe relics of saints, 
usually their body parts by the Portuguese and from there its use was extended to the 
objects observed as being of religious significance to the inhabitants of the African 
West coast (Ellen 1988: 214). As utilized by the European traders who observed the 
religious practices of the indigenous inhabitants of Africa that they encountered while 
trading with them, the term came to mean any material object that embodied 
―religious, commercial, aesthetic and sexual values‖ (Pietz 1985: 3). Key to the 
identity of these objects was their artificial character as perceived by the observers of 
these objects and their apparent worshippers. The social value of such objects is 
determined in a particular context, in this case between these two cultures, and takes 
on a form or presence in language that has meanings to those in the encounter, but not 
necessarily the same meaning to each of the parties.  
Roy Ellen describes the cognitive processes he believes are at work in the 
development of the ―cultural representations‖ that are designated as fetishes. These are 
the ―concretization of abstractions. . . the attributation of qualities of living organisms . 
. . (the) conflation of signifier and signified. . . (and) an ambiguous relationship 
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between control of the object by people and of people by the object‖ (Ellen 1988: 8). 
Of course, the relationship appears as ambiguous, but the object cannot actually 
control people. It is the illusion of the power of the object created by the physical 
nature of the object, the anthropomorphism in its definition and the failure to correctly 
analyse the nature of the sign in and of the object that gives the object this apparent 
power. 
Bill Ellis, in a study of the rabbits foot as a fetish, has defined fetishism as ―the 
fabrication, acquisition and use of a material object invested with extraordinary 
spiritual forces, which thus becomes a metonym for an implied narrative and so a 
means of gaining control over complex social relationships (Ellis 2002: 58). Again, 
the powers are not actually invested but are believed to be. But the key point is that the 
process is a strategic one, utilized linguistically and ideologically, to manage the 
relationships between people. 
The concept of the fetish is obviously a powerful one, for as Pietz points out, it 
went on to be utilised by August Comte, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud to describe 
various aspects of society. Comte used the fetish as a theory of religion. Marx, while 
using the fetish as a theory of religion, also utilized the concept as a critique of 
capitalism (Marx 1976: 163). Freud used the concept of the fetish to characterize the 
sexual relationship some people have with inanimate objects that are seen to embody 
or represent parts of the human body or the act of sex. Fetishism, therefore, has a 
strategic and powerful place in modern theoretical and analytical discourse (Pietz 
1985: 1). A review of all of the literature dealing with the fetish is obviously not 
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possible here, but some consideration of the development of the concept is required if 
the role of the set-apart sacred is to be analysed. 
Significantly, Pietz has described Marx‘s use of the fetish as a mechanism to 
understand the ideological nature of the way in which reality is constructed for the 
human subject. Arguing that contemporary Marxists have tended to downplay the 
significance of the fetish in Marx, Pietz describes the theory as ―a critical, material 
theory of social desire. . . that presents modern political economy as a real social 
metaphysics. . . and. . . as a fantastically alien misrepresentation‖ (Pietz 1993: 129). In 
this view capitalism and all it comprises — capital, machines, land and money — is a 
system that has power over people. In other words the entire reality constructed for 
human subjects is fetishised. Hence Marx‘s use of language — describing the world in 
religious, magic and occult terms — is not just a literary strategy. It is in fact the way 
in which the world appears to those who live in it (Pietz 1993: 130). The fetish is 
therefore a crucial category for Marxism and one not very often quoted or considered 
in the discourse generally. It is the category that brings together Marx‘s critique of 
religion and of political economy. It is unfortunate that the economistic and 
productivist nature of historical materialism did not allow for the emphasis of this 
aspect of the theory generally.  
As has been pointed out, the idea of the fetish as a sign is not a new one. The 
earliest recorded theoretical description of the fetish is that of the politician Charles de 
Brosses (Ellen 1988: 214). De Brosses, Masuzawa argues, sought to utilize the fetish 
as a theory of religion. This, Masuzawa argues, was also the position taken up by E.B. 
Tylor (Masuzawa 2000: 243, 244). In this use of the fetish as a theory of religion, the 
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worship of an object and the attributing to it of powers, both over people and other 
objects, is seen as a primitive or first form of religion. Masuzawa points out that the 
term fell into disuse as a theory of religion, but was picked up in other academic 
discourse to describe the fetishism of commodities and of course sexual fetishism, but 
at the same time the concept fell in to disrepute, beings regarded as a rudimentary 
theory about rudimentary practices of primitive people (Masuzawa 2000: 247). 
Auguste Comte also used the term in relation to religions, signs and symbols 
and it is through his influence on the social sciences that the term finds its way into the 
uses by, among others, Freud (Masuzawa 2000: 249). Freud developed the concept of 
paraphilia from the fetish of Comte (Ellis 2002: 54). The sexual form of fetishism 
derives from the original religious meaning of the term but it is diagnosed when 
objects that are depersonalised and objectified arouse and sexually satisfy a subject 
that experiences this fixation. In advice that can surely only promote sexual sobriety, 
one organization concerned with the health of its members advises that ―paraphilia is a 
sexual disorder best treated with shock therapy‖ (www.minddisorders.com). Clearly, 
fetishes are not things to be trifled with. 
Marx used the concept of the fetish to explain the manner in which 
commodities, the production and exchange of which he regarded as one of the 
defining features of capitalism, had come to have a perceived super-natural existence 
and power over the workers that produce them (Marx 1976: 164). Commodity 
fetishism was thus the product of the distorted nature of capitalism. Capital and 
commodities, goods produced and money, really are expressions of the social relations 
that exist, but these are presented as things in themselves that have ―the fantastic form 
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of a relation between things‖ (Marx 1976: 165). Ellis points out that Marx considered 
the primitive religious fetishism and the fetishism of capital as not only comparable 
but equivalent, in that both projected an arbitrary value onto the object in question 
(Ellis 2002: 54).  
This economic aspect of the fetish is significant, in that it goes to the very issue 
of how the set-apart sacred is of consequence in the determination of economic values. 
These various uses of the term are also significant in that they focus attention on the 
nature of the relationship between the subject and the fetishised object, but it is the set-
apart sacred aspect of the fetish that requires consideration, as it points to the manner 
in which the set-apart sacred is central to the transformation of objects into deified 
objects and to the creation of value. 
Pietz‘s description of the origins of the fetish observes the specific materiality 
of the fetish and the social value of these objects, but he also describes how the sacred, 
the economic, the artistic and even the erotic values of the society within which the 
fetish is located and seen to have power, are concentrated in these objects. Observing 
the practices of the local people who were seen to adorn themselves with or place 
particular objects in designated places, the Europeans engaging Africans understood 
this to be a practice that was based in pagan superstition and witchcraft. Of course, 
what was clearly the case but left unsaid, was not the strangeness of these practices 
and behaviour, for they surely were presented in forms unfamiliar to the Europeans. 
But the recognition of the similarity between these fetishes and related practices and 
the religious and other talismans commonly in use in Europe must have been, 
subliminally or unconsciously, significant.  
178 
 
Pietz has elsewhere argued that the fetish has to be seen in the context of the 
colonial conquest of territories and the depiction of it as the antithesis of civilization 
(Pietz 1985: 55). Given the development of the concept in relationships of trade and 
the way in which the religious worldview of the European traders shaped their 
responses to those people they encountered, this is crucial to understanding the 
significance of the fetish as a conceptual category. 
In the eyes of the European traders, the fetish was a dark force, related to 
human sacrifice and the unknown (Pietz 1985). Pietz describes how the attention of 
these traders was drawn to the myriad objects worn by their counterparts or located in 
particular places, that appeared to have some supernatural powers and as their 
relationship with the Africans developed, the various objects and places that were held 
in similar dread, even if for different reasons, such as fear of the Africans themselves. 
But the fetish also acted as a mediating force in the context of exchanges not just 
between the Europeans and the Africans on a racial basis, but also between these as 
Christians, Jews, Muslims and those who practiced indigenous African religion 
(Freinkel 2002: 118). 
Whatever their misgivings about the practices of fetishists, the Europeans 
utilised the concept to ensure that terms of trade could be developed and 
institutionalized (Graeber 2005: 124). Graeber has argued that the fetish as an object is 
the product of social creativity, first as an object within the local communities who 
develop these as a social force for securing relationships within their own 
communities, but significantly, the fetish also came to play a role in the relationship 
between the locals and the strangers that came to the shores of Africa to trade.  
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In an interesting critique of Marx, Graeber makes the following points. He recognizes 
the argument Pietz makes about the significance of the materiality of the fetish, but 
points out that what created such a complexity for the Europeans in this relationship 
was not the difference between the fetish and their religious beliefs, but the obvious 
similarities between the fetish and social institutions such as commercial and political 
contracts and agreements that were commonly practiced in Western Europe (Graeber 
2005: 114). In the local communities where the Europeans observed the fetish, one of 
its main functions was as the guarantor of contracts. These were materialised and 
signified in the fetish object (Graeber 2005: 117). They thus served as bearers of 
economic value, not dissimilar to money, which is arguably a contract. 
In the context of the slave trade, patriarchy, relationships of debt and 
obligation and the space violated by the colonial intruders, the meaning of the fetish 
must have been significant, giving rise to both the way in which the category was 
deployed by the locals and engaged by the strangers. What appeared strange to the 
Europeans was the manner in which the contract was sealed by such symbols as the 
locals utilised, often blood or the threat of death. But, as Graeber points out, these 
rituals are echoed in the blood contracts of capitalist trade, not least of all in the slave 
trade itself, in the fear of debt and the consequences of economic failure in Europe at 
the time (Graeber 2005: 125). It must be of significance that the slave trade was 
ultimately about the sale of local African people to Europeans and other people in 
faraway places. After such sales, the unfortunate victims of this trade literally 
vanished from the communities they came from. What more powerful consequence of 
a contract could there be? 
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In the collective process of negotiating the social arrangements that are 
materialized and objectified in the fetish, Graeber argues that deities are being 
constructed (Graeber 2005: 126). In other words, the fetish is a God in the making. 
This may well be the case, but what is of greater significance is the fact that the social 
creativity he describes is possible. It is only because the terms and conditions that are 
produced in this process are of the set-apart sacred that the fetish can play the role it 
does. 
Given what has been argued about the creation of set-apart sacred objects, be 
they physical objects, symbols, signs or even individuals, and given the physical, 
psychological and social causes of objectification, alienation and reification, it has to 
be understood that fetishism is an unavoidable consequence of the manner in which 
humans classify, categorise and order their world. Inherent in the subject-object 
relationship is a relationship of alienation. This, as has been argued, is defined by the 
corporeal nature of humans, that is, the spatiality of human embodiment, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 98). Catherine Bell has pointed out the 
significance of the body for ritual (Bell 1992: 97-117). In her description of the 
manner in which the body and ritual are interrelated, Bell makes clear the manner in 
which physiology determines how space is occupied and how their bodies orientate 
humans within this. The body is the primary entity within which and through which 
and even upon which the subject practices ritualisation. Given the significance of 
ritual for the production, exchange and consumption of the set-apart sacred, it is no 
accident that central to the making of the fetish is ritual activity. Given the fact of 
human embodiment, it is also not surprising that other subjects are among the most 
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fetishised of all things. This is demonstrated in the many ways in which human beings 
live their existence through other people – their immediate family, their loved ones, 
those they work and play with, and even those they fear.  
Any object, including another person, has a degree of power over others. Hegel 
understood this in relation to the master-slave relationship (Hegel 1997: 116-119). In 
this instance the fetish exists in the mind of the slave, with the master having power 
over him, as well as in the mind of the master, for without the slave the act of 
domination would cease to be possible. In such a relationship the objectification and 
alienation that are essential to the fetish are clearly articulated. 
Foucault also argues something along these lines in relation to power in the 
discourses that make up social relationships generally (Foucault: 1976: 64, 1967: 173, 
1977; 195-196). In each case of the relationships Foucault describes - patient and 
doctor, prisoner and warder, teacher and student - the relationship itself is fetishised as 
the counterparts are seen to have a power over the subject in question. Given that 
subjectivity is relative, that alienation and objectification are unavoidable aspects of 
the human condition, it is no wonder that the fetish is as ubiquitous as it is argued to 
be. 
Baudrillard describes how the system of objects in capitalism develops a logic 
and an existence as an independent linguistic-semiotic system, reifying and fetishising 
signs and the objects signified (Baudrillard 1996). Although Baudrillard is not so 
much in favour of the term fetish, it is clear that what he describes in relation to the 
system of objects is an elaboration of Marx‘s description of the world where 
commodities exist as fantastic forms and relationships. 
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This system organises what Baudrillard calls social difference, the ways in 
which meaning and location of subjects in society is expressed, whether in class or 
other terms. The effect of this is that commodities are produced as signs but also signs 
are produced as commodities, effectively creating a political economy of signs. Since 
these commodities and signs are all objectified and invested with powers within the 
system, it stands to reason that any system of signs, that is, any language, by its very 
nature, is fetishistic. 
Everything has a meaning in a system of signs, although these meanings are 
arbitrary. What gives particular things the meaning they do have is an agreement 
reached by a social compact, or hegemony based on particular power relations. 
Meanings can vary and be contested, but they are necessarily the product of a society 
and the relationships in it (Barthes 1972: 109). 
The point about the fetish is that it has materiality, is a physical presence, and 
is engendered with prohibitions and permissions as well as meanings and 
interpretations. Unlike other signs, the immediacy of the fetish is apparent to the 
observers of the object, as are the consequences of breaking the social compact that 
accompanies it. The economic nature of the fetish is that it gives voice to the 
incommensurability of values that arise out of two or more systems of value 
interfacing with each other. This is the only way in which value can be attributed to 
objects when the parties to a trading relationship face each other with totally different 
schemes of value. It is notable that in the records of the trading relationships of such a 
nature, both parties consider the decisions of their counterparts as irrational. For 
instance, Africans defined gold as the God of Europeans and the Europeans defined 
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trinkets and similar things as fetishes of the Africans. Both parties fail to grasp the 
scarcity or rarity of the objects in question as being of significance, no matter how 
common the items may be to them. 
The materiality of these set-apart sacred objects arises in other forms that bear 
a striking resemblance to the fetish. Crisis cults or cargo cults have their origins in 
similar relationships between social collectives and strangers who enter into economic 
relationships with them, trading goods and establishing new relationships that either 
cause crisis or, alternatively, when a social crisis occurs organically in that collective, 
find expression in this relationship (Lawrence 1964: 232). Due to the relationship 
between the economic partners and the arrival of one party with goods at intermittent 
intervals, it is a short leap of logic to imagine that these strangers can be induced into 
arriving with more of the same precious cargo. Much has been said with regard to 
these crisis cults, but what is significant is the fetishised relationship with the bearers 
of the goods and the fetishised objects that are sought after. In the same way that 
Europeans misunderstood the fetish, the local people in these crisis cults 
misunderstand the origin of the goods in question. What they probably got right was 
the process of valorization, often guessing that these goods required little or no 
physical labour to be manifested by those who carried them (Lawrence 1964: 248). 
Lisa Freinkel has pointed out the criticism of the term fetish by Baudrillard, 
who argues that the fetish has itself become a fetish, due to its fungibility as a term  
(Freinkel 2002: 115-116). Pietz acknowledges this weakness of the concept among 
others, but he correctly points out that the fact that the term is so widely used is not a 
measure of its lack of clarity. It is worth considering that the term fetish is so widely 
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used because it aptly describes what is encountered in relation to the subject-object 
relationship and the fact that fetishism is pervasive.  
Tomoko Masuzawa has pointed out the fact that the term is possibly ―too 
liberally expansive and uncritically inclusive‖ to be of much analytical use (Masuzawa 
2000: 243). Despite this, the term pervades the literature of the Victorian era, in 
Masuzawa‘s view mainly because of the era being one of the rise of the commodity. 
But, as Masuzawa points out, there is very little work that has been done in terms of a 
theory of the fetish as religion in the making (Masuzawa 2000: 242). 
There are many objects that might be regarded as fetishes. Among the most 
obvious are our bodies, to which much of our energy is focused in either preserving or 
improving at almost any cost. If that is not an obvious example, the amount of money 
spent on cosmetics, for decorating our bodies, is. In one financial year in the USA 
alone the figure for cosmetics purchased was US$8 billion (Anup Shah 2009, ―Poverty 
Facts and Stats, www.global issues.org/article 26). The fact that adornments and 
decorations to the human body are deemed so necessary and desirable is a clear case 
of objects having a perceived power over human subjects and also the power of such 
objects to dictate the actions of human. 
In South Africa over the recent period there have been a number of examples 
of the fetish and fetishised relationships and activities, particularly in the political life 
of this emerging democracy. Development itself is a fetish. The concept of 
development is constructed out of a number of different elements; the role of 
government in the economy, investment by the private sector and the idea that this 
process will fundamentally change the lives of the majority of poor and working class 
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men, women and children. In truth, despite many iterations of plans to ensure 
development - the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, the Presidential Jobs Summit 
Agreements and the Growth and Development Summit - all indicators show that 
unemployment has increased, poverty is on the rise and that infrastructure and services 
continue to decline in terms of quantity as well as quality. Clearly the power attributed 
to development has been misplaced, but that does not stop the idea of development 
dominating the discourse of government. 
Technology is arguably a fetish. People all over the world are daily convinced 
to be on-line, digitally connected, to use mobile technology and to ensure that 
automation is increasingly utilized to do the things that people can or used to. One of 
the objectives of all this technology is surely to cut down on the labour performed by 
people and to ensure improved productivity and greater profitability, within the 
capitalist system, at least. In fact, with the economic restructuring that such technology 
brings, people arguably work more and possibly for less. These technological objects 
can arguably be said to have the perceived effect of immiseration, when in fact it is the 
productive and social relations within which technology is deployed that determine 
such effects and they do so on behalf of other human beneficiaries of this effect. 
There is another feature of these fetishised relationships and phenomenon. 
Cargo cults, thought to be the preserve of ignorant, parochial communities cut off 
from mainstream, global culture, are alive and well. The lottery fever, where people 
are led to believe and clearly want to believe that by spending a small amount of 
money, they can win big, is almost universal, as are casinos. This idea that money will 
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be spontaneously generated is not new. But that it has become part of mainstream 
culture is surely significant (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). 
Similarly, events such as the 2010 Football World Cup have many similarities 
to cargo cults. The prevailing or popular view of the Football World Cup in South 
Africa is that it will bring investment, tourists, money and opportunities. Just like the 
cargo cults as classically described, outside powers, in this case the Federation of 
International Football Associations, FIFA, are bringing the cargo. All the locals need 
to do is observe the rules and sit and wait. The cargo will come. 
The fetish then is the term used to identify what is one product of the 
determination of the set-apart sacred and its materialization in society. The fetish is 
therefore one form of a system for managing the sacred that combines the material, the 
symbolic and the imaginary within it. The fetish serves to illustrate that all these 
systems for managing the set-apart sacred have these aspects, but they are covert or 
occluded and need to be unmasked. The fetish is essentially an object invested with 
imaginary power through the process by which it comes to symbolize some or another 
social compact. In the course of negotiating the relationships in any collective, or 
between individuals, agreements are reached that are recorded. This recordal, whether 
in the form of a single symbol, a totem or a written contract, is then seen to bind the 
parties to the agreement. This agreement places both rights and obligations on the 
parties and is protected by both inducements as well as by sanctions. In essence, any 
commodity or any sign is a fetish, in that once it is taken to signify both the signified 
and itself, it is reified and endowed with a power of its own and thus fetishised.  
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The fetish grounds the sacred in the material and at the same time the sacred 
socializes the fetish, giving it an agreed value that is then expressed in a number of 
forms, as social, political or economic capital. From this basis, it is not difficult to 
imagine how fetishised objects become coveted, as well as feared, and are thus 
exchanged to ensure that social arrangements within and between communities are 
preserved. It is a clear demonstration that exchange proceeds commodity production, 
but follows the production of symbolic property.  
Given the predominance of capitalism over all other forms of social interaction, it 
should come as no surprise that of all the forms of the fetish, it is the most powerful 
commodity of all, money, that is the most prevalent, the most potent and the most 
revealing of the set-apart sacred. 
 
Money 
 
Money, as a commodity, as a means of exchange, and as a sign of value is the 
ultimate fetish, due to its multi-faceted character, its fungibility and its utility in the 
ultimate control of all of the systems for managing the sacred. Like ideology and the 
fetish, money functions at a material, a symbolic and at an imaginary level. It is 
therefore the medium through which the set-apart sacred can be transubstantiated. 
Money literally changes everything. It commodifies all relationships and things. 
Money reveals the sacred and the profane in the category of the set-apart 
sacred. The description of money as filth, as dirt and as shit is also well documented. 
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This is of significance because it is instructive of the ambiguous nature of money. On 
the one hand, it is valued as being symbolic of freedom and of choice. Wealth is 
revered, even in religions. On the other hand, it is not just any money that is 
acceptable and the wrong money or money in all its guises can be negatively 
described.  
Money has been portrayed as everything from human excreta to human 
freedom. In a review of money in Victorian England, Christopher Herbert 
demonstrates the contradictory relationship between the religious notion of money as a 
taboo object and its desired character as a modern capitalist tool of facilitation 
(Herbert 2002: 190). Described as anathema to Christian values on the one hand, and 
as polluting excreta on the other, none of these depictions has had the effect of 
tempering the desire for money. 
The amount of money available in the world today is staggering. In 2006 the 
world produced $US48.6 trillion worth of goods and services. At the same time stock 
markets were worth $UD50.6 trillion, bonds $US67.9 trillion, leveraged buyouts were 
worth $US753 billion and all derivatives traded were worth $US400 trillion (Ferguson 
2008: 5-6). One has to ask, where did all this money come from? 
Money, like the fetish, means many different things to many different people. 
Variously described as a medium of exchange, a store of value, a commodity, as 
labour power expressed in a sign, money is a slippery theoretical concept, much like 
the real thing that eludes so many. Numismatics, the study of money and its history, is 
a subject much has been written on. Money in the form of coins, J. K. Galbraith 
argues, has been mentioned in the Hindu epics, dating it before the mention of it by 
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Herodotus as early as the eighth century B.C. (Galbraith 1975: 18). The 
Mesopotamians also had tablets that recorded debts, arguably a form of money as an 
early promissory note, as early as the second century B.C. (Ferguson 2008: 26). Given 
the identification of money in the form of shells and as other commodities in various 
accounts of ethnographers, it is arguable that money is as old as economic exchange 
itself. 
Money in the form of coins has been found in various places — India, Egypt, 
Greece and Iraq — dating back to the eighth century B.C. If there is one common 
theme running through the history of money it is the question of its authenticity. Apart 
from coins, Galbraith identifies ―cattle, shells, whisky and stones‖ being used as 
money, but for all intents and purposes, until recent times, metal and precious metal in 
particular has acted as money (Galbraith 1975: 17). 
It is significant to note that there are broadly two different views on the role of 
money and its origins. The one regards it as a development to ease the complexities of 
barter and the other regards money as a social relation that gave rise to markets, 
exchange and even the production of commodities (Smithin 2000: 6). 
Whatever the origins of money, its development through spurring on the 
colonial conquests of the Americas and Africa in the search for precious metals 
arguably started the process of the globalization of markets. The resultant impact on 
Europe, inflation, has also been well documented (Galbraith 1975: 22-23, Ferguson 
2008: 27). The amount of silver appropriated from the South American conquests is 
said to have drastically caused the devaluation of the currencies in Europe. 
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But one of the consequences of this devaluation was the formalisation of 
banking and the creation of promissory notes that went with it. It is at this point that 
money really begins to dominate economies. Banking can be traced back to the 
Roman era and certainly in the Italian Renaissance, the creation of money credit is 
notable (Ferguson 2008: 42). The explosion of money as a medium of exchange is 
therefore directly related to the era of mercantile capitalism. 
Since there have always been problems with the authenticity of money, 
whether in the form of adulterated precious metal, in the prospect of forgeries or in 
terms of the agreed value of a particular currency in relation to others, getting a 
guarantee of authenticity has been a priority (Galbraith 1975: 20). In this regard, it is 
clear that money is a matter of belief, since it requires a willingness to accept the bona 
fides of the government, a ruler or some authority that must have credibility (Ferguson 
2008: 30). Another way of putting it is that money is a relationship, a process and a 
sign that is secured by social agreement. Given that anything can serve as money, 
including nothing these days with cyberspace money, money is the purest form of the 
sign. It is a powerful code, but also a commodity. It is perhaps the one object that 
actually functions as Baudrillard describes all commodities to function. 
The creation of banking and the removal of the gold standard had the effect of 
hugely increasing the supply of money and this through increasing the amount of 
credit available. If anything is responsible for the growth of capitalism, it is the supply 
of money itself, for money does not sit still. The simple accounting formula that is 
applied where banks hold only a portion of the deposits they have taken and lend out 
money they do not have, that is they create money, seems completely ridiculous if one 
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thinks about it. One unit a banker holds allows them loan out nine! But this alchemy is 
only possible because depositors believe the banks can pay them. When they cannot, a 
run on banks follows very quickly and the alchemist‘s sleight of hand reveals them to 
be a conjurer.  
Marx defined money as being a commodity, albeit one of a special kind (Marx 
1976: 229). He also described it as being a unique social relationship and as appearing 
to have sacred characteristics (Marx 1976: 167). Marx recognized the set-apart sacred 
significance of money, referring to it variously as alchemy, as a fetish, as an illusion 
and as the concentrated expression of labour power (Marx 1976: 162).  In Marx‘s 
view, it is in relation to money, the purest sign, that the social relations are most 
clearly expressed under capitalism (Marx 1970: 176).  Money, a commodity that 
becomes a common store of value and a means of exchange, does so by being a 
symbol or a representation of socially necessary labour power (Marx, 1970: 188). 
Abstract social labour is given status only in so far as it is objectified in a commodity 
(Marx, 1970: 164). But in creating commodities, humanity is confronted with the 
―metaphysical subtleties and the theological niceties‖ that these objects generate 
(Marx 1970: 163). What is produced becomes an entity with a dual characteristic, that 
of being a material object and that of being an entity that exists as one stored with 
potential and loaded with significance‖ (Marx 1970: 165). With commodities, ―the 
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their 
own ― (Marx 1970: 165).  Marx goes on to state that ―value transforms every product 
into a social hieroglyphic‖ (Marx 1970: 167).  
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The effect of money is to create entities and their representation that have the 
same characteristics as deities. Marx best describes this creation of symbolic property 
with respect to the creation of money. As noted, for Marx, money is a commodity with 
a unique character (Marx, 1970: 186, 188).  But the creation of money as a means of 
exchange, as a store of value, as a symbol of all other commodities is occasioned by a 
number of processes. Money first arises in the form of some tangible commodity, 
whether gold, silver or shells, and because the value of all other commodities can be 
measured in terms of this particular commodity it therefore becomes a medium of 
exchange (Marx 1970: 189). Money is able to perform this function because it is 
firstly an expression of objectified human labour (Marx 1970: 188). The expression of 
the value of all other commodities in one commodity, such as gold, is, ―a purely ideal 
act‖ (Marx 1970: 190). Money is therefore the ―absolutely alienable commodity, 
because it is all other commodities divested of their shape, the product of their 
universal alienation‖ (Marx 1970: 205). Money is therefore first and foremost a 
symbolic phenomenon.  
Money arises only once counting and accounting develop for the purposes of 
exchange. Money, it turns out, is significantly associated in early societies with 
religion because only the literate, often priests, carried out this function. Marx regards 
gold as the Holy Grail of capitalist society (Marx 1970: 230). The relationship 
between money and numbers is also a mystical one, numbers being seen as 
representations of the sublime and divine nature of the universe. 
Marx describes the very circulation of money as being an act of magic or 
alchemy (Marx 1970: 229). Interestingly, he points out the confusion that arises from 
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the fact that commodities first are represented by another commodity in exchange, for 
example gold, but later, as the money system develops, by a mere symbol of that 
commodity itself, in the form of paper money. He states that ―the fact that money can 
be, in certain functions, replaced by mere symbols of itself, gives rise to (the) mistaken 
notion that it is itself a mere symbol‖ (Marx 1970: 185). Marx describes money 
variously as ―cabbalistic signs‖ (Marx 1970: 165), or as ―possessing magic‖ (Marx 
1970: 169).  Money is really the most potent economic sign of capitalism. It is also a 
sign of many other things, but in capitalist society it is money more than anything else 
that shapes the relations between people and other people and between people and 
objects. 
The fact that Marx sees through money in the manner that he does begs the 
question as to why he did not explore that dual characteristic of money any further. 
Perhaps that was not his interest, but had he, the theory of the commodity cycle would 
look somewhat different. Graeber points out that money, in certain instances, was 
worn as an adornment by chiefs or kings in pre-capitalist dominated societies (Graeber 
1996). Graeber‘s point is essentially that money develops socially not as a product of 
the economy, but as the set-apart sacred which then becomes utilized in economic 
transactions. Therefore, the relationship between money and the sacred predates that 
of the economic use of money, making it a symbol adapted from sacred utility to 
economic utility (Sutton 2004: 377). The question that has to be asked is whether in 
that adaptation, the symbolic relationship between money and the set-apart sacred is 
maintained.  
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Mauss also described the social and sacred nature of exchange, including the 
use of certain objects as money (Mauss 1966: 70). He pointed out that shells that were 
used as money were treated with great reverence and were believed to have certain 
powers. Again, this primacy of objects endowed with powers, through their set-apart 
nature and their proximity to political and religious power, is significant, for it reveals 
the pre-economic, archaic and primordial nature of money. 
If money was given its status not by labour but by social rituals that set it apart 
as sacred, this would also explain its dual nature. In other words, a particular 
commodity, because of it fungible character, is designated as set apart from other 
objects and becomes utilised as a medium of exchange because of its set-apart sacred 
characteristics. Such an object, fetishised in this manner, obviously has the assumed 
power to change the form of all objects into commodities. But this would make money 
an expression not of concentrated labour power, but of the value of all commodities by 
virtue of its set-apart nature. 
Money can therefore be regarded as a pure sign and certainly, with the advent 
of paper money and electronic money, that is clearly what it has become. Money only 
works or has value because it is agreed to be of value by those engaged in the 
economic transactions where it is utilised. This is exactly the process of designating 
the set-apart sacred. In late capitalism, but as is recorded, many times before, the value 
of money has been seen to disappear virtually overnight when there is a loss of 
confidence in it. This loss of confidence cannot be attributed to a loss of value as 
created by or through labour-power. In fact, economists talk of ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ 
money. Good money is that which is believed to have more value. Bad money can be 
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anything that does not have a value as high as it previously did. We have witnessed in 
recent times, ‗bad‘ money in the form of mortgages that are unpaid and derivatives 
based on these, being isolated because this money is regarded as being ‗toxic‘ 
(Krugman 2008: 175). A better example of the sacred becoming the profane would be 
hard to find 
There are examples of private money systems that essentially create money out 
of nothing. Communities who seek to promote local economic development or green 
trading have developed money to ensure closed systems of exchange. These systems 
invent a currency and through recording transactions between people, allow exchange 
to take place. Ithaca in the United States is one of the most famous and longest 
existing private money systems (www.ithicahours.org). This is clear evidence for the 
fact that money can be created out of anything, by agreement, just as banks literally 
create more money out of some money (Ferguson: 2009: 63). 
It has been argued that there are other forms of capital than financial, namely 
human and social. But under capitalism all of these are ultimately expressed in a 
monetarised form, especially if they are to be of practical consequence. 
The related concepts of risk and insurance are instructive as they also reveal 
the arbitrary nature of determining value. Money has been closely related to financial 
bubbles and to war and revolution (Ferguson 2009). But whatever the effect of these 
valuations, devaluations and revaluations of money, it is instructive to learn that 
financial institutions make money out of these transactions whichever way they go. 
Roger Friedland has shown how ―foreign‖ money can be a source of great 
anxiety for religious nationalists in particular, but arguably this is a more generalized 
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problem of nationalism (Friedland 2002: 401). The fact that money can be endowed 
with nationalist sentiment demonstrates the extent to which its fetishisation dominates 
its deemed characteristics. How else can the intransigence of a country such as the 
United Kingdom in relation to accepting the Euro as a currency be understood? The 
Pound Sterling is no more or less in the control of the Bank of England than the Euro, 
but the fetish of a national currency trumps any and all financial logic. 
An interesting theme with regards to money relates to transgressions of the 
value of money through what has been described as the occult economy, gambling and 
crime (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 301). These transgressions give rise to money 
described variously as hot, dirty, or fast and the relationship to money in this regard 
takes on a new level of ambiguity. They also reveal the extent to which people are able 
to imagine the possibility of conjuring up money out of nothing, winning it, taking it 
away from somebody else and even destroying it in the hope that this will result in 
even more money coming their way.  
Galbraith points out that money is able to induce a sense of the supernatural in 
to any relationship or society (Galbraith 1975: 72). This relates to its seemingly 
inexplicable power to act as a medium of exchange, a store of value, its form in 
precious metal, alternatively in paper and nowadays even just as a numeral in 
cyberspace. 
If everything is a fetish, including the fetish as a category itself, what gives 
anything meaning that is not the cause of alienation, psychological discomfort and 
anxiety, is arguably money. Money is the mediator in capitalism. It is the set-apart 
sacred in a most powerful material form. It is this form of the fetish, money, that most 
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graphically reveals the set-apart sacred, the ambiguity of the set-apart sacred and the 
social creativity that underpins it. Because it is seen as the answer to everything, it is a 
panacea and the most powerful of all things, but it is always elusive. 
David Chidester has described the relationship between blood, money, 
gangsters of the Cape Flats and the United States of America (Chidester 2005: 113-
124). This study in the political economy of the sacred sets out the truly fetishised 
nature of money where it is seem to liberate, to sentence to death and to transform the 
nature of reality itself as it globalises the market. 
Money is also regarded as the measure of civilization, with barter representing 
the primitive by comparison (Mander 1991: 216). In the conquests of colonialists in 
the Americas, Africa and Australia, money was the tool by which colonialists out-
organised and defeated the indigenous people, even assigning a value in monetary 
terms to human lives. Settlers were able to collect a bounty for the scalps of Khoi 
people in South Africa, Aboriginal people in Australia and Native Americans in North 
and South America. In the drive to make more money, these practices facilitated the 
genocide of whole nations. 
In modern capitalism, money has continued to dictate the politics of 
developing countries, whether through the rules of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, prescribing to countries what their policies should be, or in 
financing coup d etat on behalf of multi-national corporations (Stiglitz 2002, Chapman 
2007). 
Polyani argues that money is not a commodity, but an ―essential element of 
industry‖ (Polyani 1957: 72). He describes it as an outcome of industrialization. While 
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money has clearly changed in terms of its nature and character, such a view is not 
sustainable. Money, as Marx clearly explains, and as the set-apart sacred aspect of its 
creation shows, is an entity that is accorded its value by agreement between those who 
utilize it. Of course, the value can be said to be fictitious or imaginary, but the effect is 
simultaneously symbolic and real. 
Adam Smith regarded money as having no intrinsic value, describing it as 
merely oil to the wheels of capitalism (Smith 1993: 178). If that is the case, one 
wonders what he would have made of phenomena such as Ponzi schemes, the most 
incredible one being that perpetrated by Bernie Madoff. The victims of this scheme, 
through their own folly, have collectively lost $US65 billion dollars (Arvedlund 2009: 
6). There is no amount of convincing that will make these people believe that what 
they have lost has no intrinsic value. 
The issue of the abundance of money is significant. It surely is related to the 
issue of the surplus of signification in general.  While physical commodities and 
services can only be created through the activities of people working in a cooperative 
manner across the productive, exchange related and consumptive spheres of the 
economy, money, as has been argued above, can be created by fiat. Given that it 
retains its value by social agreement, this should pose no problem. In reality, it is clear 
that the value of money relates directly to the supply of it (Keynes  2006). This points 
to the arbitrary nature of value and the resultant problematic of its expression in the 
sign form of money. If this is the case, then it is no wonder that the economy is 
likened to a casino (Costello, Michie and Milne 1989), and that fears of observers and 
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commentators on what has been done to obviate the 2009 global financial crisis are 
such that they anticipate continued turbulence and economic recession. 
This fetish, money, is unique and powerful. It is at once both the material of 
capitalism and the purest expression of the ideology of the system. There is no 
conceivable way in which modern capitalism could function without money as it does 
today. Neither is it possible to contemplate any alternative to capitalism without the 
use of money in the modern form. What then does that leave by way of the potential to 
transform society? With money so much in abundance, yet so unevenly distributed, it 
is no wonder that one evangelist, the Reverend Ike, has insisted that it is not money 
but the lack of money that is the root of all evil (Chidester 2005: 112). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
By way of some conclusions based on the arguments given above, the 
following points are put forward. The set-apart sacred as a category is central to 
human social existence. Religion, as a conceptual category may seem obvious, but 
only at a superficial level. A reasoned critique demonstrates its lack of clarity, focus 
and efficacy as a conceptual category and its contested status as an actual human 
activity and institution. 
The set-apart sacred is a material category that provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding religion, but also politics and the economy. As such, this category is an 
effective one that demystifies ideas of the supernatural, the occult, spiritual realms and 
the like, as well as the idealist notion that ideas have force of effect on the material 
world through some inexplicable means, by providing a materialist theory for why 
people have and believe ideas that are obviously imaginary and yet these ideas can 
have a material impact in the world. The existence of such seemingly obvious and true 
ideas is due to the relationship between the real and the imaginary spheres of our 
existence. This relationship is mediated through the category of the symbolic and in 
the case of the set-apart sacred, through symbolic property. The set-apart sacred assists 
by unmasking these ideas, allowing what seems mystical, supernatural, holy and 
significant in an exceptional manner to be considered alongside other social 
phenomena, such as language and history, to name but two examples that seem to 
resonate with the concept. 
201 
 
Symbolic property is produced through the process of the determination of the 
set-apart sacred. All semiotic systems — languages, religions, ideologies and 
economies — function through the deployment of symbolic property. Hence the 
possibility of and the need to develop a critique of the political economy of the set-
apart sacred. 
Historical materialism, regarded as the exemplar of the study of political 
economy, is shown to be idealist, biased towards production as a category at the 
expense of exchange and consumption and economistic in its perspective. The set-
apart sacred empowers the historical materialist method to be re-materialised, to be 
located as a critique of production, exchange and consumption, as well as developed 
as a theory that offers a critique of religion, politics and the economy.  
The economy is a development of the set-apart sacred as a category, with 
exchange being the primary activity that enables social interaction between people or 
groups of people. While production and consumption as related activities are of great 
significance, exchange is the dynamic process that lays the foundation for 
development, for the movement from rudimentary economic activity to commodity 
production and capitalism in the modern form. This re-thinking of historical 
materialism opens up the possibility of changing the bias in theory and in practice that 
leads to political and economic distortions, such as regarding the role of wage or paid 
labour as the source of all economic value to the manner in which money and markets 
are managed. 
The category of necessary social labour is established as the key process 
through which value is created. Truly socialised labour, that is, labour that is geared 
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towards social, political and economic productivity, is necessary to create the cohesion 
and social stability that must prevail if peaceful development is to take place. To that 
extent, the Marxist category of socially necessary labour is a limited one, focused only 
on the production of material goods and services. Necessary social labour is a 
definition of labour that includes socially necessary labour, but also all the unpaid, 
unrecognised labour that is central to reproduction of societies most precious 
commodity, human beings. This includes the production of all symbolic property – 
found in the forms language, culture, religion, politics and the economy – that is 
generally not accorded a monetary value but without which the reproduction of society 
is not conceivable. 
The category of ritual is established as the key process through which 
necessary social labour has the effects it does. Set-apart activities and actions — the 
stuff of religion, politics and economics — is mediated through the process of ritual. 
In these processes of ritualisation, value is produced, assigned material existence and 
is made fungible, by focusing the attention of people on to the particular markedness 
of an object, a relationship or an activity itself. This assigned value is made tangible in 
the form of the object itself, or in a sign of the object. Ritual is therefore work. 
There are many possible forms of systems for managing the set-apart sacred 
can take, but three categories are of particular significance, ideology, the fetish and 
money. These illustrate and elucidate the set-apart sacred in the world. Ideology 
reveals the power of set-apart sacred language. The fetish reveals the set-apart sacred 
nature of significant or valuable objects. Money, the most potent expression of 
ideology and the fetish, reveals itself for what it is in effect, the most powerful deity. 
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The consequences of the set-apart sacred in society set limits for 
transformation in society. Any conception of transformation, no matter how 
revolutionary, must be premised on the understanding that to transform society a new 
ideology, new relationships between people and objects and between each other and a 
socialized conception of value need to be developed, at the very least. In other words, 
humans need to better understand the limitations of their biological, psychological and 
social construction if they are to overcome these in the pursuit of a better, more just 
and more sustainable future. Given the power of the capitalist economy, the question 
arises as to whether this is possible. Socialist experiments, particularly those premised 
on creating an oasis of socialism in a desert of capitalism, have all failed. At least one 
of the reasons has been the inability of the socialist system to overcome these 
challenges to date. It may well be that this is not possible unless the entire global 
system is changed simultaneously. Patterns of development to date make that 
possibility an unlikely one. 
The set-apart sacred can probably be re-socialised, but the fact that it has these 
aspects to it—the material, the symbolic and the imaginary—means that in the course 
of this re-socialisation, a critical aspect of that process must be the unmasking of the 
set-apart sacred and the destruction of value created. Such an unmasking places on the 
agenda the fact that a large part of the processes that dominate politics, economics, 
religion and society generally, are arbitrary and can be decided upon by social 
agreement. This removes many constraints to possible transformation but may well 
add others, in that arguments for or against particular decisions cannot be based on 
claims by one class or category of people very easily. 
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Superficial change, that does not take in to account the material processes of 
the set-apart sacred and the ideological power of the category, is bound to only take 
critique so far in realizing its objectives. A real critique of religion and capitalism must 
recognise the relationship between these two systems for managing the set-apart 
sacred and by identifying the origins of this relationship, empower activists to change 
the nature of both. 
Value, if it is to be managed and not allowed to destabilize society, needs to be 
re-socialised. Historically, this has been done through the ritual destruction or 
redistribution of goods through institutions such as the pot-latch and sacrifice. One of 
the features of capitalism is the continued hoarding and monopolisation of value in the 
form of money and capital. This destabilizes the system. It distorts power 
relationships, the functioning of the circulation of commodities and of value itself, 
creating uncertainty and as a result, periodic crises. One issue worth considering is 
whether or not modern forms of the pot-latch or sacrifice could be beneficial to 
societies and to the process of re-socialisation. This conclusion is echoed in the calls 
for developed countries to write-off the debts of third world countries, or for the now 
quarantined ―toxic assets‖ that were the trigger for the latest economic crisis to be 
written off. 
The questions such conclusions raise are profound. Can the critique of a 
general political economy be articulated in such a manner that it allows people to 
understand the nature of religion, politics and economics? Since the power of the set-
apart sacred in the form of money is so real and entrenched, it is arguable that this task 
is an immense one. An intellectual critique of the set-apart sacred may be important 
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for mobilising intellectuals, but it is not clear that this could mobilise the masses to 
change the world. 
If historical materialism is idealistic, productivist and economistic, what does 
this mean for the programs of socialist, communist and workers parties around the 
world? Their manifest failure in advancing the cause of socialism needs no reiteration, 
but what programmatic alternative is there, other than intellectual critique? Once the 
task of re-materialising historical materialism is accomplished, social transformation 
may well be on the agenda, but this requires an end to elitism, an end to all 
privatisation of the social wealth and value in existence and a conception of co-
operation that balances the need for social stability with the need to allow freedom for 
the human subject. This task is one that may well be described as the human condition, 
for it was ever thus. 
Finally, the academic study of religion, an important and productive institution 
to date, is revealed to be at a cross-road by the category of the set-apart sacred. Does it 
take the easy route of accepting some of the criticisms made of it, but soldier on as an 
academic category that will no doubt employ many people, but to little or no practical 
consequence except for the intellectuals in the academy itself? Or does it grasp the 
challenge of the set-apart sacred as a category and look its Gods and Devils in the eye, 
claim them as its own creations and assist humanity in demystifying the world? 
A political economy of the set-apart sacred, like Marx‘s ground-breaking 
critique of political economy, can liberate the next generation of scholars and activists. 
Understanding the significance and the crucial, material nature of the set-apart sacred 
is the key to humankind‘s freedom – from alienation, objectification, fetishism and 
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ultimately indoctrination and exploitation. For that reason alone, it is a key task for 
scholars in the academy. 
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